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Summary 
This dissertation is an evaluation of some of the basic assumptions of the literature 
on governance and their utility for understanding a specific case - that of Mexico. It 
argues that Mexican municipalities, like their counterparts in Europe and the United 
States, have experienced a change towards a way of policy-making based on broader 
policy-networks, fragmentation in governmental and societal bodies, participation of 
an increasing number of self-organised actors, and the resulting blurring boundaries 
between the public and private spheres. Mexican urban municipalities are evolving 
from traditional patterns of governmental interventions to dynamisms of local 
governance. This shift, however, has taken place in an uneven way, shaped bý, factors 
such as the complexity of urban problems, the political alternation, the federal 
policies on transfers, the different policy areas and issues, the looseness of networks 
and the way in wl-, Lich they operate. As a result, Mexican local governance has been 
developed in policy sectors that have a high legitimi'sing potential or that are in great 
need for citizens' resources. This has generated a picture of 'patches', where stronger 
policy networks and citizens' involvement in policy-making coexist with traditional 
governmental mechanisms. 
The dissertation is a contribution to the differentiated accounts of local governance 
recently developed, which use diverse contexts to argue that there is not a 'one size 
fits A' form of governance. It is a reconsideration of the importance of local 
contexts in shaping policy-making through networks, as opposed to the initial 
context-free governance understandings. The conclusion recognises the relevance of 
the main arguments of governance literature. The thesis makes use of empirical 
evidence gathered in three urban municipalities. It emploýT s qualitative 
methodological criteria, discussed in the methodological appendix. The main 
research techniques used were elite interviewing and documental analysis. 
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Introduction 
From the perspective of a politics researcher who is not a native English speaker, 
one of the most intriguing theoretical concepts recently developed bý, the Anglo- 
British acadenuc literature is, that of 'governance'. Part of its appeal lies in the fact 
that, in spite of having the same etymological origin of 'government', it means 
something different and even, in occasions, something opposite to it. 'Govemance' 
has many understandings, but A of them distinguish between 'governance' and 
traditional 'government'. This conceptual difference, which does not seem easily 
translatable to the Mexican context, can trigger basic questions related to the (JCý 
fundamental nature of government and governance. For example, what is 
(governance' if it is not 'government'ý To what extent the conceptual difference 
between government and governance depicts real differences in the socio-political 
order? Can we reaHy differentiate between government and governance? Is this 
distinction useful to understand Mexican local pohticsý If this is so, is Mexico a case 
of government or of governance? 
These questions are important given that, in the last two decades, local governments 
in Mexico have gone through a rapid process of change. During the fixst half of the 
1980s, local public services were devolved to them; in the nud 1990s, the political 
alternation m City Councils gained pace, and local politics began to be changed by 
innovative approaches to urban problems and citizens' participation. For the first 
time in decades, some Mexican municipalities began to be iiifluential in national 
politics and mayoralties consolidated as good positions to start a pohtical career. New 
solutions to the deficiencies in public sen-ices were implemented, and more or less 
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comprehensive models of government, designed in opposition administrations, 
began to be shared among same-party municipahties using networks that 
circumvented state governors. Mexican local government in the 1990s looked like a 
political laboratory where different approaches and governmental projects were 
implemented. Consequently, some aspects of the traditional government- s ocie ty 
relations changed significantly. 
As, the research progressed, it became apparent that the governance literature could 
provide some theoretical and empirical contributions useful to understand, or even 
explain, the changes occurring in Mexican municipaliti . es. In the end, this dissertation 
is the result of trying to analyse the emerging patterns of government- society 
interactions in Mexican municipalities using govemance understandings. 
The theme of this dissertation 
In recent years, the salience of the concept of governance has increased in political 
studies and in public administration and management. The term has been adopted by 
the most diverse acadernic disciplines, making it one of the most Vndely used 
umbrella-terms in the social sciences. Goiernan(., e is employed in multiple senses; its 
several understandings vary in focus, theoretical and contextual backgrounds, and 
levels of analysis. It has been defined as a social-political order that is the result of 
increased interdependencies between governmental and societal actors (Kooirnan, 
1993), as the set of policies resulting from the 'retreat of the state' in particular policy 
sectors (Strange, 1996), as a process of adaptation of the state to conditions of 
increased comple\Ity (Pierre and Peters, 2000), and as the shift to a paradigm of 
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policy-making and implementation based on inter-organizational and other kind of 
networks Uohn, 2001; Rhodes, 1997). These different definitions of governance 
emphasise diverse variables to understand emergent social-political trends. However, 
they have in common the redefinition of governmental and societal roles in 
environments With high levels of fragmentation. Fragmentation, as it is explained in 
chapter three, can be understood as the prohferation of more autonomous 
governmental agencies or, in some cases, public-priVate bodies. 
In both theoretical and empirical terms, 'governance' describes something different 
from what is known as 'government'. Governance understandings propose that these 
two concepts imply different methods of steering non-governmental actors and 
achieving acceptance of policy. In addition, most contributions to the governance 
literature assume overall qualitative differences between government and governance. 
'Government' is characterised by a relatively small number of institutions working in 
consolidated and hierarchical bureaucracies, which produces an approach based on 
direct control and centralised decision-making Uohn, 2001). 'Governance', on the 
other hand, describes a governing situation where decision-making institutions are 
numerous, and the pobtical systern is decentred and fragmented (ibid. ). This causes 
dynarnisms of 'power dependence' and 'blurring boundaries' between the public and 
private spheres of action (Stoker, 1998). 
Regardless of their differences, contributions to governance literature assume that in 
vvestern industriahsed countries there has been a 'shift' from government to 
governance. This has been especiafly evident at local level, where the move to a 
policy-making paradigm based on net-, -,, orks has generated a change in traditional 
1 -/ 
state-sociery patterns of interaction, as well as concerns about lack of accountability 
in new forms of pubhc-priVate collaboration Oohn, 2001). 
The different governance understandings presuppose diverse degrees in which 
paradigms of government and governance are compatible. KoolMan (1993) argues 
that societal direction, in the form of decision-making loci dispersed among 
govern-mental and non-governmental institutions, is a cause, among many, of 
governance. Rosenau and Czemplel (1992), and to some extent Rhodes (1995,1997), 
assume that government and governance are qualitatively different political orders. 
On the other hand, John (2001), Krahmann (2003), and Pierre and Peters (2000) 
argue that it is not possible to establish a sharp dichotomy between government and 
governance, but that all political systems are in some way a mixture of both. Finaflý,, 
authors like Bevir and Rhodes (2003), Cole and John (2001), John (2001), and Le 
Gales (2002) argue that the role of government in governance vanes according to 
national and local contexts, thus pointing at the imperative need to conduct 
comparative research and case studies in contexts other than those of western 
industrialised countries. 
The dissertation makes use of these cumulative theoretical propositions of the 
governance literature. This thesis assumes that government and governance indicate 
different patterns of state-socletýT interaction. Empirical evidence coBected in western 
industrialised countries and Mexico, however, shows that these patterns of 
interaction are not present in A pohcN, sectors in the same way. As John (2001) and 
Pierre and Peters (2000) argue, the shift from government to governance usuaRy 
takes place in a differentiated way, xvith policy sectors that display fragmentation, 
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interdependence among governmental and non-governmental actors, and networks' 
involvement in policy-making in varying degrees. What is more, Krahmann (2003) 
proposes the possibility of finding political systems with contradictory trends, With 
some policy areas that function in traditional governmental ways and others where 
governance is present. fhe variations can be explained by contextual variables, as the 
works of Bevir and Rhodes (2003), Cole and John (2001), and John (2001) suggest. 
This general theoretical framework allows us to have sophisticated accounts of local 
governance, based on a differentiated treatment by policy area and context. 
Moreover, these recent local governance understandings, by being attentive to 
national and local contexts, permit a more productive comparison between the 
assumptions of governance literature and non-European countries. This is important, 
for the purpose of comparing governance understandings and other political systems 
is not just to veriýT or disrnIss fixed theoretical propositions, but to broaden 
governance understandings by detecting different patterns and arrangements of 
governance that, nevertheless, are part of similar social-pol-itical trends in many 
countries. 
Pie point is relevant because the topic of this dissertation is local governance in 
Mexico. This subject brings together t-, -, -o bodies of literature that have become more 
important in their respective academic environments: local governance literature and 
the literature on innovation in Mexican municipalities. 
The local govemance literature, especial-ly N-, -hat Marinetto (2003: 597) calls the 
"Anglo governance school", is, an obhgaton, theoretical reference to understand 
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changes in sub-national pohtics. Its idea of conceptualising processes of increased 
fragmentation, and their new patterns of government- society interaction, as 
something qualitatively clifferent to government is very innovative. It is possible that, 
from a non-English speaking perspective, the most evident expression of this 
innovation is assigning a different word to name this qualitative change (i. e. 
cgovernance'). In Mexican Spanish, for example, there is not an equivalent word to 
cgovernance' used by acaderrua to designate a different paradigm of policy-making or 
a new set of interrelations between state and society. Aguilar (2002,2002a) has made iI 
some attempts to introduce the concept into the debates on Mexican local 
governments, but the fact that his chosen words ('gobernaci6n' and 'gobemancia) 
belong to archaic Spanish, having very specific meanings already, has been an 
obstacle to popularise them among Mexican scholars. 
At the same time, the shift from government to governance in Mexican 
municipalities has taken place in an uneven and highly vaned way, as the evidence 
collected by Cabrero-Mendoza (2002,2003), Guill6n-L6pez (1996,1998), and 
Ziccardi (1995,1995a) suggest. The great diversity in basic socio-pohtical, econornic, 
and even geographical conditions present in Mexican municipalities has shaped the 
rapid changes taking place in local management and policy-making, producing a great 
variety of governance outcomes. For the same reason, Mexican hterature usuafiy 
avolds using a single concept to describe the different municipalities' conditions. 
'Governance' is not easily translatable to the Mexican context, for although a certain 
shift to poficy-making and implementation based on networks Uohn, 2001) has taken 
place in the country, it is not present in all municipalities, or In all policy sectors- 
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Having said that, it is important to note that the týTical subjects and concerns of the 
governance hterat-ure have been present in Mexican acadenua for the last two 
decades, albeit without a umý, ing theoretical umbrella-term similar to 'governance'. 
ne 1983 constitutional amendment that expanded municipal legal capacities, making 
local governments responsible for public service provision, renovated the acadenuc 
interest in this level of government. Research centres like El Colegio de la Frontera 
Norte, El Colegio Mexiquense, the Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales of the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico, and especially the Centro de 
Investigacl6n y Docencia Econ6micas (CIDE) have become the hubs of the study of 
Mexican municipalities in the country. At the same time, governmental and non- 
governmental think-tanks like the Instituto Nacional para el Federalismo y el 
Desarrollo Municipal (INAFED, formerly Centro de Desarrollo Municipal - 
CEDEMUN), the Asoclacl6n de Municipios de M6Xlco A. C. (AMNLNC), and the 
Centro de Servicios Municipales 'Heriberto jara' A. C. (CESEM) have also secured a 
place of influence in the way municipalities are studied. Among the research products 
of these centres, this dissertation has benefited from the contributions that consider 
municipal potential for innovation in the middle of more complex economic and 
pohtical environments. 
Contributions of these research centres and think-tanks have emphasised the 
capacities of local governments to modffi- the usual government- society patterns of 
interaction, xvithin traditional legal frameworks. In their search for increasing 
acceptance of policy, some Mexican local governments have opened up policy- I 
making proccsses, augmenting direct mayor-to-citizen interaction, and establishing 
nc\-, - netv, -ork-based instruments, hke mun c ipal (parhaments', neighbourhood and 
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policy-sector comrruttees, public-private advisory bodies, and even concessions of 
public service provision to private firms. However, the Constitutional legal 
framework has remained basically the same, which has not facilitated the formation 
of more stable Public Private Partnerships, or the acquisition of substantial 
alternative sources of funding. As an interviewee put it, the problem of Mexican 
municipality is how to respond to the increasing citizens' demands With basically the 
same traditional structure: how to "make more with the same"' 
The coexistence of traditional government with new government- societý, dynarrusms 
is, in part, the result of the evolution of the Mexican political systern. The Mexican 
political system has been traditionally regarded as a hybrid, "qth characteristics of 
both an electoral democracy and an authoritarian regime (cf. Camp, 1996). 
Nevertheless, the alternation of different political parties in office, which began in 
local governments, has introduced processes of redefinition of its traditional traits. 
This dissertation assumes that governance understandings can bring in analytical 
categories helpful to deal \Xqth emergent trends in Mexican local governments. The 
aim of this thesis is to analyse some patterns of local governance in Mexico using the 
theoretical propositions of governance hterature. 
Research questions and hypotheses 
Tbe research questions of the dissertation are the f6flovving: 
I Escudero-Stacielinann, A. Personal interview. Orizaba. 18thjanuary 2001. 
1) 1) 
1. What are the founchng conceptual and empirical assumptions of 
contemporary debates about governance? 
What do contemporary modes and patterns of local governance in Mexico 
look hke; ' 
3. How useful are the resulting governance frameworks for understanding 
modes and patterns of governance in Mexico and how vahd are they when 
applied to the Mexican political systerne 
The first question addresses the theoretical assumptions that support governance 
understandings. Answering it requires the identification of the basic traits of 
governance as a different paradigm of policy-making and implementation. The 
second question deals mostly with the empincal analysis of the socio-political 
context. Mapping the contemporary patterns of local governance in Mexico is a 
precondition to the assessment of theory and constitutes one of the dissertation's 
claims of originality. To my knowledge, it is the first time that it has been done in 
such detail in order to compare the resulting picture vnth governance understandings. 
In this sense, this dissertation is a contribution to the case studies that are needed in 
order to assess the theoretical potential of governance frameworks (cf. 
BeN71r, 
Rhodes, and WeHer, 2003a; and Pierre and Peters, 2000). Fmallv, the third research 
question assumes that comparison between governance understandings and Mexican 
municipahtles is possible and, therefore, that they are potential]y useful theoretical 
tools-. Tlie research, however, is not a comparative study between the western 
industriahsed countries where governance bterature has been generated and the 
Mexican case. 'lle dissertation uses the main proposition-, of governance literature as 
a general theoretical framework in order to analyse three MexIcan munic1pal-ities, 
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which are considered representative of emergent trends. Tberefore, the conclusions 
concern prinlarily the Mexican case, although they have wider potential relevance for 
govemance hterature. 
Three assumptions have guided the research process, corresponding to each research 
question: 
(, I) The dýýerenf gommance understandigs hape common tbeorefical elements. The dissertation 
draws its theoretical framework not only from local governance literature, but also 
from XVIder governance understandings. Despite the different definitions, theoretical 
back-grounds, and levels of analysis, this dissertation argues that governance 
understandings share concerns about the change in patterns of interaction between 
social-political actors, and the role of government in more complex environments. 
Argwng that there are commonalities among the different governance 
understandings does not imply that governance always shows itself in the same way, 
regarffless of context, or level of analysis. 'Fhe dissertation presupposes that there are 
general quahties that differentiate governance from government, and that they have 
been identified by most governance frameworks. These general qualities constitute 
the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
AD ý 
(D) Local oovernance patterns in the studied munitipalifies differ according to contextual i, anables. 
One of the main reasons to consider 'Ailder understandings of governance, and not 
only local govemance ones, is to show that there has been an evolution from a quasi 
context-free treatment of governance to understandings that offer differentiated 
accounts according to national and local contexts (cf. Cole and john, 2001; John, 
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2001; and Le Gales, 2002). The research was conducted assunung that there are 
differences between the Mexican context and that of western industrialised countries, 
and among the Mexican municipalities studied in this thesis. These differences, in 
their turn, produce diverse local governance patterns (Cole and John, 2001). The 
dissertation offers, as a conclusion, a set of variables related to the national and local 
contexts that are useful to understand variations in governance. 
(C) Goilernance understandings are useful to anaýlyse the Mexican case. If the reconsideration 
of the importance of context in governance hterature is taken seriously, this 
dissertation cannot be a simple comparison of theoretical propositions With the 
Mexican case in order to confirm or refute hypotheses. Rather, it implies the 
depiction and analysis of Mexican local governance patterns per se, With the intention 
of extracting the corresponding implications upon governance literature. In this 
sense, the dissertation's aim is to broaden governance understandings by identiý, ing 
patterns of local governance that, despite not being on the same scale as those found 
in western industrialised countries, belong to similar trends of change. The 
dissertation assumes that governance literature has identified crucial problems In the 
redefinition of the government- s ocietv interactions, wl-tich are also present in 
Mexican municipalities. It argues that there are governance dynarnisms in Mexican 
urban local governments, albeit not in A municipalities or all policy sectors. By 
anal, VsIng three cases of study from the theoretical perspective of govemance 
I 
understandings, I acknowledge their value. 
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Main argument and contribution 
The main argument of this dissertation is that in Mexican municipalities, the shift 
from government to governance has taken place in a limited and uneven way; a 
phenomenon that is contingent upon contextual factors, such as the bureaucratic 
structure of Mexican local government, the different policy areas, the diverse pohc-v I 
networks, and the political party in office. The dissertation argues this pnMarily for 
the three case studies, but it also maintains that the governance patterns found in 
these Mexican municipahties are part of Widespread trends in the country. 
In general, this dissertation treats governance as a "flexible pattern of public 
decision-making, based on loose networks of individuals" Uohn, 2001: 9). Defined 
hke this, the distinctive shift from government to governance argued by the hterature 
in Britain and other places, has taken place in Mexico in a partial way. As Cabrero- 
Mendoza (2003a) argues, Mexican local governments traditionally put emphasis on 
improving coverage of public services, mainly through increasing amounts of federal 
transfers, and they decide about policy in traditional ways, either by following 
adrmnistrative or operative criteria defined bN- local officials, or by the compliance 
vnth instructions issued by the federal or state governments. Evidence suggests that 
systematic policy-making and implementation based on inter-organizational or policy 
networks has emerged in municipalities with certain conditions, among which we can 
count being urban or serm-urban, to have the real possibility to experience partisan 
alternation in office, or the development of strong community relationships (cf. 
Cabrero-Mendoza, 2002). None of these trends is a generahsed occurrence in the 
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country. Mexican municipalities are usually described as being "between tradition and 
change" (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003a: 27). 
In any case, the case studies show a partial use of networks in policy-making and 
implementation, especially in the provision of public services. The introduction of 
devices such as the direct mayor-to-cldzen exchanges, neighbourhood and thematic 
citizens' conmiatees, and citizens' advisory bodies with the legal power to decide 
priorities in the use of federal transfers, imphes a quahtative change in the usual 
government- society interactions. However, the scope of the decisions of these 
citizens' bodies is hmited to some public services, and local officials are still able to 
influence them through informal channels. In the three case studies, for example, it is 
usual that only non-governmental members of citizens' planning councils have voice 
and vote rights. Nevertheless, local officials and technical experts are still able to 
shape citizens' councils decisions using their political and technical prestige to meet 
with other members informally, as it is mentioned in the following chapters. The 
three case studies show sirnilar patterns to those identified by Cole and John (2001) 
in England and France, where local officials were not able to direct pobcy-making 
processes as before, but stiH possessed power to influence 
pohCý7 
networks. 
-fl-ie dissertation argues that in Mexico there has been a limited sh-ift to the use of 
network-based arrangements in pobcy-making, accompanied by increased 
fragmentation of bureaucratic structures, and certain blurredness between the public 
and societal traditional spheres of action. In this sense, the studied municipalities 
qualifý, as cases of 'governance', as opposed to traditional 'government', because the 
typical patterns of government-soci I have begun to change. If, on the 
other hand, governance is understood as a V)ecific modahty of interaction, then 
Meyaco cannot be considered a comprehensiVe case of governance. In this particular 
point, it is important to note that Mexican local governance is not characterised by 
strong inter- organizational networks with the capacitv to override the state's steering 
and coordination capacities (cf. Rhodes, 1997). In Mexican-style local governance, 
there is an increased dispersion of power among governmental and societal decision- 
making loci. Government depends on a greater number of actors than in the past, 
and some of the necessary resources to provide pubhc sen-ices are sought in the 
social sector and the markets. Nevertheless, government has been able to use 
fragmentation, blurredness, and increased self-organisation to its advantage, to the 
point that it is the 'hinge' of pohc) T and inter-organizational networks in the three 
case studies. 
The 'patchy' picture of Mexican local governance suggest that, at least in the case 
studies, the move towards governance has been steered by local governments in 
order to adapt to complexit-y and lack of legitimacy and resources, as Pierre and 
Peters (2000) argue. It also points to the possibility that there could be policy sectors 
more compatible vnth governance dynamisms than others (the fiscal and financial 
municipal policies, for example, are areas in which it would be difficult to have 
citizens' or pubfic-pnvate bodies). The most interesting of these possible implications 
over governance bterature is that the Mexican case, vnth its 'patches' of govemment 
and overnance, could be better described by the image of the overlapping areas of 9 
influence, rather than by the 'shift' to governance. 
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The originality of the thesis rests on two points. In the first place, to the best of my 
knowledge, it is the first time that governance theoretical propositions are used in a 
substantial way to analyse the Mexican case. This fills, up two important gaps in the 
literatures on governance and Mexican municipalities. Governance understandings 
are the product of western industrialised countries, and comparing their theoretical 
propositions With other contexts is useful to evaluate their validitý,. On the other 
hand, literature on Mexican municipalities is abundant in case studies that focus on 
the increased importance of local governments as loci of decision-making, on "I 
citizens' involvement in policy-making and implementation, and on the innovations 
implemented to tackle new policy challenges (Garcia del Castillo, 2004a), but it is 
scanty in theoretical proposals to systematize the wealth of empirical research. 
Governance Eterature could provide a broad theoretical reference to assess the 
diversity of local governance patterns in Mexico. 
In the second place, this dissertation is innovative because it offers an analysis of 
three concrete Mexican municipalities that have used the rhetoric of citizen 
participation in policy-making. The thesis analyses the scope of the move to 
governance in Le6n, Orizaba, and Zacatecas. Le6n has been present in academic 
literature for more than a decade, but this dissertation is the first approach to 
Orizaba and Zacatecas from the governance bterature standpoint. 
The selected case studies 
From the start of the research, it was decided that the most appropriate urIlt of 
analysis was the murucipality itself. llýs category, considered from the governance 
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literature perspective, includes not only the bureaucratic governmental structures but 
also the municipal sphere of influence. The unit of analysis comprises the public and 
private actors that are relevant to shape governance patterns. The case study modality 
is especially useful in circumstances like these, where it is difficult to draw clear 
distinctions between various inputs and their respective significance (Yin, 1994). 
FolloWing the criteria of Bernard (2000), 1 chose municipahties that had a potential to 
illustrate variations within general governance trends and to which I had access, in 
both primary documental sources and possible inteniewees. Pie selected cases were 
the municipahties of Le6n, Orizaba, and Zacatecas city. They have in common some 
characteristics that make comparison among them easier: 
(1) They have similar, although not identical, indicators of quality of life. Le6n is a 
metropolitan munIcipality I%Xqth a relevant place in the economy and politics of the 
Bqlio region. It has a territory of 1,183.20 square kilometres, and a population of 
1,134,842 inhabitants (2000). The municipality has a very low percentage of 
indigenous population (0.21 per cent) and a Human Development Index (HDI) of 
0.798. In 2000, its adjusted Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita , vas 7,080 
USD (INAFED, 2004). Orizaba, on the other hand, has the smallest territory of the 
three cases, but as Le6n, it has a considerable econorruc and political relevance in the 
region of the Gulf of Mexico. In 2000, it had 118,593 inhabitants, VAth 2.34 per cent 
of them belon ing to local indigenous peoples. Its HDI for 2000 was 91 17,0.823 and, in 
the same year, its, adjusted GDP per capita was 7,075 USD (ibid. ). Finafly, Zacatecas 
'ty of the state of Zacatecas, and it has a place of importance i the is- the capital cl 1 in 
North-Central re 'on of the countm It has a terri i 91 1 
itory of '19.60 square kilometres, 
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and a population of 123,899 inhabitants in 2000, of which, 0.22 per cent was 
indigenous population. Its HDI for 2000 was 0.821, and its adjusted GDP per capita 
was 7,131 USD (ibid. ). Indicators of quality of life are similar; but their difference in 
size is relevant: while Orizaba and Zacatecas have comparable populations, Le6n is 
almost ten times bigger. Governance patterns differ following these lines, for in 
many aspects, solutions implemented by Onzaba and Zacatecas are more similar 
than those applied by Le6n, a metropolitan municipality. Other factors, described 
below, were determinant in the final decision of incorporating this latter municipal-ity 
into the case studies. 
(2) The case studies are considered referential models for their respective political 
parties. Le6n has been governed by the National Action Party (PAN) since 1989, and 
is regarded by interviewed politicians as an Innovative municipality at national level 
(it was one of the first to put into practice programmes such as the Cifiýens'Dqy, the 
citizens' planning councils and an autonomous plantung centre). These programmes 
gained Le6n a national reputation that is indicated in constant allusions from local 
and national officials and acadenuc bterature (e. g. Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996: 53-120 
dedicates an extensive chapter to the 1989-1991 adn-ýinistration; in Cabrerc, 
Mendoza, 1998 he analyses some aspects of the foflovnng penods; Ward 1998, and 
1998a uses tlus municipafitýT as an example of technocratic tendencies in his 
typolop, ). Informally, it is regarded as the municipal 'flagship' of the PAN, among 
other reasons, because their officials have been originators of policies that are used in 
most PANista municipalities. In addition, many politicians of Le6n were members of 
the state cabinet when Mr. Vicente Fox was the govemor of Guanajuato, and 
followed him once he was elected president, including Dr. Gadsden, the former 
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director of the INAFED. The dissertation analyses primarily the administration from 
October loll', 2000, to October 9", 2003. 
Orizaba, on the other hand, has been governed by the Institutional Revolutionary 
Party, (PRý since the party was founded, except in three administradons (1995-1997, 
1998-2000, and 2005-2007). The studied government (Vt of January, 2001, to 31" of 
December, 2004), a "New PRI" administration, has maintained some of the changes 
introduced by the PAN in the 1995-2000 period but has also developed a particular 
style of government that combines New Public Management (NPM) policies with 
traditional clientelism. As it is explained in the following chapters, NPM in general is 
characterised by the pre-eminence of management over politics, the appraisal of 
efficiency in administration, the atorrUsation of governmental agencies, the emphasis 
on outputs, targets, and monetary incentives for bureaucrats, and a pubtic service 
delivery XXqth an user-pay basis 
(Be-, 
71r, Rhodes, and WeUer, 2003). PRI politicians 
consider the 2001-2004 administration of Onzaba as a model for the central region 
of the state of Veracruz, for it was one of the few important municipahties that were 
regained by flus party in the year 2000 elections. 
Finally, Zacatecas city has been the only state capital, ýxqth re ional relevance, that 91 
has been governed by the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) in two 
consecutive perjods from 1998 onwards. Although PRD slates have been elected 
subsequenfly in other state capitals like Colima, Tepic, and X'alapa (PRD, 2000), 
Zacatecas city has remained a reference to pobticians because its City Councfl has 
introduced innovative regulations that enable citizens' council, to produce binding 
deci-sions on pubbc services. In addifion, the state constitution is one of the few in 
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the country that considers exphcitly the participation in pubhc-Pnvate planning 
bodies. The thesis focuses primarily on the administration from 15 th September, 1998 
to 14 th September, 2001, although some references are made to the 2001-2004 one. 
(3) In spite that the case studies are municipalities with different social-political 
conditions, they have developed similar approaches to their respective urban 
problems. It appears that the capacity to innovate in issues related to management 
and citizens' participation in Mexican municipalities is linked to the urban status. 
Medium size and large urban municipalities have more human and econornic 
resources to implement governance-Eke policies (cf Cabrero-Mendoza, Garcia del 
Castillo, Garcia-Výzquez, and G6mez-Castro, 2001). Fragmenting the bureaucratic 
structures or maintaining the engagement with semi-autonomous networks is Z7) 
expensive, and rural municipalities do not usual-ly have enough income to allow free 
resources to fund new progranimes. Le6n, Orizaba, and Zacatecas have renovated 
their governmental structure and maintain expensive participatory systems that are 
not present in smaller municipalities. 
(4) The three municipalities keep records, albeit not always complete or sufficiently 
disaggregated, on the pubhc works the), cam out and on their finances. They pubhsh 
them on a yearly basis and, in the case of Le6n, evenT month through its webpage. 
Finally, I had access to potential interviewees in the three cases. 
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Outline of the dissertation 
In order to develop its argument, the dissertation Is diTIded In Introductory and core 
chapters. Chapters one and two are introductory, and the rest are the central part of 
the thesis. 
Chapter one argues that governance understandings have commonalities that aHow 
us to establish the basic characteristics of governance as a different paradigm of 
pohcy-making from government. In order to do that, I propose a classification of 
contributions to governance literature based on the role that they assign to 
government and context. The chapter shows how, following roughly a chronological 
sequence, governance understandings have moved from being basicaUy context-free, 
paying attention to the essential qualities that differentiate governance from 
government, to the reassessment of government and local contexts as important 
factors in governance. This literature review also argues that governance 
understandings have in common the consideration of governmental and societal 
fragmentation, the blurredness between the pubbc and private spheres that results 
from citizens' involvement in policy-making, and the increased self-organisation 
among non-governmental actors. These quahties (fragmentation, 'blurredness', and 
self-organisation) are considered the basic traits of governance. 
Chapter rwo is a brief description of the limited and uneven shift from government 
to governance that has been mentioned in this introductory chapter. It identifies the 
areas where the emergent trends of governance dynamics have been more evident. 
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Chapters three, four, and five are an analysis of the basic traits of governance in the 
three case studies. Chapter three argues that fragmentation, defined as the 
proliferation of governmental agencies and the introduction of pubhc-pnvate bodies, 
is present in the three studied municipalities in different degrees. What is common in 
the three cases is that fragmentation has been used by mayors to strengthen their 
leadership and political position. Bureaucratic structure is especially important in this 
case, for it appears that the mayors of Orizaba and Zacatecas, hajing a less 
fragmented municipal structure, display more traditional governing styles than the 
mayor of Le6n, where citizens' councils and municipal departments are more 
numerous. 
Chapter four analyses 'blurredness'. It argues that in the studied cases, the use of 
inter-organizational networks in the form of neighbourhood committees and citizens' 
councils, seeks to increase the acceptance of policy and find an alternative supply of 
resources. The research found that the studied munIcipalities establish and suppress 
networks with different approaches, being Zacatecas the most community-minded, 
while Orizaba and Le6n where more concerned in obtaining resources for the 
introduction of public sem-ices in poor neighbourhoods. This behaviour is consistent 
vAth the general policy orientation of the three political parties at national level. 
AdditjonallýT, in the three cases local officials were able to influence decisions of 
citizens' bodies, confirming the role of government as the key node xvith-in pobcv 
networks. 
Chapter five focuses on self-organisation among non-governmental actors. It argues ZD 
that, regardless of the increased autonomy from governmental scrutinv, non- 
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governmental networks in the three cases are able to coincide and collaborate with 
governmental policies, especially in some policy areas. The differences can also be 
traced back to the pohtical party in office. 
Finally, the conclusions argue the implications that the findings have on the classical 
understandings of Mexican local government and governance literature. 
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Chapter One 
Charting understandings of governance 
Introduction 
It is already a truism to state that 'governance' is an 'umbrella ten-n' that has multiple 
understandings. The different theoretical backgrounds, academic disciplines, 
originating contexts, and levels of analysis that are involved in the contemporary 
debates about governance have generated dissimilar, and often contradictory, 
understandings of it. In one and a half decades, governance literature has produced a 
substantial number of contributions in most of the sub-fields of politics, econon-ucs, 
sociology, and public management ranging from more or less comprehensive 
explanations of change in state-society interactions, to very specific proposals for 
innovation in policy-mak-ing processes 
In spite of this 'Babylonlan multiplicity' of understandings (B6rzel, 1998), there has 
been a constant effort to explore the theoretical potential of governance, going 
beyond the consideration of it as a simple metaphor of change in the social-political 
environment. Contributions considered in this literature review treat governance as a 
theoretical tool, using it as a framework of analysis through which new 
interdependencies, institutions, and actors are incorporated into the explanations of 
public policy outcomes. Contributions that treat governance as an analytical tool 
usua. Uy begin by pointing out that western Industrialised countries have experienced a 
rise in societal and political fragmentation, in blurredness between the public and 
private spheres, and in the autonomy and resources of pohcv networks. Pohcv 
networks can be defined as the "tier, " that exist between the "bodies relevant to a 
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policy area" Oordan, 1990: 333) or among the decision makers and the persons or 
institutions affected or benefited by their decisions, as it is explained in chapter four. 
The governance literature argues that this state of affairs is different to the patterns 
of interaction that are present when government is the centre of social-political life, 
and hierarchical command is its preferred mode of intervention. Authors considered 
in this chapter have tried to deterrmne to what extent the new patterns of social- 
political interaction, emerging in the n-udst of more fragmentation, blurredness, and 
self-organisation, constitute a qualitatively different political system or policý 7 -making 
modality. At the same time, the literature has dealt With the question of how 
compatible are the new patterns of interaction, grouped under the generic name of 
'governance', With the traditional institutions of government. 
These considerations have been carried out at, mainly, three levels of analysis: 
national and sub-national, regional, and global (Krahmann, 2003). In this bterature 
review, I presuppose that the theoretical contributions of the fiterature on 
governance have some elements that are common among the different levels of 
analysis. The concern with political institutions in fragmented environments, the 
problems of le itimacy and accountability when private actors enter the policy- 91 
making processes, the redefinition of the roles of state and society, and the problems 
to achieve consensus when a strong pobtical authority is absent, are recurring themes 
in governance frameworks developed for national and sub-national, regional, and 
global levels. 
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This is a thesis on local governance and, therefore, its theoretical framework is drawn 
mainly from governance literature written for the sub-national level. Nevertheless, 
literature on global, regional, and national levels is briefly treated here; in the 
presupposition that common themes among levels of analysis help to understand 
dynarrucs that are evident at local level, but that are actually part of trans-level 
processes. Thus, the presentation of the relevant literature is made fol-loWing the 
mentioned paths: the theoretical concern about the compatibility between 
government and governance and the three main levels of analysis. This chapter 
proposes a matrix made with. these two elements in order to classify the various 
dimensions of the governance understandings, producing a dynamic picture of 
mutual influence among authors that roughlv follows a chronolo ical sequence. 91 
The basic argument of this chapter is that in the national and sub-national level of 
analysis, governance literature has moved increasingly from an apparently context- 
free treatment of the characteristics of governance, to the reconsideration of the 
importance of national and local contexts, and how they shape local governance 
patterns. By 'context-free' I mean that, in spite of being generated in the particular 
contexts of western industrialised countries, earl), theoretical frameworks developed 
governance understandings that did not acknowledge the important role of those 
contexts in detern-uning the particular forms and modalities of governance. 
The transition towards, the reconsideration of context is especlaUy evident if the first 
widely influential governance frameworks are compared with the latest contributions 
in the field. Koolman (1993) and Rhodes (1994,1995,1996, and 1997), propose an 
understanding of governance that is ver-\- different to that of government, to the 
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point of questioning the steering capabilities of governments in the face of growing 
fragmentation and complexity. On the other hand, Pierre (2000), and Pierre and 
Peters (2000), make a point in arguing that governance is, in man'v aspects, an 
adaptation strategy of the state that strengthens governments in selected policy 
sectors. These authors put forward the idea that government and governance are part 
of a 'continuum', warning against any form of dichotorfUsation between them, which 
would be an oversimplification of the complexities of both paradigms of policy- 
making. 
Finally, contributions like those of Bevir and Rhodes (2003), Cole and John (2001), 
Gaster (2002), John (2001), and Le Gales (2002) propose that local governance 
patterns are shaped by national and local contexts, producing 'comparable but not 
identical trends' among different countries (Cole and John, 2001: x). By 'context' the 
mentioned authors mean political and procedural culture, values, the structure of 
government, previous interactions of networks, and institutions in general. The latest 
contributions open governance literature to the possibility of offering differentiated 
and more sophisticated accounts of the supposed transition from government to 
govemance. 
Tl-ýis- dissertation draws its theoretical framework, mainly, from these developments 
in local governance understandings. As a result, although other approaches are 
considered, governance in this dissertation is understood as a consistent method of 
public policy-making based in interactions, with networks Uohn, 2001). In this sense, 
in the seminal categorisation of the basic forms of co-ordination proposed by 
Thompson, Frances, Levacic, and Mitchell (1991), governance -,,, -ould be the 
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equivalent to the regular use of networks by governmental managers. Government 
and governance are considered here as paradigms of policy-making and 
implementation, leaving behind understandings of governance as a different soclo- 
pohtical order. 
This chapter deals first With the insufficiencies of the traditional governmental 
mechanisms to deal with increasingly complex policy problems, which is the 
departing point of most governance frameworks. Then the criteria used for the 
selection of the relevant contributions are explained, and are followed bV the 
governance frameworks themselves, explained in the way already mentioned. Finally, 
the concluding section proposes some useful commonalities of the analysed 
contributions to governance literature by explaining the PhD general framework. 
The insufficiency of government 
One of the core assumptions in the governance literature is that government failure 
is not only caused by the increased complexity of policy problems, but also by the 
"inherent shortcornings of its traditional instruments115 to deal Xkqth situations that are 
qualitatively different to what was the standard when the governmental paradigm of 
poky-making was being formed (Mayntz, 1993: 10). 
Governance frameworks presuppose that government, at least in its traclitional 
hierarchical form, is no longer sufficient for solving most of the problems it has to 
confront to accomplish its objectives. TI-ie literature points at substantial limitations, 
related to con-stitufional ways in , vhých traditional go-vernments intervene in society. 
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Clear and legitimate hierarchies, a sharp distinction between the pubhc and private 
spheres, and the "attempts to neutrality underpinning the exercise of power" Uohn, 
2001: 98) do not ensure the legitimacy and steering capabilities that are necessary for 
sustainable collective action. Additionally, financial and other kinds of resources are 
distributed among a greater number of actors, In different levels of governmental and 
non-governmental spheres (KoolMan, 1993), With the resulting "power dependence" 
among them (Stoker, 1998: 18). Indeed, some governance frameworks have 
presented contemporary governments as actors operatingVqth 'one hand tied behind 
their backs' in policy sectors where poliCýT and inter- organiz a ti onal networks are 
powerful (e. g. Rhodes, 1997) 
Traditionally, the role of government has been analysed according to the 
effectiveness in accomplishing its mandate, which is shaped by the expectations of 
society (Lpset, 1959). The governmental role defined in this way, however, does not 
necessarilý, mean that the conventional exercise of go-, Ternment requires citizen 
involvement beyond elections to legitin-ýise pohcy. As Rosenau (1992) points out, 
governmental interventions can be sustained without the immediate support or 
knowledge of the majority of the governed, or even regardless of their opposition. In 
governmental patterns of interaction, citizens are expected to play a complementary 
or subordinated role to government in order to ensure the effective implementation 
of poficy (Pierre and Peters, 2000). This modahty of interaction is enforced and 
sustained bv rules and other institutions, among which the separation of the pubbc 
and private interests has a place of importance. 
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In the classical Weberian framework, legal authority is established on rational 
grounds in order to regulate private interests and promote public goods (Weber, 
1983). The impersonality of bureaucratic rules airn at ensuring not onlý, that laws 
themselves are general, but also that they are apphed to particular cases in a 
consistenfly ffnpersonal way (Weber, 1978). Bureaucratic rules enable the 
establishment of the differential between public and private interests. Officials 
should "be completely separated from ownership of the means of production or 
administration" (Weber, 1978: 219) and therefore, their personal property and 
interests should be distin ishable from those of bureaucracy. Despite the fact that 9w 
the concrete definition of pubhc interest is left to the consensus of the particular 
societies, government is assumed to play a role in it by regulating private interests on 
an equal basis. The main assumption here is that equal-ity is only possible to the 
extent that private interests do not control state institutions. Government seeks to 
accomplish public objectives, which are distinct from private ones. Once public and 
private interests were identified, traditional governmental activity was defined in 
terms of efficiency in administration and the gathering of optimum information in 
order to take rational decisions (Coase 1937). Government was considered a 
technical matter, especially in policy sectors like basic urbanisation services like 
paving, public lighting, sewers, etc. Powns, 1957). 
One of the first assertions of governance bterature was to recognise the failure of 
'afly in the areas of effective government to meet socletal expectations, especl I 
regulation, welfare, and development (Mayntz, 1993). Its clecreasIng levels of 
legitimacy, the lack of citizens' conformity Nvith closed processes of pobcy-making 
and implementation, and a generalised technical ineffectiveness in tackling complex 
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policy sectors have prompted more fundamental doubts about government as a 
paradigin of policy-making (ibid. ). That government could fail was a known fact well 
before the advent of governance literature (e. g. Downs, 1967). What is new is the 
kind of conclusions that are drawn from these failures. Mayntz (1993) argues that 
traditional government's instruments are not able to solve most contemporary 
problems because the conditions in western industrialised countries have become too 
complex, especially in terms of fragmentation. Concentrating in the technical 
character that is expected from governmental interventions, Mayntz (1993: 15) points 
at the almost "insolvable problem" for the central authority to obtain sufficient 
information to decide, for "it is impossible under conditions of high complexity to 
make general and long-term forecasts of the kind of behaViour of specific actors". 
The only solution is either to modify the traditional instruments of oovernment, or to it) 
lower the expectations ofwhat it can accomplish (ibid; Pierre, 2000). 
AdditionaUy, the aforementioned distinction between the public and priVate spheres - 
a requirement to the effective functioning of government according to traditional 
understandings of it- becomes less clear as fragmentation and interdependencies 
among actors ow. The paradox of the 'blurring boundaries' among different kinds C) gr 
of actors hes in the fact that they can be interpreted both as cause and solution of 
some governmental problems. On the one hand, governance literature abounds in 
references to the accountability related problems that 'blurredness' between public 
and private functions cause to the traditional ways of keeping public actors in check. 
On the other, the involvement of pnvate actors in pobcy-making and 
ion can also be as a means to obtai i dispensable resource, -, implementati I in in 
government 
lacks. that g 
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'Governance' goes beyond 'government' because its literature considers not only the 
formal sources of legitimacy and social-political order, but also the societal actors 
that contribute towards the final results of policy implementation (Holsti, 1992). 
Differently from traditional pubhc administration approaches, governance 
frameworks recognise that non-governmental actors are capable of offsetting the 
traditional patterns of public-priVate interactions and of imposing nex-, - ones over 
state institutions. Governance frameworks reject the usual "simplistic dichotomies 
that inform the social sciences" Oessop, 1998: 31), trying to go beyond the public- 
private distinction in order to find the loci of real decision -making (Hyden 1992). In 
this sense, governance literature recognises the insufficiency of the paradigm of 
government to explain the emergent patterns of interactions between the public and 
private spheres, and uses the examples of government's failure to question the 
validity of its instruments. 
Mapping contemporary understandings of governance 
Contributions to the governance literature have in common the above-mentioned 
departure from the paradigm of govemment. However, this criterion is too vvide to 
attempt a classification of governance understandings based solely on it. Governance 
frameworks can also be distin ished according to their explanatory capacity and, gul 
therefore, their theoretical status (Payne, forthcoming 2005); in addition, their le-vel 
of analysis offers another criterion to distinguish among them (Krahmann, 2003). 
'n-ie first criterion to organise this hterature review is that it focuses on the analysis 
that governance frameworks make of the role and influence of government. Hirst 
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(2000: 13) has drawn attention to the fact that the concept of governance has been 
constructed 'largely at the expense of the concept of government". In that sense, 
governance understandings have dedicated a considerable effort to demonstrate that 
the concept of 'governance' stands for something qualitatively different to 
'government', either as a social-political system, as patterns of interaction between 
political actors, or as methods of policy-making and implementation. The quotation 
of Hirst also implies that, at least in earliest formulations, governance is presupposed 
to be an alternative or substitute for government (e. g. Rhodes, 1995). This 
presupposition, however, stands out against the fact that governance has not 
replaced government, which, in many aspects, continues to be a formidable source 
for legidmacy, resources, and rules for allocadon of goods Uohn, 2001; Pierre and 
Peters, 2000). Tbus, the point is one of compatibility between two paradigms of 
policy-making. The proposals range from the different "spheres of authonty" 
(Rosenau, 1997: 145) to varying degrees of coexistence (Cole and John, 2001; Pierre 
and Peters, 2000). 
In the second place, this literature review considers only governance understandings 
that are tbeorefit'al frameworks. TI-is means that regardless of the particular assessment 
about the consistency or accuracy of models, contributions considered in this chapter 
treat governance as an analytical tool. In this way, I follow the distinction argued by 
Payne (forthcornIng 2005: 2) between governance 'projects' and 'theories. Alile 
projects are "particular programmes" whose "purpose is not to analyse the 
world, but to change it", theories "endeavour to understand and explain practices of 
governance". This differentiation is useful because it allo\-, -s the relevant literature to 
46 
be narrowed down substantiaBy. 'Mus, good governance, corporate governance, and 
other highly normative approaches are not within the scope of this literature review. 
Having said that, it is appropriate to remember that the theoretical status of 
governance understandings has been a disputed matter. At one end of the spectrum 
are Stoker (1998), and Peters and Pierre (1998), who treat governance as a vahd 
(although in some ways limited) theoretical tool. In this first consideration, the term 
is. defined as an organising "conceptual framework" (Stoker, 1998: 18) whose 
presence supplies analytical categories and explanations that cannot be obtained 
using traditional approaches. Peters and Pierre (1998) argue that governance is a 
political theory because its literature offers explanations about the exchanges 
between state and society. In a later work, Pierre and Peters (2000: 7) qualiýT their 
previous argument, saý, ing that governance 'theories' are in realitýT "proto-theorles" or 
theories in the process of consolidation. This position acknowledges that governance 
literature still has lacunae and inchoate elements waiting to be developed. This 
position is confirmed in other, more recent, contributions (e. g. Cole and John, 2001; 
and John, 2001). At the other end are Smouts (1998) and Hewitt de Alcintara (1998) 
who argue that governance appears to be a mcant conceptual structure. According to 
this second approach, 'governance' does not quahý, as a theory because of its lack of 
"'content" (Smouts, 1998: 81). The latter is provided by theorles of soclo-political and 
individual change, which are the real explanatory categories behind governance 
frameworks. 
FinalIv, the tIurd critenon used in this literature review is a classification based on 
level of analysis, according to the argument of Krahmann (2003). Many of the most 
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influential contributions have been made for the national and sub-national levels of 
analysis (e. g. Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). Nevertheless, other seminal 
works, hke those of Rosenau and Czemplel (199-2), and Koolman (1993) were written 
with global governance and societal (multi-level) governance in rrund, respectiveIN - 
This thesis makes a differentiated treatment of governance according these levels, in 
the understanding that global, societal, and local governance describe different 
patterns of interaction among public-private actors. 
Table 1 shows the classification proposed in this chapter. This, being a dissertation 
on local governance, focuses on contributions that were designed for the national 
and sub-national level, which explains their greater number. Some works on regional 
and global governance are mentioned, but only because they are considered senunal. 
contributions that influenced later understandings of national and sub-national 
governance. Therefore, the list of contributions for supranational. levels of analysis 
should not be considered exhaustive. The folloWing sections of the chapter vA-U 
explain governance understandings according to this table. Their sequence is defined 
by their analysis of the role of government in conditions of governance. 
Got, ernance defined as a soa*alpolitical order 
The first cluster of authors analysed in this chapter treats governance as an eqw-, Talent 
to 'social-political order'. Governance has been defined as a social-political order in, 
v, two vvays. In a first, loose way, governance understood as a synonym for basicall. 
other concepts like 'political system', 're i e', 'state structure', 'order', and 'control' gim 
(Krahmann, 2003)). In tl-us sense, governance "can refer to any mode of coordination 
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of interdependent activities" Uessop, 1998: 29) and be applied to national, sub- 
national, and supranational contexts. 
Table 1. Governance understandings 
Level of Governance 
analysis defined as a 
social - 
political order. 
Government a 
player among 
many 
Governance and 
government defined 
as different political 
systems, "spheres of 
authority", or 
steering modalities 
Governance 
and 
government as 
ideal types in a 
"continuum" 
Governance and 
government co- 
exist in polities 
in varying ways, 
shaped by 
national and 
local contexts 
National KoolMan, 1993, 
and sub- 2000,2002 
national ("social 
governance"). 
KoolMan and 
Ehassen, 1988. 
Mayntz, 1993. 
Stoker, 1995. Krahmann, 2003 Bevir and 
John and Cole, 1995. Peters, 1997, Rhodes, 2003. 
Rhodes, 1981,1990, - Pierre, 2000, Cole and John, 
1994,1995,1996, Pierre and 2001. 
1997,2000 ("Rhodes Peters, 2000 Gaster, 2002. 
model"). ("the John, 2001. 
B6rzel, 1997,1998; government - Le Gales, 2002. 
Daly, 2003; De Bruijn governance 
and Ringeling, 1999; continuum"). 
Hanf and 07foole, 
1992; Jordan, 1990 
(governance as 
networks). 
Regional Kooiman, 1993, Rhodes, 1997 (if Krahmann, 2003 Blatter, 2003. 
2000,2002 applied in a trans- Marks, 1996; 
(44social border analysis, like Marks, Hooghe, 
governance"). Blatter, 2003 and Blank-, 1996 
attempts) - (ccmulti-level 
governance"). 
Global jessop, 1998 Rosenau and Krahmann, 2003 Payne, 2005 
Koonnan, 1993, Czempiel, 1992; (forthcoming). 
2000,2002 Rosenau, 1997 
(ccsocial ("global governance"). 
governance"). 
Source: Own elaboration. 
This understanding, however, does not represent a relevant innovation other than 
ren-unding the reader that the final outcome of the analysed process is caused bv the 
interaction of both goveriunental and non-govemmental actors. The innovation 
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comes in a second, more restricted, way to define governance as order. Governance 
can be understood as a spe6ific mode of social coordination (Mayntz, 1993) where 
drawing a distinction among roles of actors, or their effects in society as a whole, is 
not possible or easily done. The main governance framework that uses this approach 
is KoolMan's (1993a: 258) "social governance". 
Drawing from basic assumptions of complexity theory, like the proposition of 
emerging patterns that result from the interaction of many actors (Battram, 1998; 
Nfihata, 1997), Kooirnan developed a definition of "social governance": 
Governance can be seen as the pattern or structure that emerges in a 
social-political system as common result or outcome of the interacting 
intervention efforts of all involved actors. [Social governance] is the 
functional interdependence between formally and/or relativeIN 
autonomous (non-hierarchically ordered) political and social actors 
(Kooffnan, 1993a: 258). 
Kooiman argues that in a social- political system, considered as a whole, 
No single actor has the possibility of 'doing the job' (solVing a problem 
or grasping an opportunjtýý) unilateraBy. No actor is so dominant as to 
enforce a single hne of behaviour jbid). 
"r , 
'Social governance", then, is the result of the 
'interaction of existing traditional 
, structures and actors of government, their 'eroded' methods and interventions, new 
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socio-political actors, and new forms of social mediation (KoolMan, 2000). AD of 
them try to introduce 'order' in the political system, and governance is the result of 
A their combined, and sometimes, competing efforts (KoolMan and Eliassen, 1988). 
This does not mean that government is irrelevant, but that governability is the result 
of maintaining equilibrium between the emergent trends and the established ones 
(Koo. lMan, 1993). Koolman argues that governing is not external to (or opposed to) 
society. Government's efforts to control diversity, complexity, and dynamic 
interrelations, are part of the self-organising tendencies of ever), complex systern 
(KoolMan, 1993a). Government is distributed among different governmental and 
non-governmental actors, all capable of imprinting direction to some social-political 
processes (KoolMan, 2000). By blurring the boundaries of governmental 
intervention, Koonnan equates government to societal 'co-government'. 
In an environment where complexity, dynamics and diversity are on the rise, the 
outcomes of governing actions do not depend on established static structures, but on 
flexibility, co-production and co-operation among the different public and private 
actors. This has generated a redefinition of the traditional role of government: 
Seen from the point of -, -Iew of more traditional public govertung 
activities, there has been an increase in the role of governments as a 
facilitator and as a co-operating partner, for example through public- 
private partnerships and covenants. Hence, it is generallN, more 
appropriate to speak of shifting roles of government rather than of 
shrinking roles of government. A reshuffling of government tasks and a It) 
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greater awareness of the need to co-operate with other societal actors 
does not render traditional government interventions obsolete. It merely 
implies a growing awareness of the limitations of traditional government 
"command-and-control" mterventions. (KoolMan, 2002: 6) 
The main innovation -and, at the same time, difficult-\I- of the societal "co- 
government" framework is its systernic outlook. This understanding of governance 
implies that resources to deal With social-political issues are distributed among ZD 
governmental and non-governmental actors. The problems of governance are seen as 
a shared responsibility and, thus, the only real difficulty is to locate resources, 
because systems maintain overall equilibrium (Peters, 2000). In the long term, 
governance is understood as the capacity of a society to meet its needs, the capacity 
of the social-polit. ical system "to govern itself Within the context of the broader 
systems of which it is part" (KoolMan, 1993a: 259). 
Kooiman has been influential in what Marinetto (2003: 597) call,, the "Anglo 
governance school" vnth the introduction of an approach that goes beyond an), 
cbchotom3, of analysis. By stressing the trans-sectoral character of political 
dynarmsms, his understanding of governance exposes interdependencies that 
transcend institutional boundaries, which allows us to paýT attention to the real 
explanatory causal relations. For Koolman, government is another player in the 
system of governance. This produces an understanding of government's steering 
capabilities that acknowledges their limitations, x"thout necessarily being pessimistic. 
As Mayntz (1993) points out, this systemic approach assumes that most social- 
political processes are self-sustained and self-organised. Government onlv intervenes I 
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when it wants to change the direction of some of these processes. As a consequence, 
a redefinition, or even the diminution, of governmental roles does not necessarily 
entail a nsk for the self-sustaining dynamisms of society. Government, after all, is 
considered to have a limited influence on the overal] configuration of the social- 
pohtical system. 
In addition, KoolMan's understanding of governance can be applied to any level of 
analysis. If governance is defined as the result of all the actors' interactions, then it is 
suitable for the local, national, re ional or global levels of analysis, as Iong as the 91 1-1 
system of reference is well defined. However, here hes one of the main difficulties of 
this governance understanding. Defining the borders of the systern, or level of 
analysis, iMplies the selection of the actors that wil-I be considered rele-vant to explain 
governance outcomes, but this is not easily done in polities were interdependencies 
abound and change rapidly. Kooirnan does not offer much in the way of empirical 
evidence to support the inu-nediate utility of "social governance". It remains a stirring 
and stimulating concept that has generated useful hypotheses that, nevertheless, are 
difficult to prove. Finally, it is important to observe that "social governance" implies 
a context-free treatment of social-pobtical systems. It is assumed that as long as the 
basics of the model are taken in account, CCsocial governance" is able to explain any 
social-pofitical situation in any level of analysis. However, fl-tis still has to be proved 
empiricafly. 
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Governance andgovernment as di fferent orders or 'ýbberes of autboriý, 
If governance defined as a social -political order includes government in governance, 
there are other approaches that offer a more differentiated understanding of them. 
The authors considered in this section argue that governance is an 'order', i. e. a 
pattern of interactions, a "sphere of authority" (Rosenau, 1997: 145), or a paradigm 
of policy-making that is qualitatively different to government. According to this 
understanding, governance is charactensed by: 
1) A set of institutions and actors that are drawn from but also beyond 
government; 2) Fit] identifies the blurring boundaries and responsibihties 
for tackling social and econornic issues; 3) governance identifies the 
power dependence [... ] in the relationships between institutions 
involved in collective action; 4) [it] is about autonomous self-governing 
networks of actors; 5) governance recognses the capacity to get things 
done which does not rest on the power of government to command or 
use its authority. (Stoker, 1998: 18). 
Propositions 2), 4), and 5) are particularly relevant. The ideal type for government is 
based on the distinction between roles, as already mentioned, and public-private 
blurredness changes the ways in which government works. Proposition 4) is the basis 
for the 'governing without government' approach (Rhodes, 1996) and number 5) is 
the fundamental assumption of 'governance , -, Ilthout government' (Rosenau and 
Czempiel, 1992). Both governance understandings assume that the patterns of social- 
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pohtical interactions have changed substantiaUy in the recent past, diminishing the 
effectiveness of government in the process. 
Governance vAthout government 
One of the first understandings to argue that government and governance are Lý 
qualitative]), different political orders was proposed by Rosenau (1995,1997) and 
Rosenau and Czemplel (1992) for the a. nalysis of global governance. For these 
authors, the key of the government-governance distinction is the kind of means used 
to maintain a certain pattern of social-pohtical interactions. Government rehes on 
I-lierarchy and command to maintain 'order', but this is not strictly necessary for the 
"fra=ng of goals, the issuing of directives, and the pursuit of policies" (Rosenau, 
1995: 14). \X`hile traditional government frameworks assume that by exerting 
command they can achieve control, governance understandings, propose that political 
order is, the result of intended intenentions of a greater number and diversity of 
individual actors and institutions (Rosenau, 1997). 
Rosenau (1997: 147) argues that there are lax forms of control that rest on "a 
modicum of regularity, a form of recurrent behaviour that systernaticaRy links the 
efforts of controflers to the comphance of controBees". If pobtical order is defined in 
this \vay, then "it follows that systems of rule can be maintained ... even in the 
absence of established legal or political authority" (Ibid. ). This point (political order 
v. Ithout legal authonry) is N-,, hat enables Rosenau (ibid.: 145) to define govemance as 
a different systern of rule xvith is o\-, -n "sphere of authoritv". Indeed, this governance 
understanding was created to offer an explanation for the apparent 'govemance 
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without government' of world affairs (Young, 1997). Global interactions are 
characterised by the absence of a world central authonty and, at the same time, the 
presence of qualities that are usually considered part of governmental orders: 
This political world scene has no government, no real legitimate centre, 
no government responsible for world affairs, except econon-nc affairs to 
some extent; yet norms, representations and rules have developed, 
conflicts are increasing, ways of resolving conflicts are being organized, 
and regulations are appearing, all of which bnngs us back to the term of 
governance (Le Gales, 2002: 86). 
In governance at the global level, "there is no single organizing pnnciple... no 
emergent order around which communities and nations are likely to converge" 
(Rosenau, 1995: 16). Seen from this perspective, "governance is the sum of a myriad, 
literally millions of control mechanisms driven by different histories, goals, 
structures, and processes" (Rosenau, 1997: 149). As a result, governance is, also 
charactensed by tlie dispersal of power. Power diffusion, in turn, is accompanied by 
"pockets of coherence operating in different levels and in different parts of the 
world" (Rosenau, 1995: 18). 
Both government and governance are "spheres of authority" in the sense that they 
are consequences of "purposive behaviour" and "goal-oriented activities" (Rosenau, 
1992: 4). But governance refers specifically to: 
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the capacity to get things done without the legal competence to 
command that they be done. Vlere governments ... can distribute 
values authoritatively, governance can distribute them in a way that is 
not authoritative but equally effective. Governments exercise rule, 
governance uses power (Czemplel, 1992: 250). 
Governance is equiValent to consensus reached outside governmental hierarchical 
interventions. In ontological terms, 'governance without government' presupposes a 
political environment where self-organisation is pervasive but consensus is achievable 
Uessop, 1997). In government, conversely, self-orgamsation appears to be more 
linaited. by state institutions (Czemplel, 1992). Governance is different from 
government given that they develop different patterns of interaction among actors, 
and they have diverse instruments to sustain them. However, both "spheres of 
authority" are not coexistent in the sense that they are intended for different levels of 
analysis and action. The national and sub-national sphere of action is the natural 
environment for governments, while governance describes the state of affairs at 
supra-national level. This has been an important cause of criticism, for it would 
appear that 'global governance' is not different to 'global order' or even 'control' 
(Finkelstein, 1995). 
'Global governance' has shaped discussions on governance in the International 
Relations literature, exemplified bý, specific case studies. This understanding, 
however, 1,; closely linked to a specific level of anah-sis -that of world affairs. In the 
first instance, the particular contexts related to th-is govemance understanding do not 
concern local governance, the main reason being that at sub-national level,; 
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government is not absent. Nevertheless, the 'governance without government' idea 
has been useful to stimulate sub-national studies on political Interactions that emerge 
in policy sectors where the powers of government are absent or diminished. Table 2 
is a summary of this governance understanding. 
Table 2. Government and Governance as "spheres of authority" 
Govermnent Governance 
Intentional (purposive) behaviour Intentional (purposive) behaviour 
constructed around goals constructed around sbaredgoals 
Enforced by formal authority in an Constructed by resource sharing and 
environment of limited self-organisation "power dependence" In a self-organised 
environment 
Centric (hierarchic) Polycentric (heterarchic) 
It can exist without the support of majority It cannot exist without consensus of 
majority 
Source: Developed from Czempiel (1992), jessop (1997,1998), and Rosenau (1992,1997) 
The Rhodes model 
Another governance understanding that treats government and governance as 
different political orders is the model developed by R. A. W'. Rhodes, which arguably 
is the most influential among the contributions to the "Anglo governance school". 
Rhodes begins by proposMg a model of intergovernmental relations JGR) 
conducted by rational "games" between central and local levels of government 
(Stoker, 1995: 106). In these 'games', political actors use "cons titutional, legal, 
organizational, financial, political, and [informational]" resources in order to gain 
influence over governmental decisions (ibid. ). Rhodes's original contribution is to 
consider that these 'games' take place in an arena that goes beyond the bureaucratic 
sphere, including also non-governmental actors and having policy networks as main 
unit of analysis (see Rhodes, 1981,1997). 
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Networks, particularly policy networks, shape IGR (Rhodes, 1990). Increased 
political and societal fragmentation has modified governmental structures and 
functioning, to the point that governments are better described as "segmented 
executives" (Rhodes, 1997: 4) rather than unitan, bodies. The result, considenng 
resource limitation, is that bodies and levels of government depend on resources of 
other bodies and levels (Rhodes, 1997; Stoker, 1995). Rhodes argues that in order to 
cope with "power dependence" and competition, governmental actors form polic) 
communities with non-governmental actors (Rhodes, 1990: 303), establishing 
relationships to exchange resources (Rhodes, 1997: 37). Through policy networks, 
the sectors of government that have established coalitions With non-governmental 
actors try to be dornInant in their respective areas of interest (ibid. ). 
The fragmentation of the state into competing and strong inter-organizational policy 
networks, it is argued, has generated a great array of alternative arrangements to 
traditional government Uessop, 1998: 29). TI-i-is change has been interpreted as a 
"decline" of government in favour of the "exercise of authority by non- 
governmental institutions coupled with claims [ ... ] to legitimacy" (Painter and 
Good"n, 1995: 345). Local governance, defined by this approach, is understood as 
the implementation of pubbc-pnvate partnerships in administration (Clarke and 
Gaile, 1997). Especially in the British context, local governance means bringing in "a 
whole raft of ne-w bodies ... all appointed, wHst removing functions from elected 
governments at the same time" (Andrew and Goldsrruth, 1998: 105). 
Rhodes (1996: 660) argues that governance refers pnmarýv to "self-orgaming, inter- 
organizational net-, vorks". By self-organisation, he basicafly means (i) autonomy from 
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the state and (ii) self-govemment (Rhodes, 1997,2000). These charactenstics imply 
unaccountability to the state and therefore, possible problems Within the traditional 
processes that link policy outcomes to officials' responsibility. For Rhodes (2000: 75) 
self-organisation is related to private interests. Therefore, when powerftil inter- 
organizational networks seem to override the state's steering capabilities, his 
conclusion is that traditional government conditions have changed qualitatively. 
Indeed, the presence of networks and their increased power produces 
"polycentricity", i. e. multiple centres of real decision making dispersed in the 
governmental and non-governmental spheres (Bogason and Toonen, 1998: 216). 
Thus, the presence of inter-organizational networks implies "new [processes] of 
governing, or a changed condition of ordered rule, or [a] new method by which 
society is governed" (Rhodes, 1996: 653). These conditions signal the shift from 
government to governance. 
Inter- organizational networks, however, have been always part of pobtical systems. 
The variation introduced by the Rhodes model is that it argues that networks have 
become more numerous, powerful, and influential, producing sigriificant changes in C) C? 
the functioning of governments: 
'ne governance approach does not claim networks are new, only that 
they have multiplied. Precise figures are not available, but the 
fragmentation of public services through the increasmg use of special- 
purpose bodies and contracted-out senrices is obvious and x"despread. 
(Rhodes, 2000: 64). 
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Governance implies that these networks are more open, complex and 
potentially unstable than hitherto and that bargaining and the building 
of trust form more of the story of pobtical He than the standard 
operating procedures of bureaucracies, the closed nature of party 
government and the hidden power of local elites" Oohn, 2001: 9) 
As Clapham and Kintrea (2000) argue, the problem from the governmental point of 
view is that influential and powerful inter-organizational. networks can deten-nine 
their own policies, even against the policy direction established býý central authorities. 
The Rhodes model supposes that informal authority of networks can supplant the 
formal authority of government (Bevir and Rhodes, 2003). However, the immediate 
problem is how government can adapt to these new conditions, and steer networks 
into complementary roles, instead of competing ones: 
The challenge of British government is to recognise the constraints on 
central action imposed by the sh-ift to self-organising networks; and to 
search for new tools for managing such networks. Game playing, joint 
action, mutual adjustment and networking are the new skifls of the 
pubhc manager (Rhodes, 1995: 17) 
In this understanding of governance, the analysis of governmental capacities in the 
middle of nemvorks borders the pessimistic, especially concerning problems of 
accountability and policy coordination. Rhodes (1997: 100" reco ises that I 
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government "is not hollowed out" completely. British central government retains 
control over a significant part of financial resources, wl-ých gives it a considerable 
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control over sub-national matters (ibid. ). But this control is exerted over an 
4ý increasingly shrinking pohcy intervention base" (Mannetto, 2003: 595). 
The innovations of the Rhodes model are many, but most of them coincide vAth 
KoolMan (1993) and Rosenau and Czemplel (1992) in going beyond the 
government-society conceptual division to explain political d) Tnan-lics. According to 
Rhodes (1995: 17), "focusing on governance dissolves the distinction between state 
and civil society". In spite of the assessment of this particular assertion, the Rhodes 
model alerts us about the real places of decision-making, regardless of where they are 
in the bureaucratic structure or among societal institutions (Cole and) ohn, 200 1). By 
conceptualising the state as a coBection of inter-organizational networks, Rhodes 
posed a major paradigm shift that has been very influential and is still under 
consideration through empirical studies. 
Rhodes's definition of governance, however, does not lack questionable aspects. T'he 
most important is the centrahty that is assigned to inter-organizational networks, 
both in theoretical and empirical terms. I agree vnth Rhodes that all understandings 
of governance introduce inter-orgaruzational methods or approaches to pohcy 
shaping. Nevertheless, this phenomenon of contemporary politics is not always 
central in politics, as empirical studies have demonstrated (cf Blatter, 2003; Cole and 
John, 2001; Le Gales, 2002). As this dissertation argues, there are multiple wavs in 
wl-ých the basic problems of government-society interdependencies, detected by the 
Rhodes model, are manifested. 
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The model proposed by Rhodes was designed specially for the national and sub- 
national level of analysis. Specifically, Rhodes is writing in order to explain the shift 
from government to governance in British politics. This evident trait of his 
governance understanding has become increasingly underlined in the local 
governance literature after empirical studies have contrasted the British experience 
ýmth other European countries. 
The shift from local government to local govemance 
Once Rhodes and other authors established the qualitative difference of government 
and governance, it became apparent that a substantial change, or "shift", had taken 
place in British politics. The presupposition of a 'shift from government to 
governance' is ubiquitous in local governance literature. John (2001: xii) argues that 
the change introduced by inter-organizational networks and new forms of 
government-society interactions is not an adaptation of local government's 
repertoire, but something "qualitatively different from what went on before" (ibid.: 
168). The heart of the government to governance shift is that "traditional institutions 
have become less important in local politics" (ibid.: 167), which, in its turn, is the 
cause and effect of new modalities of government- society interactions. 
The local governance literature has been especial-ly abundant in analysing the 
particular forms of this shift in British pohtics. just to mention some examples, 
Mlinar (1995: 145) defines governance as the introduction of "hvbrid frameworks of 
ipation of citizens i participationil in local adn-ýnistration, \-, -hich aBows the partici I in 
poky-making, and implementation. McLaverty's (1998) concern is how British 
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government can effectively promote citizen involvement going around the problems 
of closed inter-organizational nerworks. Kjellberg (1995), Sharpe (1970), and Teune 
(1995) analyse the implications of the shift to governance over the traditional values 
of local government, a ing that governance does not necessarily improve local rgul I 
democracy and the quality of citizens' participation. The literature also includes 
comparative studies trying to determine the extent, in both qualitative and 
geographical terms, of the government to governance shift (cf. Cole and john, 2001; 
Desal and InIrie, 1998; John, 2001, and Le Gales, 2002). These latter contributions 
are analysed in a section below. 
The concept of a shift to governance can be problematic N-, -hen used as a synonym of 
transition, which brings us to the issue of movement between paradigms. 
Governance frameworks have already dealt With the problem, and have offered a 
clifferentiated account of th-is shift. It is now accepted that change does not occur in 
A policy sectors at the same pace, but that are areas in which the change happens 
more rapidly and affecting more actors (see John, 2001; Krahmann, 2001; and Pierre 
and Peters, 2000). The shift from government to go, %7'emance, as it is explained in the 
folloWlng section, takes place in a varying way. 
Biin, uiiio, aOi, ernmenf back in: the 'ýaoiernment-gommance confinuum" 
Governance de6ned as a different "sphere of authontý, " to government produced a 
dichotomised view of the shift bet-, veen them (Pierre and Peters, 2000). A pohfical 
svstem could be classified either as 'government' or 'governance', according to the 
characteris tics mentioned in the previous sections of the chapter. Authors analvsed in 
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this section certainly recognise that traditional methods of administration, pohtical 
chentelism, and strong party control are not effective enough to secure acceptance to 
public pobcy and societal co-operation as they did in the past (Cole and John, 2001). 
However, they also point out that governance has not replaced government (Le 
Gales, 2002). Government refuses to go away despite governance, and in some policy 
sectors it has become more resistant than it used to be. 
The assertion of government's importance in governance is the result of the simple 
observation of the British and European cases. For example, in a study of four 
English local governments, Cole and John (2001: 120) conclude that: 
Local government officers and councillors were at the heart of local 
political networks. V'hile they could not doMinate and dictate as before, 
they had the orgoarusational., pohtical, informational and financial 
resources to lead and persuade or cajole others to fol-low them. 
Peters (1997: 51) had noticed this phenomenon before, arguing that governments in 
western industrialised countries continue to make "'authoritative allocations of values 
for a society', even if the), choose to do so and to implement their authontative 
decisions, in manners that at one time would have been considered very 
unconventional". Other studies, like john (2001), Le Gales (2002), and Pierre and 
Peters have demonstrated that in European and non-European countries 
considered cases of governance, governments continue to be politically relevant 
bevond the central control of finances suggested by Rhodes (1997). Furthermore, 
Bevir and Rhodes 422) recognise that, despite all the changes in poficy-making 
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and implementation involved in the "shift to governance", government continues to 
be "a major way of dehvenng services in Britain". 
Governments are relevant, especially at sub-national level, where it still seems to have 
"reservoirs of legitimacy" (Peters, 1997: 52) that confirm its centrahty in man), policy 
sectors. What has changed, however, is "the selection of instruments and 
organizational arrangements through which the state imposes its wiU in society" 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 93). In the United Kingdom, local governance "is not 
synonymous With the effacement of local government" because "governance creates 
more choices as compared with more traditional government practices", through 
which government seeks to increase its influence over society (Cole and John, 2001: 
120). In this way, public-private partnerships and other forms of co-operation can 
reinforce the legitimacy and the political place of government as coordinator of 
collective action in some policy areas (Cole and John, 200 1; Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
There are two reasons that could explain this 'governance with government' 
arrangement. The first one is that powerful and autonomous inter-organizational 
networks do not behave as Rhodes (1997) expects. Uiat is, pobcy-making and 
implementation based on networks could not necessarily entA strong private 
interests conducting public affairs, endangering in this way policy co-ordination and 
accountability to the state. It is possible that, as Cole and John (2001) and Peters 
(1997) argue, government deploys alternative means to influence net-ovorks and steer, 
albeit in a 1-inuted way, the pobc), processes. Other possible explanation hes in reccnt 
empirical studies on non-European contexts that argue that although local 
governance dynanucs are present, not A take the form of strong inter-organizational 
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networks. Blatter (2003), for example, argues that patterns of interaction have 
changed in the trans-border zone between Mexico and Tlie United States, confirming 
the fundamental local governance assumptions on fragmentation and increased self- 
organisation of actors. Nevertheless, he could not confirm the hypothesis of the 
'shift from hierarchies to networks', for networks have not replaced bi-national and 
other governmental commissions dealing with important trans-border matters. In the 
same lines of argument, Desai and InIrle (1998) propose a differentiated account of 
local governance manifestations between India and the United Kingdom. 
In any case, authors of this cluster of governance understandin s seek to bring 9 
government back to the analysis of local governance, and analyse its modified role in 
conditions of more fragmentation. This is a necessity because the realisation of 
certain degree of coexistence between government and governance has been present 
in the literature for a time (cf. Pierre and Peters, 2000). If coexistence is the norm, 
then the really important point is, the particular form that it takes when trying to 
accommodate qualitatively different 'orders' or paradigms of policy-making in the 
same pobty. 
Blatter (2003: 50) has suggested a way forward. Commenting on Genschel (1997), 
he argues that governmental institutions, when challenged by more complex 
environments, do not replace institutions 'With. other institutions, but rather, they set 
up "supplementary" ones. This phenomenon, which Genschel (1997) caUs 
"transposition", implies that institutional adaptation to the external environment is 
, gradual, and that, at some point, onginal and 
"supplementaly Institutions" coexist. 
Z-) I 
This phenomenon is present in the case studies of tl-ýs dissertation. Formal 
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institutions and the structure of local governments are, basicaRN, the same the in 
Mexican municipalities considered. Nevertheless, formal descriptions of the position 
in the governmental structure can be misleading, as it seems that persons holding the 
same post can be asked to perform completely different tasks. The evidence collected 
suggests, as it is explained in the following chapters, that Mexican municipalities have 
adapted to conditions of governance by changing officials' tasks fi-rst and, in a later 
stage, government's structures. As John (2001) argues, governmental institutions in 
governance do not disappear, but they become more complex. 
Government has to be brought back to governance analysis, but this is a different 
government to the one described in traditional public administration. Government in 
governance conditions means fragmented authorities sharing decision-making With 
non-governmental actors (b-rahmann, 2003). Considering governmental 
fragmentation and citizens' involvement has prompted contributors like John (2001), 
Krahmann (2003), and Pierre and Peters (2000) to propose a governance 
understanding that treats the government-governance relationship as a "continuum". 
Government and governance as ideal Z: Vical poles in a continuum 
This governance understanding questions the possibility of making any clear and 
comprehensive differentiation between examples of government and governance, 
especially if this classification is intended to consider all policy sectors and polic)- 
making processes. Contributions considered in this section understand governance in 
more concrete ways, distancing themselves from definitions of 'order', and treating 
paracligms of pobcy-making and implementation. -, overnance and government as 
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Pierre and Peters (2000) begin by acknowledging that governance does not mean the 
same as government. They accept that traditional approaches to government "are no 
longer either full), descriptive nor full), acceptable" in contemporary politics (Peters, 
1997: 52). Nevertheless, being different does not mean being mutually exclusive. 
Given the governmental fragmentation in western industrialised countries, and the 
variation in governance arrangements that it causes, it seems right to allow for a 
more differentiated account of the shift from government to governance. As Pierre 
and Peters (2000: 29) observe: 
Rather than as a sharp dichotomy [ ... ] it makes more sense to 
conceptualise the role of government and the state in governance as a 
continuum. Different governments and different policy areas are located 
at different points along this continuum, with a major analytical issue 
being understanding why those differences exist and what impact they 
have on the effectiveness of governance. 
'Mus, the difference between government and governance is "of degree rather than 
kind" (ibid. ). This suggests that it is not possible to offer an overall categonsation of 
governance unless it is demonstrated that the shift to policy-making based on open 
networks has been significant, in a significant number of pohcy sectors. On the other 
hand, the change of "degree" argued by Pierre and Peters (2000) is hard to measure. 
'Fl-ie main problem is determining the quantitative parameters that should be used to 
distingWsh between cases of government and governance. Krahmann (2003: 340) has 
located this problem when she argues that 
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it is difficult to speciý- which or how many dimensions have to be 
fragmented to quahýý a pohc), -making arrangement as governance rather 
than government, not least because the institutions and practices in each 
dimension are dynan-uc and constantly evolVing. Separate dimensions 
may proceed either toward greater fragmentation or towards integration. 
In fact, different dimensions might display countervailing trends. 
The idea of the government-governance continuum implies a quantitative dimension 
that is difficult to analyse. Rhodes (1997,2000) has argued that governance is 
constructed by a set of quantitative changes that eventuafly produce qualitative ones. 
The increment of the empowerment of inter-organizational networks, fragmentation, 
and 'blurredness' of functions, reaches a point when traditional governmental 
instruments cease to be effective (ibid. ) Nevertheless, defining the point at which the 
(shift' takes place is problematical and not very useful. Being able to offer an exact 
differentiation between government and governance does not add any significant 
advantage to contemporanT analyses, especially because they are offering increasingly 
differentiated accounts of governance that distin ish between poticy sectors (see e. g. 9W 
Cole and John, 2001; and Le Gales, 2002). In the end, the qualitative approach used 
by most contributors to governance literature suffices to give a general orientation to 
research questions, hypotheses, and empirical studies. The qualitative approach to 
defining governance ponders pohcy sectors and processes that are considered 
significant; it analyses general conditions of fragmentation and blurredness, and 
proposes the classification of 'governance' when there have been changes of 
substance in government-societN, interactions. 'Mis, of course, does not rule out anv 
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attempt at measuring differences of government and governance by quantitative 
methods. 
The government-governance continuum offers a picture of fragmented 
administrations Aqth contrasting, and possibly conflicting, degrees of proximitv to 
one paradigm or the other. Krahmann (2003: 332) has worked on this idea, 
developing seven dimensions in which policies can be nearer to government or to 
governance: geographical scope, function, distribution of resources, interests, norms, 
decision-making, and policy iMplementation. For her, this is only a rough guide that 
indicates general tendencies, but that could offer a basis to attempt a classification of 
political systems. Table 3 is an explanation of government and governance as "poles 
on a continuum" (ibid. ). 
Table 3. Government and Governance as poles on a continuum 
Dimensions Government Governance 
Geographical scope Sub-national Sub-national 
National National 
Regional 
Global 
Trans-national 
Functional scope Several issue areas Single issue area 
Distribution of resources Centralised Dispersed 
Interests Common Differentiated 
Norms Sovereignty 
Command and control 
Redistribution 
Limited sovereignty 
Self-government 
Market 
Decision-making Hierarchical HoriZontal 
Consensus Negotiation 
Formal equality Inequality 
Implementation Centralised Fragmented 
Authoritative Self-enforced 
Coerci, %, e Voluntary 
Source: Krahmann, 2003: ')')2 
john (2001) has also developed the idea of a govemment-governance con6nuum. 
For Iii-rri, the fact that governance has not replaced government has produced a 
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mixture of traditional governmental institutions (hke law, taxes as main source of 
revenue, pol-itical parties, and powerful senior bureaucrats) with new institutions (e. g. 
public-private partnerships, citizens' councils, and networks) (ibid.: 17). As a result, it 
is better to conceptualise government and governance as ideal types, for they are 
helpful to establish frameworks of analysis and hypotheses Without disregarding the 
complex variety of governance arrangements of real political systems (ibid. ). Table 4 
is a surnmary of his governance understanding according to general vanables. This 
definition of governance presupposes that a concrete pohtical Sý7stem can develop 
different degrees of proxinuty to one or another ideal type, depending on the 
analysed variable. 
Table 4. Local government and governance contrasted 
Govemment Govemance 
1 Number of institutions Few Many 
2 Bureaucratic structure Hierarchical Decentred 
Consolidated Fragmented 
3 lJoriZontal networks Closed Extensive 
4 International networks Minimal Extensive 
5 Democratic linkage Representative Representative + new 
experiments 
6 Policies Routinized Innovative learning 
Central government Direct control Decentralizes + micro control 
8 Leadership Collegial / clientelistic Mavoral / charismatic 
Source: John, 2001: 17 
An underpinning assumption of the government-govemance continuum is that the 
adaptive capacity of the state is greater than what is acknowledged by previous 
governance understandings. Unlike Rhodes (1995,1997) or Stoker (1998), the 
(continuum' understanding of governance stresses that power dependence can be 
part of the adaptation process of the state to new societal conditions. By focusing on 
governance as a modaht-NI of pohcý--rnaking and implementation, John (2001), 
Krahmann (2003), and Pierre and Peters (2000) recognise that the different degrees, 
of proximity to the poles of the continuum have allowed government to remain as an 
important player in many policy sectors. Governments have relinquished some of 
their prerogatives and modified others in order to gain acceptance of policy in key 
areas, and diminish their problems in policy sectors in which they cannot give 
satisfactory results (Pierre and Peters, 2000). 
In this sense, the 'continuum' model assumes that government's officials have at 
their disposal a greater variety of means to steer and influence policy outcomes than 
in the past. As Rhodes (1995) argues, they can choose among hierarchies, markets, 
and networks, according to the particular context, in order to solve problems more 
efficiently. Government and governance are different sets of interaction patterns 
between the state and the citizens that seek to solve, basicafly, the same societal 
problems (Pierre and Peters, 2000). The difference is that the governance approach is 
-post-political" in the sense that it uses alternative methods that do not follow the 
pubbc-private separation; thus, roles, resources, and interaction patterns traditionally 
assigned separately to governors or governed are now considered mutual. 
The governance ideal type defined by the most recent contributions incorporates 
elements that offer a more detailed picture of local governance in western 
inclustnalised countnes. 'fhe model cle-veloped by John (2001: 14-17) is especially 
relevant, for it also considers governmental efforts to deal , x-lth the unintended 
outcomes of policy-making based on networks. Table 5 is a summary of his 
positions, the obsen, ations of "revived central initiatives" and "the search for new 
mechanisms of control and accountability" being particularly important. Among 
these we can find the "more pron-unent forms of executive leadersl-ýp- that, 
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paradoxically, are normally considered a component of government. John's (2001) 
argument is that in a more fragmented government the role of a strong leadership (in 
this case a strong mayor) is necessan, for introducing pohcN, coherence among A the 
governmental departments involved in solving complex problems. The evidence 
collected in this dissertation suggests that this leadership is exerted not only through 
the usual bureaucratic channels, but goes beyond them in order to establish direct 
links With society. 
One possible problem With the go-vernment-governance continuum is that it appears 
to imply the concept of linearity of change. On the one hand, Pierre and Peters 
(2000) offer a useful tool when they think of local policy-making as a set of different 
tracks of pohcy sectors, where pubhc and private actors interact in order to achieve 
political objectives. The framework explains conflicting policies and, at the same 
time, it takes into consideration Rhodes's (1997) proposals regarding the importance 
of networks in policy shaping. On the other hand, this governance understanding 
presupposes that policy sectors can be defined clearly. In reality, many of them 
overlap and influence each other. That is, policy developments sometimes resemble a 
three-dimensional area in a horizontal and vertical vveb, rather than a point in a 
horizontal track. In this way, change in a policy track could happen in non-linear 
ways when one poficy sector influences another. The evidence coHected by Cabrero- 
Mendoza (2002) in 39 Mexican municipalities suggests that relatively small programs, 
like the Cifi: Zens' Dq), described in chapter three, have had influence not only over 
p, -i-, Ing, potable %vater, public lighting, and drainage progranunes, for \vhých it was 
designed, but also over xvider and more strategic pohcv-making for the cities. 
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Table 5. Governance as an ideal type 
Dimension Characteristics Observations 
Institutional Institutional Creation of new levels of elected sub- 
reform multiplication national government, special purpose 
bodies, proliferation, and blurring 
boundaries (Stoker, 1998) 
Institutional restructuring Adoption of NPM ideas, decentralisation, 
Pnvatisation, contractingr out, =cro 
dehvery agencies and new budgeting 
agencies 
New networks Stronger honZontal Fragmentation, complexity and the 
networks presence of private actors facilitate the 
formation of links of trust, and in some 
occasions of urban regimes (Stone, 1989) 
New cross-national Local authorities develop stronger cross- 
networks national hnks to access resources and 
influence policy 
New policy Local innovation and The competition for scarce resources, and 
initiatives capacity building the opportunities in the areas from which 
the state has 'retreated', allow innovative 
solutions 
Revived central initiatives Decentralisation does not i ly that IMP ý 
central government is powerless to 
influence local policy; the fracqnented state 
reinvents its role in highly targeted policy 
areas, it becomes an actor and more 
prominent partner in networks 
Responses to The search for new Broader networks diffuse the lines of 
dilern-mas of mechanisms of control 
coordination and and accountability 
accountability 
control and command, producing lack of 
clarity. To counter the possible negative 
implications on democracy, authorities seek 
new ways to involve and mobilise citizens 
to leggittmýise policy 
More prominent forms of Complexity of public adn-unistration, 
executive leadership fragmentation, and the growth of decision- 
making using networks produce the crisis 
of traditional ways of policy coordination. 
As a response, the office of leadership 
strengthens to fill the vacuum 
Source: Elaboration on John, 2001: 14-16. 
Finally, it is important to note that the 'continuum' understanding of governance was 
designed for national and sub-national contexts, and is especially useful for an 
environment of fragmented policy-making or Implementation. This governance 
understanding is more context-n-nnded, In the sense that it aflows for greater local 
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variation than the definitions of Kooiman (1993), Rhodes (1997), and Rosenau and 
Czemplel (1992). 
Multi-level govemance 
Besides the 'continuum', "multi-level governance" (Marks, 1996; Marks, Hooghe, 
and Blank, 1996) is another governance understanding that has avoided making any 
sharp distinction between government and governance, reconsidering the importance 
of government in the process. This model was developed after the introduction of a 
supranational level of government in the European Union, and it tries to explain the 
apparent contradiction of states giving away power and sovereignty rights. 
The basic assumption of the framework is that states, by giving away some carefuHy 
selected external decisions, actually strengthen their positions in domestic issues, 
(Marks et al., 1996). Pie process is steered by state actors who seek to be re-elected 
or to maintain their power positions, and who may or may not "defend central state 
authoritý, " (Marks, 1996: 35). The model assumes that political actors share the 
decision-making process. "Multi-level governance" is possible because political 
arenas are not "nested", as in the state-centric frameworks, but "interconnected" 
going beyond the usual categories of analysis (Marks et al. 1996: 346). The distinction 
between domestic and international matters becomes blurred ývhen what happens at 
local level in one country can have important consequences at national or 
supranational le-, -els in other. 
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In the same way as the "continuum" understanding of governance, the "multi-level" 
framework does not need to make distinctions between government and governance 
pohfical orders. At the core of this approach hes the same set of assumptions present 
in Pierre and Peters (2000): a) fragmentation is never absolute because once it 
increases b) re-arrangements of interests and power dependencies take place, creating 
alternative centres of decision-making. But c) these re-arrangements seldom foHow 
the state's formal bureaucracies (Hirst, 1994). Governmental orders are not 
qualitatively different from governance ones because political power re-arrangements 
need resources originally owned by the state (Peters, 1997). This means that at least 
some of the new power dependencies are the state's own making (Marks, 1996; 
Marks et al., 1996). This governance understanding was designed for making regional 
level analyses, and although not direcflý in local governance matters, it 
considers the new roles of cities in an environment where they can be influential vis- 
ý-vis supranational, national, and sub-national governmental agencies, and national 
and international private actors within the European Union (Le Gales, 2002). 
Conlextualised Povernance 
The last group of understandings draw from earlier contributions their basic 
assumptions and arguments on governance. However, unlike previous contributions 
that can be criticised by their context-free approaches, Bevir and Rhodes (2003); 
Bevir, el al. (2003,22003a); Cole and John (2001), Gaster (2002), John (-'ool), and Le 
Gales (20022) I-lave installed national and local contexts as unportant variables that 
explain patterns of government-society interactions and mould governance 
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outcomes. In order to demonstrate this, thev have taken, in part, the chaHenge posed 
by Pierre and Peters (2000) of conducting comparative research to figure out how 
governance looks like outside the United Kingdom. Their conclusions can be 
summed up in the argument of Cole and John (2001: x), who find 'comparable but 
not identical' patterns of governance between English and French cities. For the 
aforementioned authors, governmental and other kind of institutions, previous 
networks' engagements, values, political and procedural cultures, among others, are 
factors that determine the final form that local governance takes in different 
countries. 
The issue of context is important given the generic, and inappropriate, treatment that 
some governance frameworks have given to non-European regions. Pierre and Peters 
(2000) have argued that dynamics of governance should be considered as part of the 
state's adaptation process to more complex conditions. \XI-ien applying this idea to 
Latin America, however, they find this region as prone to state-weakness as Africa 
(ibid.: 185), a statement that is nor proved by them. States in Africa and Latin 
America, they argue, have not been able to benefit from governance arrangements 
because the "predatory" and "chentebstic" traits of their political systems inhibit their 
capacity to increase in flexibility and modiý,, to their advantage, the traditional 
government- society patterns of interaction Jbid: 187-188). Tbey certalnlý 
acknowledge that in the cases of Mexico and Brazil this is somewhat different 
(ibid. 186), but their treatment of the Mexican context is inadequate, for they do not 
offer a differentiated account of the diversity existing in African and Latin American 
Polities. Blatter (2001) ana]ýTses bi-national and international co-operation issues in 
the border between Mexico and the United States, but his main contribution lies in 
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the regional level of analysis. Gibbins (2001), on the other hand, makes a broad 
description of Mexican local governance conditions, but in so general terms that it is 
not useful to obtain a detailed account of the var)'Ing levels of fragmentation, 
'blurredness' of functions, and self-organisation among political actors that can be 
found in Mexican municipalities. Mexico is practically absent in governance 
theoretical frameworks. This dissertation is a contribution to this gap that needs to 
be covered, for although governance understandings have had contexts of western 
industriahsed countries as ffnmediate origin, they propose basic theoretical 
dimensions, as fragmentation, blurredness, and self-organisation that are useful to 
explain local governance outcomes in Mexico. 
Brin ing context back into the governance analysis is invited by the foregoing 91 
discussions. John and Cole (1995), for example, argue that networks shape 
governance outcomes and form. If it is acknowledged that networks are not present 
in all contexts in the same way, then it is possible to link govemance vanetýý with 
network variety. In the same line of thought, Gaster (2002) recognises that the 
importance given to inter- organizational networks and other themes hke pol-itical 
management, community leadership, partnerships, and citizens' involvement, is the 
response to the particular conditions of B7ilirh local governance. Unlike previous 
contributions, this explicit ackno-, T., Iedgement of the contextual ongins of the "Anglo 
governance school" has emphasised the need to conduct comparative studies. 
Other important contribution in this -sense Is that of Cole and John (2001). -nese 
authors compare the cases of England and France, argWng that local governance in 
both countries is characterised by the presence of new actors participating in 
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decision- making, the change of the roles of traditional decision-makers, the change in 
routines of policy-making, new chaRenges in policýý, and the implementation of 
contested accountability mechanisms. These traits, however, are 'comparable, but not 
identical', because national and local contexts, in addition to the particular pol. icy 
areas, influence governance (ibid.: x). Tbus, "there is no a 'size fits A' description of 
governance" (ibid.: xi). The presence of similar local governance trends in England 
and France does not necessarily mean a move towards convergence, but on])- that in 
both countries the interdependence between pubhc, pnVate, and societal actors has 
grown to different extents (ibid.: 142 - 143). 
John (2001) has also contributed to the re-evaluation of context in local governance 
understandings. He studies the forms that local governance has taken in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Scandinavia, Spain, and 
the United Kingdom, and arrives at the conclusion that despite the differences in 
local governance patterns, there are trends that are cross-European, like the 
formation of regimes, institutional fragmentation, privatisation, institutional reform, 
new patters of leadership, and the spread of NPM cntena. John (2001) makes a 
convincing case against the North-South divide in European local governance, for 
there are important Similarities among countries. Thus, governance is not only a 
phenomenon of northern Europe. The difference lies in the fact that not A 
countries 'develop all aspects of the government to governance shift' (ibid.: 172). 
Local governance can be defined as an ideal type, and different countries display 
different degrees of development in the mentioned traits. A similar concluslon is 
reached by Le Gales (2002), ,,, -Iio argues that a common trend in local governance in 
Europe is the corroboration of the European city as a decislon-making locus. Bevir 
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et al. (2003) argue in the same lines, but from the institutional standpoint, after 
comparing experiences of local governance in Australia, Britain, France, Germanv, 
The Netherlands, and Norway. 
Local governance in the analysed countries appears to have some commonalities that 
justiýý the usage of the term beyond the Anglo-Saxon context. For Cole and John 
(2001: 11), local governance in England and France is charactensed by: a) increased 
fragmentation (i. e. the presence of non-elected agencies and quasi-public bodies With 
overlapping functions), b) blurring boundaries between areas of influence (public Z-71 
officials acting as entrepreneurs and priVate firms holding public responsibilities); and 
c) inter- organiz atio nal networks, which are considered a "necessary feature of 
governance". For Goldsrnith and Garrard (2000), local governance in European 
countries can be summed up in the presence of non-elected agencies conducting 
pubhc matters, and the formation of local partnersh-ips. For Desal and Imne (1998), 
local governance in Britain and India has in common the proliferation of 
governmental agencies and new forms of design and implementation of policy. 
Krahmann (2003) has argued that the commonalities between different cases of 
governance go beyond ffie level of analysis, and that some qualities are common 
between local, national, regional, and global governance. In this way, "governance 
can universal1v be defined by fragmentation of political authority In different 
dimensions" (ibid.: 123-324). Finafl) 7, Stoker (1998) also established common 
elements in governance understandings, regardless of difference of context and level 
of analysis, as it was mentioned above. 
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Despite the common trends found in different contexts, and levels of analvs1s, the 
recent contributions mentioned in this section argue that "there is not an essentialist 
notion of governance" (Be-, -lr and Rhodes, 2003: 43). In this way, "'governance' as 
applied to British government wiU mean something different to 'governance' in 
France" (ibid.: 14). The reaHy 'important point is to determine the common and 
different trends in the studied cases and offer plausible explanations for these 
variations (Pierre and Peters, 2000). In this way, 
there is no tool kit applicable vqthin or across countries. Govemance is 
constructed differently and continuously reconstructed so there can be 
no one set of tools. The battery of reforms masquerading under the 
single label of the New Public Management Alustrates the point (Bevir 
et al. 2003a: 203). 
This governance understanding recogn"ses that there can be conunon trends between 
different countries, but that the variations are the result of national and local 
contexts, that is, the 'sh-ift' from government to governance does not necessarýy take 
the same form in all cases. As a consequence, the only possible wav forvard in regard 
the analysis of govemance understandings is its comparison \xqth as many different 
contexts as possible. Governance understandings like those of Kooirnan (1993), 
Pierre and Peters (2000), and Rhodes (1997), although elegant and appealing for the 
analysis, as Bevir and RJ-iodes (2003) say, should be considered onIN, as broad 
references to gWde the research. The resulting picture of local governance has to be 
much more complex than the one offered bly the first theoretIcal frameworks, 
n, tu considering all the Llifferent pohcy sectors, and the traditional and new I tI tlons 
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that coexist ýxqth different degrees of fragmentation. In this way, a government- 
governance mixture is assumed in this governance understanding. 
Conclusions: the dissertation's theoretical framework 
In this chapter, governance understandings were classified according to three criteria: 
their theoretical character, their analysis of the role of government, and their level of 
analysis. There has been a cumulative process bN7 which some common themes and 
concerns have been preserved in most governance understandings as the), have been 
developed. In this way, fragmentation, the blurring boundaries bem, een public and 
societal actors and the presence of strong inter-organizational networks are 
commonalities among the main definitions of governance. These concepts are 
treated differently according to the level of analysis, even though there seems to be a 
common line of understanding linking the most influential authors of the "Anglo 
governance school" 
This dissertation draws its theoretical ftamework from the aforementioned 
contributions. Its main propositions are the following: 
Goivinance and goi)ernment are not a diclwoi; g. This dissertation assumes that 
government and governance are ideal types of policy-making and implementation 
(see John, 2001, Krahmann, 2()03). As such, they are never fully verified in A 
their possible dimensions, but only partially developed in particular political 
svstems. I Fhese ideal týTes are useful, for thev identifi- overall trends of co- 
ordination modal-ities, but can be misleading if the), are interpreted as poles in a 
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dichotomy. As Cerny (1997), Genschel (1997), and Payne (forthcorning 2005) 
argue, in real political systems what we can find is a blend of different ideal types 
of governance modalities. Fherarchies continue to be used and so are some 
traditional government's intervention mechanisms, like taxes and la-,,,, 
enforcement (John, 2001). In situations of governance, however, policy-making 
processes based on networking, and charactensed by fragmentation, accompany 
them. Equally important are policy arrangements based on the markets' 
participation in some policy sectors. 
This combination produces political systems that, overall, are nearer to 
government or governance as ideal types Oohn, 2001; Pierre and Peters, 2()()()). 
But this general evaluation has to be qualified according to what happens ad intra 
in political sýlstems, where traditional government mechanism-, can be used pre- 
eminently in one policy sector, and governance networking and fragmentation in 
another. As K-rahmann (2003) argues, in the same pohtý, we could find 
countervaihng tendencies. In this sense, government and governance cannot be 
considered to be mutually exclusive in the same political system. Another matter, 
of course, is how problematic it is to implement paradigms of traditional 
government and governance policy-making in the same pohcv area. This 
diss-ertation presupposes that in Mexican municipalities it is not possible to apply 
a sharp distinction between government and governance, but that they coexl,, -, t in 
different poh 
C)T sectors. 
B) In lhiý dissedation, goiernment and g0rernance are considered as paradiams of polig, <5 6 
, mikiq tind implemenl(ition. 
Governance understandings relate to definitions of 
84 
social-political orders and the role that government plays in them. They 
presuppose a different kind of social-pol-itical order, where the traditional 
patterns of interaction between government and society are modified bý 
increased fragmentation and the involvement of non-governmental actors in 
policy definition (IRJ-iodes, 1997). Governance is more complex and requires 
more flexibility from political actors than traditional governmental orders 
(Kooirnan, 1993). Nevertheless, the principal focus of this dissertation hes in the 
particular arrangements in policy-making and implementation. Therefore, 
although it is assumed that the general patterns of interaction between 
government and society have suffered changes in Mexican local ()FONT ernments, 
this thesis deals mainly with particular municipal policy sectors and hoxv they 
have accommodated the shift from government to governance. The 
dissertation's conclusions suggest that changes in paradigms of policy-making at 
local level might be related to wider changes in the traditional relations of Zý) 
government and society, affecting important pol-icy areas in the three levels of 
government. But this is beyond the scope of this research. 
Gorernance is characten*. fed bl, ino-easedftqpmentation, blurTedness, and se -o anisation. 
This dissertation presupposes that governance is a "flexible pattem of public 
clecision-making, based on loose nemorks of indi'Viduals" Oohn, 2001: 9). Tl-ý, -, 
definition assumes certain elements that are common to most governance 
understandings, and that point at basic traits of local governance in western 
industrialised countries. In the first place, governance as a policy-making 
paradigm supposes fragmentation. As it -was explained above, tl-ýs implies a move 
towards decentrahsation and power dispersal into a greater number of 
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governmental or quasi-governmental agencies, many of xwhich are composed by 
non-elected members from the three societal sectors (Andrew and Goldsmith, 
1998). This produces, policy coordination problems that are counterbalanced by 
the development of strong mayoral leaderships and other alternative cteering 
methods based on personal governing styles Uohn, 2001). 
In the second place, greater citizens' involvement in policy-making and the 
increase of the importance of networks blurs the Weberian distinction between 
the pubhc and private spheres, producing private actors deahng with provision of 
public services, and governmental officials behavmg like entrepreneurs Oohn, 
2001). Finally, local governance presupposes that self-organisation, among 
networks and other non-governmental actors, has increased as the result of the 
government's modification of its traditional role (Koolman, 1993). Nevertheless, 
fragmentation, blurredness, and self-orgawsation do not remain constant in the 
selected cases of study. The studied Mexican murucipahties display vanations that 
give different pictures of local governance, although such differences sometimes 
are n-unor. This dissertation considers that these governance outcomes are the 
dependent variable in the research, for the), change according to conditions of 
the national and local contexts. 
pe localgmeriialice- In this dissertation, it is presupposed that local D) Contexts sba 
govemance variations are moulded bv national and local contexts, in accordance 1, - 
to recent developments in local governance literature (Bevir et al., -2003. Bevir 
and Rhodes, 2()()'). Cole and John, 2001; John, 2001, and Le Gales, 2()()-). -Fl-ýs 
thesis argues that in the studied Mexican municipabdes, governance outcomes are 
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shaped by several variables in the local and national contexts. Among these, the 
political party in office, the way networks operate, and the policy issue are 
especially important. In this thesis, this set of conditions is considered the 
independent variable for the analysis. 
The foBoWing chapter introduces the subject of context by describing the contours 
of Mexican local governance. 
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Chapter Two 
The contours of local governance in Mexico 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the understandings of sub-national governance 
have gradually incorporated local and national contexts into analyses that seek to 
explain variations in patterns of governance. Comparative studies between European 
and other western industriahsed countries show that thev share siniflar trends 
regarding the inclusion of non-governmental actors in policy-making and 
implementation, the substitution of traditional governmental instruments of control, 
and the resulting problems in securing accountability to the state (Cole and John, 
2001). These shared tendencies have similarities among them, but they are not 
exactly the same in all countries (ibid. ). ITie most recent contributions to the 
literature on sub-national governance argue that the differences are explamed not 
only by the variations in the configuration of inter-organizational networks, as the 
original argument of Rhodes (1997) suggests, but also by variables that describe the 
medium in which these networks interact, like political and procedural cultures, the 
structure of government, and the customary modes of government-society relations 
(Bevir and FLhodes, 2003; Gaster, 2002; John, 2001; and Le Gales, 2002). 
Consequently, if governance can be theoretically identified by a "flexible pattern of 
public decision-making based on loose networks of individuals" gohn, 9), the 
particular modahties that this flexible pattem takes are the matter of empirical 
research. 
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This chapter is an initial consideration of the Mexican context. It argues that, in 
recent years, local political arenas in Mexico have experienced a rise in the 
implementation of NPM cntena, in the electoral fragmentation of municipal 
governments and the citizens' partisanship, and in the number of actors (both 
governmental and non-governmental) participating in the pohcy process. As a result, 
traditional methods of policy-making andimplementation have begun to be replaced 
by others based on flexible networks of governmental officials and citizens, which 
will be treated in detail in the following chapters. This change, however, has not 
taken place uniformly, but in a highly uneven way, vaiýying among municipalities and 
even among different pohcy sectors within the same local government. This 
unevenness, which amounts to a partial 'shift' to governance, is related to structural 
conditions of Mexican munIcipalities, such as their rural or urban quality, the 
bureaucratic organisation of local government, and federal policies that have made 
social participation a requirement to receive transfers. FolloWing chapters will 
elaborate and qualify this assertion, analysing mainly local conditions, and comparing 
them with the variations of governance patterns in the three studied municipalities. 
The chapter begins vvith a brief description of Mexican municipahty's perfon-nance, 
and the unevenness of the conditions under which it must work. This is followed by 
a section on traditional traits of Mexican local governments, which are mostIN- the 
result of a municipal system designed to ensure the prevalence of a single political 
partý T. Finally, there is an analysis of the emergent trends of local governance that 
have become especially evident since the second half of the 1990s, -when the partisan 
alternation in mutucipal and state governments became significant. 
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Municipal unevenness 
One of the salient characteristics of Mexican municipalities is that despite having a 
common constitutional status, which gives them equal responsibilities and legal 
instruments to deal with the provision of public services, their actual performance 
and the conditions in which it is carried out vary greatly. 
Mexico is a federal republic ýXqth three levels of government. There are 31 states and 
one Federal District (Mexico City), which are Jointly called 'federal entities' (enfidad 
fiederativa). Federal entities are diVided into local governments. Municipalities are the 
states' local governments, while the Federal Distnict has delqxiones instead (literally 
'delegated governments'). Delep(7'ones, unlike municipalities, do not have City C) 
Councils made up by aldermen, and until recently, their chiefs were directly 
appointed by the Federal District's governor2. The country has a power di, ýTjsion that 
follows the model of the United States, With elected executives (president, governors, 
mayors and cl-i-iefs of delega ' nes) and le islatures (there are two federal chambers, one " 
(70 91 
of deputies and another of senators, and 32 local congresses, one in each federal 
The dissertation focuses on municipalities rather than on delegaciones. The main justification 
for this selection is that the 16 delegationes are exceptional, especially if one considers the pace 
of their democratic consolidation and their funding system. Municipalities differ greatly in 
their capacities to produce partisan alternation in office. The), possess, however, a well- 
established tradition of electoral competition and its institutions. Even if one argues that 
these institutions became really operational until the recognition of opposition local 
governments became the standard, still there is a decade's gap between municipalities and 
delý ' nes, for the latter's first direct elections occurred until 2000. The funding systems are , gacio 
also different. Federal agencies directly financed the Federal District's, public serviCes until 
the rnid 1990s, when the process of decentralisation, which had begun in the states a decade 
earlier, gained speed in the capital. However, this process has not reached the level found in 
the states. For example, education services, which can consume up to 50 per cent of the 
states' budgets, are still fully funded by the federal government in the delý:, gaL-7*011ef. In addition, 
they display significant characteristics, like a relationship with the Federal District's governor 
inclined towards administration (as opposed to politics), and a lo,, ý-er dependence on federal 
transfers, which make them exceptional local governments, 
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entity). There is also a supreme court (appointed by the president, ratified bv the 
senate) and 32 high courts, one for each federal entity. 
The 2,435 municipalities of the countrýý share electoral, funding, and constitutional 
conditions in general; they, however, display a considerable variety in everything else. 
If the Federal District is excluded, the state of Bala Califortua has the most populated 
local governments, With an average of 497,473 inhabitants per municipality (although 
most of them are actually concentrated in Tijuana). The state of Oaxaca, on the other 
hand, has 570 municipalities with an average population of 6,033 inhabitants each. 
Regarding their territory, the largest municipalities belong to Baja California Sur, With 
an average of 14,735 Km2, while 'naxcala has 60 municipahties With an average of 65 
square kilometres each (see table 6). The dissertation argues that there are common 
governance trends in urban municipalities, but the scale of the problems they have to 
face varies sign1ficantly according to the basic conditions of population and territory. 
Table 6. States with the smallest and largest municipalities in averages of 
population and size 
Average size of Average of 
Number of municipality in population per 
State municipalities square kilometres municipality* 
Bala Califorrua 5 14,023 497,473 
Bala Cahfornia Sur 5 14,735 84,808 
'naxcala 60 65 16,044 
Oaxaca 57 0 167 6,033 
Source: INAFED (2004). *The population is for 2000. 
Differences related to population and territory are accompanied by socio-econon-uc 
ones. Among the munlcipahties , -, -e can find cases hke Metepec (state of MeXico), 
Cuernavaca (Morelos), San Pedro Garza Garcia, San Nicolis de los Garza (Nuevo 
Le6n), Santa Maria del Tule (Oaxaca), and four delegat' nes of Mexico City (Benito ,g 70 
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juirez, Coyoa6n, Nliguel Hidalgo, and Tlalpan) that have indicators of education, 
health, and income per capita similar to those of European countries (UNDP, 2004). 
In the particular case of Benito juýrez, these indicators are as good as those of similar 
areas in Germany, Italy, New Zealand, and Spain (ibid. ). By the same token, the 
municipalities of SitaU, Santiago el Pinar, Aldama (Chiapas), Meflat6noc (Guerrero), 
Colcoyin de las Hores, San Sim6n ZahuatUn, Santa Lucia MiahuatUn, Santa Maria la 
Asuncl6n (Oaxaca), Tehuipango, and Nfixtla de -Mtan-urano (Veracruz), have human 
development indexes comparable vnth those of Sub-Saharan African countries 
(ibid. ). Between these two extremes, there are more than two thousand municipahties 
with a great variety of socio-economic conditions. These have shaped a multiplicity 
of patterns of interaction between government and society, ranging from some cases 
of high governmental fragmentation and the implementation of NPM criteria 
(Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003), to very traditional governments, almost totally dependent 
on federal transfers and ývith strong clientehstic patterns of interaction with citizens 
(Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996). NPM in general 1,,,; composed of different policies based 
on a preference of managerial approaches over political ones, the appraisal for 
efficiency in adrrunistration, the prohferation of more autonomous governmental 
agencies, the emphasis on outputs, targets, and monetarv incentives for bureaucrats, 
and a public senice delivery that considers citizens as clients (Bevir et al., 2003). 
Mexican style NPI\I, as it is explained below, shows many of these qualities found in 
western industriahsed countries. 
With. in this framework of diversity, Mexican local government as a whole shows 
g patterns 
that are uneven, and in some aspects deficient. A municipal functioning 
sun, ev, conducted in 2002, shoxv, that most local governments in the countn- do not 
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have adequate administrative systems. 60 per cent lack a department specialised in 
the supervision of expenses (Ofuialia Mayor); 75 per cent of mavors estimate that in a 
týypical year they collect less than 75 per cent of the planned local taxes; in 17 per cent 
of the municipalities there is not a single computer; and almost half of them 
accomplish less than 75 per cent of their planned public works (Cabrero-Mendoza, 
2003). Given that in Mexico there is not a local civil service, the previous experience 
in public posts can be an advantage for local administrations. However, half of the 
mayors lack such experience, as local government's appointments are usually seen as 
the first stage of a pohtician's career. In addition, almost 30 per cent of municipal 
staff has remained less than a year in their posts, at any point of the three-year 
government period (ibid. ). 
According to the same survey, onl)T 80 per cent of Mexican municipalities actuall) 
submit a Municipal Development Plan (MDP) to their respective local congress, 
despite that in most states this is a legal requirement in order to be entitled to state 
transfers. A NflDP sets the priorities for the three-year administration, establishing its 
strategic objectives, and how they fit the respective State Development Plan. 
Moreover, only 20 per cent of the municipahties have introduced planning 
regulations (ibid. ). Having internal regulations controffing the mechanisms to define 
and adJust the obJectives of the MDP is usually an indication of citizens' formal 
invol-vement in planning (cf. Cabrero-Mendoza et al., 2001). If this is, the case, then 
eight out of ten municipalities in Mexico conduct consultations to citizens, if they do 
at all, in an informal wav, NvIthout necessari. 1v open-ing up the process of construction 
of pobci - 
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As Cabrero-Mendoza (2003a) argues, in most municipalities local officials take policy 
decisions by themselves, using a technical or administrative approach limited to what 
is considered possible in a three-year period, and following the directives of other 
levels of govemment. Most mayors' priority is to provide good public services, and 
to do so by obtaining the greatest amount possible in state and federal transfers 
(Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003). Maintalmng a systern of pohcy-making and 
implementation based on the interaction with networks does not appear to be among 
the main concerns of most local officials. In many aspects, the Mexican municipahtý 
is closer to a governmental paradigm of policy-making than to one of governance. 
Much of the municipal unevenness described here is related to variations in the initial 
soclo-econornic and geographical conditions under which governments must work, 
and to the difficulty to accomplish their mandates using traditional governmental 
instruments. 
Traditional traits of Mexican municipalities 
The performance of local governments is explained not only by the aforementioned 
conditions, but also by the existence of a political system designed to ensure the 
hegemony of a single party. 
Once the revolution irutiated in 1910 came to an end, the m= v, -inning mýibtanl and 
pol-ifical ebtes formed an albance with the intention of ensuring certain level of 
econornlc and pobtical stabibty. In 1929, these groups founded the National 
Revolutionary Party (PNR) in order to control the access to public office of generals, 
militan- officers, and politicians, the majority of which , vere veterans of the 
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revolution. As Camp (1996) argues, the objective of the PNR was not to contend for 
political power in elections, but rather to maintain it in the hands of the influential 
faction from the state of Sonora, which led the project of transfornUng, the 
revolutionary theses into a functional government. The PNR changed its name and 
structure in 1938 in order to accommodate the labour unions and the formalised 
corporatist relations with workers, peasants, bureaucrats and the military (Morns, 
1995). T'he Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM), as it was then called, changed 
again its name in 1946, when it became the Institutional Revolutionary Party (P". 
This transformation signalled the exit of the military from the structure of the party 
and the shift to a competition for the presidency among purely civihan PRF-, blocs. 
The PRI, as its name suggests, aimed at continuing the social transformations 
introduced by the revolutionary movement, allowing elections in the three levels of 
government, but reducing real competition to its n-unimum. The result was a 
hegemonic, semi-authoritarian system that generated an institutionalised corporatist 
order that, nevertheless, had the capacitý, of adapting to the needs of the president in 
turn. Continuity was ensured by the disproportionate constitutional and extra-legal 
capacities of the president, who is the centre of the pobtical He in Mexico. 
Presidentialism has deteriorated in recent years by balances introduced by a plural 
federal congress, vanous state governments control-led by the opposition, and by the 
president himself, after the first opposition presidency was inaugurated in 
Nonetheless, in the period between 1929 and 1997, the PRI's organisation -, -,. -()n every 
presidential election, the majority of state and municipal governments, and almost all 
the seats in the federal and local congresses. It -, vas not until 1989 that the first 
opposition state government xvaý, recognised (Ba'a CahfoMia), and although there II 
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had been opposition municipal governments prior to that year, there was not a 
significant number of them before the mid 1990s (cf. INAFED, 2004). The PRI lost 
its absolute majority in the chamber of deputies undl 19T. 
In this system, municipalities were considered the last piece of the political machinery 
that allowed the PRI to stay in power for seven decades. The pre-errunence of party 
politics, local presidentialism, and fiscal dependency from the federal government 
were instrumental to maintain PRI's control. In the following sections I analyse these 
traditional traits of the Mexican political system. These traits have begun to be 
transformed by the introduction of new governmental and non-governmental actors 
in decision-making processes; but on the whole, the), can still be found in most 
municipahties. 
Thepre-envinence ofpan)i politics 
One of the legacies of the hegemonic party systern is the pre-enilnence of partisan 
politics in municipal life. The official partý, 's weight would nom-laBy show itself in 
two ways: the usage of local government's resources to reinforce PRI's influence 
over voters, and the establishment and conservation of clientelistic networks of 
citizens, where public services and other benefits were provided in exchange of 
political support. Given that local governments were at the bottom of the political 
pyran-ud that sustained PR-I', -, hegemony, the administrative and technical 
requ-irements for the , N-cfl functioning of municipalities occupled a subordinated 
place, unless their neglect caused problems in social tranqUillity. 
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Cabrera-Mendoza (2003) has mentioned the importance of public sen-ices among 
the pnonties of mayors at the present time; but this is a relatively new development, 
built upon the real possibility of partisan alternation in office. In the period of the 
PRI's highest influence, local political partisanship was instrumental in maintaining 
the social-pohtical control required by Mexico City, or the corresponding state 
capital. Political control exerted through the party members, unions, affiliated 
commerce chambers and neighbourhood associations was a responsibilitý, of both 
mayors and party officials. Local officials could also adopt a more direct approach, 
and use municipal resources to strengthen the support for the PRI in electoral times. 
In the case of Zacatecas City, for example, the chiefs of block (Jefes de Alanýana) were 
used for this purpose as late as the 1980s and early 1990s. The chiefs of block are 
semi-official representatives of the municipahty, elected by the inhabitants of each 
block, which promote compliance with municipal regulations (e. g. garbage collection 
and recycling, the registration of nevly bom children within the legal time limit in the 
Civil Registry, and the application to military service admission by all men of 18 years 
old or more). As the election approached, chiefs of block promoted the vote among 
their neighbours, in favour of the PRY. Similar partisan usage of the municipal 
resources has been found in the region of Orizaba (Osegueda, 2000), the northern 
states in the late 1980s (Espinoza-Valle, 2000), and other parts of the country. 
Municipalities maintained chentelistic networks especlafly With the lower socio- 
economic strata, which were more hkely to reside in poor neighbourhoods Nvith basic 
public services of low quality or even without them, despite the legal obligation of 
local governments to provide them. '17his created a favourable situation for 
Govtia-Robles, P. Personal mter-, iew. Zacatecas. 16,1, Februan, 2(ol. 
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bargaining that could be mutually beneficial for citizens and local officials, 
neighbourhood associations aff1hated to the PRI could ensure a fast track treatment 
in so] Ving their needs, and municipal officials could secure attendance to the party's 
rallies, or even votes (Loaeza, 1993). Ihis politics-over-administration approach is at 
the root of the typical scepticism of local politicians, who usuaRy interpret the 
decisions of other party's governments as efforts to benefit only social groups that 
can give them pohtical backing4. 
Having said that, it is important to note that it is not mN, intention to argue that the 
government-govemed interactions in Mexican municipalities have consisted of solely 
chentelistic exchanges. Davis (1989,1994) has found evidence that suggests that 
Mexican local governments have tned to avold political clientelism when possible, 
folloVAng adnunistrative priorities instead of partisan ones, even before the PRI 
began to loose local elections in significant numbers. Rodriguez and Ward (1994) 
argue in the same line, pointing at the irrelevance of PRI's ideology in shaping local 
policies and, therefore, making a case of adminis tra ti on- over-p oh tics in some areas of 
municipal life. The influence of the PRI officials over municipal life and policy, 
however, was real, although it can be accepted that the degree of its control was 
vanable. 
,, ý-; 'osa and Velasco (1999) and the same Rodriguez and Ward 
(1994) describe the 
traditional process through which mayors were selected: federal deputies submtted 
the names of possible candidates for the municipalities in their districts to the 
govemor. T'he govemor, once he had chosen among them, presented the names to 
4Trueba-Graciýn, T. Personal Interview. Orizaba. 41" September 1998. 
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the PRI murucipal comrruttees. The corrMlittees usually accepted them after some 
bargaining, and the local representatives of the three sectors of the party (workers, 
peasants, and the 'people') acceded not to present alternative pre-candidates. At a 
time when the PRI ordinarily won, these local internal partisan decisions were in fact 
an appointment process conducted by state authorities. Nevertheless, the party had 
the power to place militants in key posts of the municipal administration, and in this 
way, influence policy-making'. 
The tangled nature of many municipahty-PRI relationships produced an over- 
pohticisation of local hfe. As Loaeza (1993) argues, elections were helpful to ratiý 
the PRI's position as representative of social interests, but day-to-day legitimacy was 
constructed by direct appeals to partisan and municipal officials who were seen as 
dispensers of services and benefits that, in spite of often being public ser-, -lces, were 
not accessible to all citizens. In addition, the short government periods, and the legal 
prohibition of the consecutive re-election of mayors and aldermen ensure a campaign 
environment to renovate the City Council in full e,, -ery three years. These conditions 
have produced the traditional volatility of Mexican municipal life. Everýýg is 
oriented towards the urgent, to . xhat is achievable in the three-year period of a 
municipal government. The PRI's corporatist structure ensured some stabilit), in 
patronage and chentelistic networks, although once the decline of corporatism 
gathered speed in the countiý,, chentebstic networks estabbsh and reorganize 
themselves more rapidly, changing from government to government (Cabrero- 
Mendoza, 2003a). 
5 Cruz. -Arellatio, E. Personal Inter-, ieA,. 
Orizaba. 2-1 Februan- 2001. 
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Localpresidentialism 
Subordination to partv directives was, in part, the manifestation of the president's 
central position in the Mexican pohtical system. The mayor's status in the local 
sphere mirrors the president's prominence in the country, for mayors continue to be 
at the centre of municipal politics, above other Citý, Council members, and most of 
them remain a key node in municipal pobcy networks. 
Mexican presidendahsm is, basically, the donlinance of the president over other 
branches and levels of government (Camp, 1996). As it was mentioned above, this 
functional superiority is maintained through the use of political devices, like formal 
and informal regulations that limit political competition and manoeuvre space for 
other national and sub-national authorities. Espinoza-Valle (2000), however, nghtly 
points out that presidentialism has been sustained also by regulations that secure the 
president's right to intervene in local matters (political and otherwise), and through 
the control of the distribution process of transfers. In the period when the president 
held an uncontested authontý- over most policy issues in the country, it was not 
possible to explain local political dynamisms vithout his restrictive presence, or that 
of the federal agencies (Espinoza-Valle, 2000a). 
In spite of the frequent criticisms to presidentialism made by current local officials, 
the municipal-ity's structure and regular functioning have produced local versions of 
it. Mavors consohdated their importance after the 1983 and 1999 constitutional 
amendments. Pie one occurred in 1983 changed the article 115, assigning to 
municipalities, for the first time, the right to coflect taxes and to constitute 
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themselves as public service providers; a role traditional. 1v performed by state and 
federal agencies. The 1999 amendment explicitly declared municipalities as an 'order 
of government', recognising their right to issue regulations and to design policies 
independently from the state and federal governments. As these changes began to be 
implemented, municipalities increased their bureaucracy's size and became more 
expensive institutions, attracting the attention of tax-payers (Gwfl6n-L6pez, 2001). 
The mayor has been at the centre of this revitahsation, but not necessarflv because 
his/her leadership has secured social backup in all cases. 
Mayors are at the centre of municipal political life because electoral and functioning 
rules produce weak City Councils, as it is explained below. The mayor is elected with 
hIs/her trustee [sbidico] and the aldermen [regidores] in a single slate. Trustees' main 
function is to serve as legal representatives of the municipality and to substitute the 
mayor when he/she is out of the city. The trustee's usual duties comprise the 
supervision of A agreements and contracts signed by the municipahty (if they are not 
binding for more than three years, in which case they must be approved by the City 
Council), and the authonsation of the day-to-day expenses to run the municipal 
bureaucracy (Estado de Veracruz-Llave, 2002). Aldermen, on the other hand, are the 
representatives of the municipality's inhabitants, although they do not have a specific 
consfituency defined by neighbourhoods. They are the more numerous members of 
the City Council, and are in charge of approving general budgets, the MDP, 
expenditure reports, and the appointment of the General Secretary and the Treasurer 
of the municipahtýT. Tliq also have supervisory functions over their respective poficy 
areas, being able to audit adnmmstrative and technical staff (ibid. ). The City Council 
consists of the mayor, the trustee (or trustees in some states), and the aldermen. The 
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municipa . ty's General Secretary and Treasurer ordinarily participate in City Council 
meetings, but Without voting rights. 
Parties put forward candidates to the City Council in a bst that establishes an order 
of precedence: the first name of the slate is the candidate to mayor, the second to 
trustee, and the folloWing to aldermen. This order cannot be changed once the slate 
is registered in the corresponding state electoral institute. If the state allows onIv 
elections based on proportional representation, then the winning party obtains the 
mayor, the trustee, and the majority of aldermen. The rest of City Council seats are 
assigned to the parties that obtained the second and tl-iird highest proportion of 
votes. 
The states have different criteria to establish representation in the City Council. 
Veracruz and Zacatecas (the states to which the municipalities of Orizaba and 
Zacatecas City belong, respectively) decide on the number of aldermen 
prop orti onally to population. Veracruz assigns three aldermen for municipalities of 
less than 20,000 inhabitants, and increases the number progress'lvely up to 15 for 
those mutucipahties \Xqth more than 250,000 residents (Estado de NTeracruz-Lla\-c, 
2002). TI-ie trustees are determined according to the number of aldermen, but the 
rules are applied in an ad boc basis: Orizaba, with 118,593 inhabitants in 2000, could 
quahý, for up to four trustees because its City Council has 12- aldermen (INAFED, 
2002). llovvever, the local congress approved only one. Zacatecas applies a sin-ular 
rule, vith a mmmum of six aldermen for municipalities of less than 15,00(1 
inhabitants, and a maximum of 122 for those populations greater than IU0,000 
(Estado de Zacatecas, 2002). Zacatecas Citv, hoxvever, has -2() aldermen as an 
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exception, given that it is the capital of the state. Finally, in Guanajuato (the state to 
wl-ýich Le6n belongs), the legislature divided all municipalities in three echelons 
(according to population and economic importance) and assigned a fixed number of 
aldermen (Estado de Guanajuato, 2002). Thus Le6n, with 1,134,842 residents in 2()()() 
has only 12 aldermen in total (INAFED, 2002) (see table 7). In addition to this 
disproportional ratio between population and City Council seats, the latter are 
assigned without any reference to specific territorial districts. In this , vay, despite that 
aldermen are supposed to represent a given number of citizens, there is not a formal 
constituency to which he/she is accountable for his/her voting records. This, 
additionally to the rule of non-immediate re-election, does not stimulate the 
establishment of relations seeking the accountability of politicians to citizens. 
Table 7. Members of municipal governments in the selected case studies, 
according to political party* 
Le6n Orizaba Zacatecas 
(2000-2003) (2001- 2004) (1998 - 2001)_ 
Mayor PAN (1) P RI (1) PRD (1) 
Trustees PAN (2) PRI (1) PRD (1) 
Aldermen elected by PAN (8) 0 PRD (1 '1) 
majority 
Aldermen elected by P RI (3) P RI (4) PAN (4) 
proportional Other (1) PAN (4) PRI (2) 
representation PRD (1) PT (1) 
PVEM (1) Other (1) 
Other (2) 
Total number of Citý, 15 14 
Council members 
Population '*1,1 ')4,84-" 118,593 12'), 899 
Number of inhabitants 75,056-13 8,47/ 0.92 5,631.7 
per City Council 
member 
S tA- Council members Is given Source: data from INAFED (2002). Notes. 
* The number of C, 
bet-, -,, een brackets after the acronym of the corresponding pobtical partý-. 
PVF, N1 is the 
103 
Green-Ecolo ist Party of Mexico and PT the Labour Pam% The population corresponds 91 
to the year 2000. 
The City Council [Cabildo] is the highest goverrung body of the municipality and the 
mayor is its president and convenor; but because most of its members are aldermen, 
a post that in the Spanish colonial administration involved representation and 
defence of trade guild interests, the City Council is intended to check and 
counterbalance the mayor's power (Rodriguez-Banda, 1999). Nevertheless, most 
states allow the winning party to have enough votes in the City Council to approve 
the ordinary decisions made by the mayor without the necessity of negotiating -,,, Ilth 
opposition aldermen. This is the case in Le6n and Zacatecas, where the mavor can 
easily obtain the necessary votes to run the municipality. On the other hand, given 
that the wining margin of the PRI in Orizaba was small, the mayor of that citý, must 
persuade two opposition aldermen to meet the required majority. The aldermen's 
impartiality in voting, however, is not guaranteed. Given that aldermen are not 
accountable to a specific population, and that unmediate re-election is not pern-utted, 
political careers depend on the support of the mayor and party officials (Guill6n- 
L6pez, 1996). Aldermen of the same partý, of the mayor tend to vote in favour of 
his/her proposals, for their political careers might depend on the mayor's 
recon-miendation for other posts, mostly administrative, in the foHoAqng 
administration. The mayor's approval can also be decisive for obtaniung a candidacy 
for a local congress seat. Voting against the mayor is usually seen as disloyal, 
ition ones, if the especially among aldermen of the same partý-, but also among opposi 1 
lqque over which a vote is held is considered in the interest of the entire municipahtý 
(Guffl6n-U)pez, 1998). 
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In addition, the way the Citýý Council works aHows a certain freedom of choice that 
reinforces the mayor's position. The basic government process begins xvith the 
proposal of the MDP, the Annual Operative Plans (AOPs), and the general budgets. 
These documents are prepared by the different directors of department and 
approved by the City Council. Once approved, aldermen establish conumssions, 
which are in charge of supervising the work carried out by the mayor and the 
departmental directors. Once the fiscal year is fimshed, departmental directors 
prepare expenses reports that are approved by the City Council, and submitted to the 
local congress (Estado de Guanajuato, 2002; Estado de Veracruz - Llave, 2002, 
Estado de Zacatecas, 2002). 
Aldermen, however, have more autonomy regarding procedures than it seems at first 
approach. Orizaba, for example, elected its first opposition government in 1994, and 
the new aldennen and directors lacked previous governmental experience. In that 
administration, the distinction between the directors' (operative) functions and the 
aldermen's (supenlsorý, ) was not respected. Aldermen in charge of commissions 
were also involved in the operative details of the day-to-day sen-ices, and in the final 
supen-ision of expenseql,. This is certainly not usual; but it is revealing that the 
situation was not corrected by the legislature because the local congress cannot pay 
detailed attention to procedural malpractice in all 210 munIcipahties of the state of 
Veracruz. In this particular case, the Citý, Council's powers to check the mayor were 
substantiallN, din-iJIUshed because the aldermen became directly involved in the 
implementation of pohcles. Having no formal constituency, aldermen are 
accountable only to other aldermen and to the local congress, , -hich rarely 
Brisefio, F. Personal Interview. OriZaba. 4tiý September 1998. 
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intervenes. In this environment, it is usual that the already important position of the 
mayor is strengthened even more. 
Financial dependency 
Other traditional trait of Mexican municipalities is their dependence on transfers 
from the federal government. Basically, municipalities do not have enough local 
revenue to run administrations, which has implications in the degree of autonomy for 
local pohcy design. In order to function, municipahties must receive more than 60 
per cent of their income from other levels of government; but a considerable amount 
of them are earmarked for specific public services and are closely supervised by local 
congresses. '11-is dinUMshes budgetary manoeuvre space, which in its turn reduces 
the possibility for innovation and improvement in public services not considered in 
the federal assignations (Zarzosa, 1999). As late as the mid 1990s, there were 
indications that transfers could follow a partisan logic, benefiting PRI's state 
governments above opposition ones (Porras, 1998). This section elaborates on the 
general conditions of municipal financial dependence, which created the conditions 
for such pohtical use of funds. 
In essence, municipal revenue is formed by local income, transfers, and tax collection 
made on behalf of other levels of government or agencies. The main single source of 
municipal local revenue is taxes, especial-ly the estate tax [bvpilestopredia4. In addition 
to this, Municipalities charge 'profits' [apmvi-hanuenlos], N-,, Iuch include fines and late 
pal, ment surcharges, 'rights' [derecbos] that are fees, for adrninistrative and other 
municipal services, including potable water and garbage collection fees. and 
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'products' [productos], mainly income from leasing or sell-ing municipal properties 
(INEGI, 1998). In addition, a recent source of local revenue is the 'contributions for 
improvements' [contribucidn de mýjoras]. 'Mese are the fees that directly benefited 
persons have to pay to the municipahty for the introduction of public service 
infrastructure. They are usually charged in monthly instalments, and complement the 
federal and state funding for the public work (INEGI, 2001). 
The main source for overall municipal funding is the transfers from federal 
government. 11-ie), are decentralised funds, administered and audited by local 
congresses, which include the 'branches' [ramos] 28 and 33 of the federal expenses 
budget (INEGI, 2002). Municipalities also collect money for third parties (usually 
federal agencies related to social security services). Despite that these funds have to 
be transferred aftemards, municipahties usuaUN, benefit from the coDection of 
interests while they are kept in their bank accounts (see table 8). 
Local income, in general, has become less important with time. Tax collection was 
diminishing until the constitutional amendment was fufly implemented in 1984, when 
it rose significantly (it went from 6.08 to 10.62 per cent of total income). The 
benefits of the new legal and administrative capabilities of municipalities are evident 
from 1987 onwards, when tax income began to rise consistently untfl it peaked in 
1992 (20.39 per cent of total income). This can be explained because many 
municipalities did not have the administrative infrastructure (including computers 
and updated databases) to collect taxes efficienth-, and their acqw,, ition required time. 
'fl-ie most benefited local governments were large urban municipalities, which 
bet-ween 1975 and 1992' increased their tax collection in 441 per cent. In the same 
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period, rural municipalities augmented their tax collection in 50 per cent (Cabrero- 
Mendoza, 1999: 37). Since 1992, however, taxes have declined in relevance (reaching 
9.57 per cent in 2002). 
As table 8 indicates, the contributions for improvements are not significant in the 
overall structure of municipal income as well (they reached 0.39 per cent in 2002). 
The descent from 0.69 per cent obtained in 1997 suggests that other authors are right 
when argwng that the model of co-financing public senrices, analysed in chapter 
four, has reached its exhaustion point (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003a). Contributions for 
improvements cannot grow much given that their coflection depends on the uneven 
performance of neighbourhood committees, analysed in the folloWing chapters. 
These contributions, however, are important because they are an iDdication of the 
estabhshment of networks as a method of pubbc senice dehvery. The descent in the 
relative importance of local income can be easily seen in chart one. 
Before 1983 municipalities were more self-sufficient, but they also were less 
expensive to run. As Guill6n-L6pez (1996) argues, before 1983 municipalities were 
considered representatives of state capitals, almost like local branches of state and 
federal governmental agencies. As a result, in 1980 and 1981, income for thýird parties 
reached 21.24 and 18.31 per cent respectively. This money was mainly the payment 
for local services provided by the respective state. In 1982 and 1983, these funds 
(normally transferred to the state capital) were devolved to municipalities. That 
explains the 'for tl-ýird parties' income fall from 18.31 to 4.69 per cent in 1981-1982 
and from 4.69 to 0.16 per cent in 1982 -1983. 
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Table 8. Municipalities' revenue, 1980 - 2002 (percentages) 
Year Local 
taxes 
Citizens' 
contributions 
for the 
introduction 
of public 
services 
Other 
local 
income* 
Federal 
and 
state 
transfers 
For 
third 
parties 
Public 
debt 
Availabilities+ 
1980 12.24 32.77 26.31 21.24 2.40 5.03 
1981 10-13 33.41 29.33 18.31 3.06 5-76 
1982 8.49 34.75 45.77 4.69 3.07 3.23 
1983 6.08 224.73 64-37 0.36 2.87 1.58 
1984 10.62 19-93 59-13 0.78 4.2 4 5.30 
1985 12.12 ??.? o 57.08 1.46 4.50 2.64 
1986 11.43 21.39 59.42 1.21 5.30 1.25 
1987 10.84 ??. 19 57.29 1.26 5.53 2.88 
1988 11.05 20-7/6 58-05 3.35 3.77 3.02 
1989 12.95 23.92 50-99 2.38 6.42 3.34 
1990 16-84 20.90 48-08 7.04 5.95 1.19 
1991 17.65 22.31 47.11 4.94 5.18 2.81 
1992 20.39 20.50 47.88 4.3 7 4.50 2.36 
1993 19.66 19.53 44.37 4.65 8.04 `5 
1994 18-07 19.53 47.35 4.40 8.40 2.25 
1995 17.30 0.65 17.41 51.89 56 6.66 3.53 
1996 14.77 0.68 17-14 58.23 1.24 6.44 1.50 
1997 13.76 0.69 17.07 59.78 2.35 4.23 2.12 
1998 11.16 0.52 18.01 62.20 2.39 3.37 2.35 
1999 9.38 0.46 16-15 66.28 1.65 3.04 3.04 
2000 9.39 0.47 13.73 68.72 1.78 2.16 3.7/ 5 
2001 9.47 0.39 13-95 69-11 0.71 2.92 3.45 
2002 9.57 0.39 13.30 68.09 0.58 4.41 3.66 
Sources: own calculations from data in INEGI 1990,1992,1994,1998,2001,2002, and 
2005. The table does not consider figures for the Federal District. Notes. -, Other local 
income includes profits, rights, products, and other 'income from 1995 onwards. 
+Availabilities are the unspent funds from the previous fiscal year. It also includes Cuentas 
de Orden, 1. e., in-the-books income, like unpaid debts to the municipality. 
Regarding municipalities' expenses, administrative costs are the most important item. 
In the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, administrative expenses usually 
represented between 50 and 60 per cent of municipal budgets. It was not until 1997 
that their share began to decrease, mainly because the increment of public works' 
expenses and devolutions to state and federal go%-ernments (see table 9). 
AdiTUTUstrative costs usually comprise salaries, bonuses, travel expenses of local 
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politiciams and staff, office supphes, outsourcing services, and the acquisition or lease 
of properties for office use (INEGI, 2001). This high proportion of the budget is 
partly explained by the above-average salaries of politicians and nud and top level 
staff, who unlike other countries, are usually emploved on a full-time basis-,. Public 
works [obra. v piblicas j (oviento], on the other hand, comprise the budding and -f 
maintenance of the municipality's facilities, roads, schools, hospitals, irrio-ation 11 
systems, and urban infrastructure, including potable water, public 1-ighting, paving, 
and sewers (INEGI, 2001). On average, adnunistrafive and pubbc works combined 
use more than 80 per cent of municipal budgets. 
Chart 1. Local revenue of municipalities, 1980-2002 (percentage of total 
revenue) 
501 
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UJ, Local revenue 
Source: data from table 8. Local revenue includes all sources of revenue excluding state and 
federal transfers, income for third parties, public debt and availabilities. 
The only exception in Mexico is the 'usage and custom' municipal governments, which 
en-iploy traditional indioenous forms of overriment in rural communities 
(CEDEMUN, 
2oo"). Most of these traditional appointments are ad hw,, ortwi or receive only basic allowances. 
110 
Table 9. Municipalities' expenditure, 1980-2002 (percentages) 
Year Administrative Public Transfers For Public Availabilities 
expenses works to other third debt Other 
levels of parties 
government 
1980 58.56 23.24 3.64 6.54 8.02 
1981 56-91 28.60 3.50 4.92 6.07 
1982 60.719 27.77 3.57 3.09 4.78 
1983 57.48 30.31 2.97 4.14 5.09 
1984 50.97 33-64 3.35 3.91 8.13 
1985 54.57 32.92 4.58 4.33 3.60 
1986 59-87 28.45 4.40 3-67 3.61 
1987 56.69 24.68 4.65 4.18 9.80 
1988 56.38 25.41 5.64 4.49 8.07 
1989 57.74 25.58 6.26 3.89 6.53 
1990 55-93 27-23 6.48 3.61 6.75 
.7ý7 1991 56.18 25.64 7.17 33 . 28 1992 56.13 24.61 7.28 3.68 8.30 
1993 57.74 24.86 5.97 4.19 7.24 
1994 57.25 24.09 6.12 4.80 7.74 
1995 58-92 20.76 6.56 2.07 6.28 5.41 
1996 60.67 20.56 6.40 2.49 5.64 4.24 
1997 59.11 21.29 6.43 3.49 5.11 4.57 
1998 52.40 23.83 9.26 3-7 3 4.27 6.50 
1999 49.94 28.15 10.08 2.40 3.31 6.12 
2000 49.28 27.00 12.55 2.35 3.22 5.59 
') -7 2001 50.24 32.89 5.24 0.96 7.95 
2002 49.45 33.50 4.97 0.20 3.6 2 8.26 
Sources: own calculations from data in INEG 1 1990,1992,1994,1998,2001,200 " and 2005. 
The table does not consider figures for the Federal District. Notes: transfers in this context 
are fund devolutions to state and federal governments. Other expenses include 'for third 
parties' and 'availabilities' expenses (from 1980 to 1994). Afterwards they are reported 
separatel, N. 
If the mumcipalities were to be left to their own revenue resources, they would not 
be able to meet these basic expenses. Financial dependency per se does not equate to 
political dependency from federal government, but there is an instinctive reluctance 
among local practitioners to agree to the increasing weight of transfers (they reached 
68.09 per cent of municipal income in 2002), iven the discretionary xay in which 91 
they used to be allocated in the past. As Escalante-Nlacin (2000) points out, before 
1998 the federal government distributed transfers in an ad boc basis, establishing "I 
annual agreements with the federal entities using criteria that considered population, 
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development indexes, grow rates, and participation in the production of the state's 
GDP, but that stifl aflowed many discretionary decisions of the president. Between 
1975 and 1992, for example, transfers to municipalities grew considerably, but the 
distnbution was acutely unequal, benefiting especlafly urban municipahties. In this 
17-year period, transfers to large urban municipalities (with income between 50 and 
100 million pesos) grew more than 23 times, while rural municipalities (xvith an 
income below 5 million pesos) received only an increase of 60 per cent (Cabrero- 
Mendoza, 1999: 37). The regulations for assigning transfer amounts are now 
published on a regular basis, and discretionary agreements have decreased 
substantially since the second half of the 1990s (Escalante-Macin, 2000). 
In the 1980s, when municipalities were confronted with a considerably enlarged 
mandate financed by federal government, the prevalent political discourse focused 
on the perils of dependency, and the possible unjustified influence of other levels of 
government in the recently gained autonomy (Martinez-Assad and Ziccardi, 1988). 
This political discourse assumed that the advantages of a greater self-government 
could only be secured if they were accompanied bý7 fiscal autonomy8. When present 
mayors talk about fiscal dependency they focus on the implications, and possible 
difficulties, when having to cohabitate with governors of a different political partý,. In 
the period of the PRI's hegemony, opposition municipalities regularly experienced 
problems in obtaining federal and state funding for their programmes (Escalante- 
Macin, 2000). As late as the mid 1990s, local politicians presupposed that the 
discretionan, power of governors was still considerable, sufficient to obstruct 
8 Vep - Mahn, 1-0. Personal 
1 nten-ieNý-. Mex-ico Citv. 13 ffi Februarv 200 1- 
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projects of opposition murucipalities that required state transfers, and that tý ically Ypi 
were intended to establish a degree of difference with traditional PRI's governments'. 
However, this is a characteristic that is fading rapidly. Once it was evident that 
transfers are now made under explicit rules, enforced by local congresses, maý, ors 
began to emphasise the importance of co-ordination with state capitals, and the 
development of lobbying approaches to the problem of financial dependency. 
Municipal associations have augmented their presence in the federal and local 
congresses in order to influence legislatures' decisions, especially since 1998, when 
the branch 33 transfers became decentrahsedO. While in the 1980s the Mexican 
municipalities' position was evaluated as caught "between society and state" 
(Martinez-Assad and Ziccardi, 1987: 287), the current perception is closer to one of 
co-governance, where different levels of government work siMultaneously in order to 
achieve governability. Financial dependency is regarded now as another of the 
variables that the mayor must have in mind in order to deal with the new conditions 
ot - govemancell 
Emergent trends 
Over-politicisation of municipal life, presidentialism, and financial dependency were 
instrumental in maintaining the hegemony of the PRI and a system of closed poficy- 
processes, with predorninanfly governmental and corporate actors defining thern. 
From the early 1990s, howc-ver, Nlexican municipabties began to experience a 
9 H-scudero -'ýtadelmann, A. Personal intenliew. 
OriZaba. l8tlýjanuary 2()()l. 
1() Ibid. 
11 Vega - Marin, J. 0. Personal interview. 
Mexico City. 13til February 2001. 
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significant change in their general situation. The federal government increased the 
speed of services' decentrahsation to the states, accompanying it With a gro\-, -lng flow 
of transfers distributed using clearer rules. Partisan alternation in sub-national 
governments became a permanent feature of the pohtical system, xvhich introduced 
the notion of a partisan differential not only in electoral discourse, but also in the 
exercise of government. This, in its turn, highhghted the need to improve pubhc 
services' quahtý7 through a more technical approach to the cities' problems. Given 
that the PRI can loose elections now, public senices turned into one of the main 
issues to evaluate a municipal government and, therefore, to increase or decrease the 
chances for a party re-election (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1995). Political fragmentation and 
the reduction of the traditional legitimacy of unions and partisan structures 
compelled local politicians to innovate in policy-making and implementation 
(Cabrero-Mendoza, 2004). In addition to this, lack of resources, and the increment 
of balances to supervise municipal performance have augmented the number of 
actors in the poficy process. 
As a result, policy-making and implementation are more open now than in the past. 
There has been a move to what Cabrero-Mendoza (2000a: 82) caUs co-gesfiýn, which 
can be loosely translated as 'co- attainment'. Non -governmental actors are now an 
integral part of pobcy-making and implementation in many municipahties, 
participating in traditional consultation processes, like survevs and referenda, but also 
ha,, ing co-operative, decisional, and evaluative functions, through neighbourhood 
comn-uttees, NGOs co-dehvering pubhc services, and professional associations in 
shared prog-raryi-ine-, (ibid. ). It is true that there are pohcy areas that are more 
adequate than others for citizens' participation. Technical complexity puts some 
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limits 
over the influence of non-governmental positions. Nevertheless, the mere 
presence of this kind of societal actors, and the interaction between programmes' 
beneficiaries, authorities, and technical experts, has brought in a qualitative change to 
traditional pohcy-making (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003b). 
Interestingly, man)T of these qualitative changes were implemented first in opposition 
(non-PRI) governments. In order to consolidate an alternafive model of government, 
opposition municipalities sought autonomy from their respective governors through 
a more intensive use of local and transfer regulations (Guill6n-L6pez, 1999a). As the 
sermnal works of Cabrero-Mendoza (1996) and Ziccardi (1995) show, by the n'ud 
1990s the most important innovations came from opposition governments that, 
seeking the conditions for a long-term government pro)ect, established local 
regulations and mastered the abilities to secure high transfer rates and, thus, funding. 
At the present time, innovation comes from governments of aU parties, advancing in 
areas such as po-,, ert-\, reduction, housing, pubhc health, and service dehvery based on 
modern technologies, all of which were considered too complex for a murucipal 
government just a decade ago (Garcia del Castillo, 2004a). These changes are part of 
a Latin American trend towards the diversification of governmental areas of 
influence (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003a); but thev are also the result of a revalonsation 
of the municipahtýy itself as part of a federal system, which is been revitahsed in order 
to deal with the increased socio-political complexity of these years (Guill6n-L6pez, 
1999). 
Change is occurring, but at different speeds. Cabrero-Mendoza et al. (2001), 
Cabrero-Mcndoza (2003a), and Garcia del Castillo (2()()4) make a case for the 
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understanding of Mexico as the co-existence of various kinds of municipality, 
differentiated in their capacity to incorporate non-governmental actors in their pohcý 
processes. They range from rural traditional overnments, almost totaflýl dependent 9 
on federal transfers, to governments of metropohtan cities, With complex systems of 
social involvement in policy shaping (ibid. ). 
The following sections of the chapter elaborate on some of the emergent trends that t) 
have shaped this partial shift towards governance. In tbe first place, municipal 
governments have introduced NPM and technocratic criteria in order to depoliticise 
some aspects of local administration. SecondIv, political fragmentation has 
counterbalanced local presidentialism by evidencing that the multiple partisan 
projects of government many times cannot be accomplished because structural 
limitations, and that the mayor himself is subject to 'power dependence'. Finally, the 
subordination to federal government, product of the financial dependence, has been 
moderated by the presence of a new array of actors that is the result of recent 
regulations on transfers. 
Tedmocratic rafionaliý, 
One of the side effects of the real possibility of party alternation ýwithin the City 
Council has been the introduction of NPM and technocratic models of government. 
ParadoXicafly, the presence of a number of eligible parties has depoliticised some 
areas of local administration which, in the past, involved an intense political activity 
but that now are seen as mainly technical. In the times when the mutucipahty was a 
simple representative of the state agencies, obtaining good quality in public semces 
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required negotiation with the state capital. Now that municipal agencies are in charge 
of services, solving a problem involves, in addition, technical expertise. Moreover, in 
an effort to reduce the instability in the quality of services that can result from the 
change of the directors of area every three years, some municipalities have 
i ty implemented regulations that allow Mid and top level staff to remain once the C' ý 
Council members leave. 
This trend is especlafly evident in successive administrations of the same party for, 
although mayors are free to follow or not their predecessors' policies, expensive 
projects can only be completed by a process of accumulation of coherent advances 
made in several government periods. Bazdresh-Parada (2002), Cabrero-Mendoza 
(1999b), Negrete (2002), and Santos-Zavala (1999), for example, show that the 
sophisticated model of social participation of Le6n was actually constructed through 
at least three successive PAN administrations. 'n-ie first introduced regulations and 
founded citizens' con-irmttees and councils, while the third established an 
autonomous planning institute that coordinates the work of these bodies. Tbis, has 
been possible because, in some areas, administrative and technical criteria have 
prevailed over purely political ones. 
Subsequent to the analysis of a number of municipahties, Cabrero-Mendoza (2000a: 
19-20) proposes a description of Mexican style NPM: 1) NPM is characterised by the 
perception that the ethos and efficiency of the market are not desirable but essential 
for the survival of an), project of govemment. 2) T\Iunicipahties have multipbed the 
policy sectors in xvhich they intervene and, as a result, their structures and general 
I Is not Possible to conceptuabse functioning have become more complex. 'flius, it i 
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municipal governments as a coherent whole, but it is necessary to differentiate 
according to municipal department, policy sector, and programme. 3) NPM 
incorporates non -governmental actors in the policy process in order to legitimise it 
and shape it according to citizens' needs (ibid. ). After analysing 141 innovative 
municipal programmes that were submitted to the recently established Gfffidn Local 
2002 pnZe, Cabrero-Mendoza (2003) argues that NPM is pnMarily present in large 
municipahties (100,000 inhabitants or more) and that, therefore, it is a basicaUy urban 
phenomenon. Most innovations introduced in rural municipalities rely on basic 
administrative improvements that do not multiply or fragment their bureaucracies, 
and despite that some of them make use of citizens' networks in order to design or 
implement their policies, the largest and most sophisticated systems of social 
participation are found in metropolitan municipalities (ibid. ). 
NPM, Vnth its technocratic approach, presupposes that effectiveness in 
administration and public senice delivery should be at the centre of municipal 
functioning. Ward (1998) has identified changes carried out in some Mexican 
municipalities appl)ing NPM principles. In the first place, parq, affiliation or 
ideological identification is no longer considered essential to be appointed to office. 
At the same time, more stabihtý, in technical posts and the appointment of officials 
based on techrucal expertise is vvidely practised in urban mumcipalities (Camp, 1996). 
Secondly, efficiency in financial management has grown, -, x-hich has been a central 
gn offer of the three main parties (PAN, PRI, and PRD) in recent years. This campais 
is also the result of both the need to collect taxes more efficiently and the 
reqwrement of local congresses to improve in anti-corruption measures. CM, 
Councils now are accountable to local congresses in A matters concerning the use of 
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earmarked transfers: they must be used in the specified amounts, in the particular 
services and neighbourhoods approved by the LFC. As it is analysed in the following 
chapters, Orizaba, Le6n, and Zacatecas have implemented this kind of NPM 
changes, although in different degrees. 
Ward (I 998a) points out that this shift to a technocratic rationality has changed the 
traditional government model in Mexican municipalities; but it has done it in a 
differentiated way. Using an approach suggested in another placel2, he designed a 
typology of Mexican municipahties based on technocratic rationahty and PR-I-style 
political partisanship. These variables are put in a basic strong/weak matrix, resulting 
in four models of local governance. After analysIng a dozen municipaldties in the 
north and the centre of the country, he classifies most of them in the two models of 
local governance in which technocratic influence is strong. Most of the governments 
where NPM influence is strong come from the PAN and the PRI, but there is also a 
government of the PRD. This confirms the observation of GwH6n-L6pez (1996), 
who argues that NPM began to be implemented in opposition municipalities, 
especially governments of the PAN in the northern states, but that now it is common 
in metropobtan and large municipalities of all parties. Technocratic changes have 
restrained the traditional over-politicisation of local government, introducing more 
stabifity and continw", in adn-ýnjstration. 
The most important consequence of NPM, however, hes in its effects over pohfical 
clientelism. In the three studied municipalities, technocratic criteria are used to lin-ýt 
12 The basic variables of VVard's model were suggested by GuiH6n-L6pez (1996): 
'administrative modernisation' and 'traditional politics'. 
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the requests of citizens' groups and neighbourhood associations, modiý, ing the 
traditional patterns of networks' interactions. Mayors now argue that transfer and 
other regulations have constrained their manoeuvre space in managing public 
services and that, therefore, there has been a reduction of discretionary decisions in 
this area13 
gmentation Electoralfrq 
Electoral fragmentation has played a role in the modification of the traditional 
conditions of Mexican local government. Fragmentation defined as the proliferation 
of governmental agencies, and the resulting complication of interconnections among 
networks, is treated in chapter three. In this section, electoral 'fragmentation' refers 
simply to the breakdown of the PRI's hegemony in local elections, resulting in 
partisan alternation in a considerable number of City Councils. 
The municipal-ity was the first level of government to experience partisan alternation 
in Meyjco. In 1946, the first of a series of post-electoral municipal conflicts took 
place, as a result of credible accusations of electoral fraud. The first non-PRI 
. was 
recognised by the government of San Lws Potosi state in 1958 murncipahtýT 1 
(Martinez-Assad and Ziccardi, 1988); but the total number of opposition 
municipahties in the period bevveen that year and the mid 1980s remained 
unimportant. Ilie presence of this smaH number of opposition municipaLities, 
however, was helpffil in the validation of the PRI's vast majonty of local 
crovernments, for it was usuafly mentioned as proof of the democratic character of 
Govtia - Robles, P. Personal intervieýw. Zacatecas. 1611, Februan- 2001. 
120 
the Memcan political system (Camp, 1996). Once the new Federal Code of Electoral 
Institutions and Procedures (COFIPE) was introduced in the earlv 1990s, partisan 
alternation became a distinct possibility for most municipalities. The COFIPE 
relocated the control of elections from the Interior Nfinistry to the Federal Electoral 
Institute (IFE), an autonomous and a-partisan federal agency With branches in every 
federal entity. The ultimate evaluation of the elections' vahdity rests now in a council 
made up by citizens With an apolitical background. Disagreements are resolved in a 
section of the judiciary branch specialised in electoral regulations. In this way, in a 
13-year period, the number of non-PRI local governments increased more than ten 
times (see table 10). 
Table 10. Number of opposition municipalities (selected years)* 
Political Party 
1981 1986 1999 
PAN 18 26 287 
PRID --- --- 2-8 
PARM 9 7 0 
PPS 7 7 0 
Other 18 42 
Opposition municipalities M the country 41 58 607 
Total number of municipalities 2,378 2,378 25419 
Source: Data from Martinez-Assad, and Ziccardi, 1988; and CEDEMUN 2001. Notes. 
Opposition municipalities are the non-PRI parties. *The selected years are years without 
federal elections. The PRD figures are not available for 1981 and 1986 because it was 
founded until 1988 (PRD, 2000). PARM is the Authentic MeXican Revolution Party, and 
PPS is the Socialist People's Party. T'he table does not include 'usage and custom' 
(rovernments. I- 
If the partisan composition is seen in detail, a more complex picture appears. In one 
decade the PR-l went from having almost nine out of 10 municipahties, to slightly 
more than one third. In 2004, the PRI held 36.18 per cent of municipalities, while the 
PAN had 18.15, and the PRD 9.90 per cent. Tbus, v, -hile the PRI remains the most 
important part-v (both in number of municipalities and federal congress seats), there 
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has been a significant fragmentation of the political interest groups. In the 20-year 
penod between 1981 and 2001, nine parties have been founded in addition to the 
PAN, PRI, and PRID. In the local elections of July 2003,11 parties contended for 
congressional seats. Nevertheless, the PAN, PRI, and PRD remain the most 
influential parties in the current situation. Finally, it is important to note that 
alternation has taken place in an orderly manner. In 1995 there were 50 Alunhi 'pal 
Councilý, which indicates the number of municipalities that had irresolvable post- 
electoral problems. Municipal Comils [Concýo (sic) Aluni, 5ipa4 are substituting City 
Councils appointed by the local congress when the corresponding state electoral 
institute annuls the results of an election in one municipality I'his is usually the 
consequence of an important number of irregularities in the election day. In 2004 
there were only five municipalities in this situation, which is a measure of both the 
reduction of post-electoral conflict and of the increased citizens' trust in electoral 
results (see tables 11 and 12). 
Table 11. Number of municipalities according to governing political party, 
1994-2004 
Year 
PAN PRI PRD Other Coalitions 
Municipal 
Councils 
Usage and 
Custom Total 
1994 101 2,128 84 37, 421 2,3 92 
1995 160 21019 120 46 50 2,395 
1996 224 11544 1-: 9 49 10 406 2,412 
1997 250 1,477 220 45 14 410 2,416 
1998 307 1,359 288 50 1 -) 403 2,419 
1999 287; 1,384 278 44 4 4 418 2,419 
') 12 1,377 24 1 52 11 10 418 -2,427 
2001 324 1283 216 59 118 9 418 2,427/ 
2002 374 1,149 206 156 125 418 2,430 
407 957 2, ", " 253 166 1 418 2,430 
2o04 442 881 41 29 3 155 5 418 2,435 
Source: data in CEDEMUN (2001,2002), and INAFED (2005a). Notes. Other parties 
include PT, PVEM, PRT, PARIA, the Partý, of the Cardem'sta Front for National 
Reconstruction (PFCRN), the PPS, and other regional parties. Coahtions were introduced in 
1999. 
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Table 12. Percentage of municipalities according to governing political party, 
1994 -2004 
Year PAN PRI PRD Other Coalitions 
Municipal 
Councils 
Usage and 
Custom Total 
1994 4.22 88-96 3.51 1.55 1.76 100 
1995 6.68 84.30 5.01 1.92 2.09 100 
1996 9.29 64.01 7.42 2.03 0.41 16-83 100 
1997 10.35 61-13 9.11 1.86 0.58 16.9, 100 
1998 12-69 56-18 11-91 2.07 0.50 16.65 100 
1999 11-86 57.21 11.49 1.82 0.17 0.17 17.28 100 
2000 12-86 56-14 10.18 2.14 0.45 0.41 17. -22 100 
2001 13-35 52.86 8.90 2.43 4.86 0.37 17'. 22 100 
2002 15.39 47.28 8.48 6.42 5.14 0.08 17.20 100 
2003 16.75 39.38 9.38 10.41 6.83 0.04 F. 20 100 
2004 18-15 36.18 9.90 12.03 6.37 0.21 17.17 1 ()() 
Source: Data from table 11. 
As Espinoza-Valle (2000) argues, once opposition local gov, ernments began to be 
systematically recognised, elections became the focal point of political life. However, 
effective electoral democracy did not immediately underrruned prýesidentiahsm. In the 
particular case of Bala California, Espinoza-Valle argues that the recognition of the 
first opposition state government was actually a confirmation of the meta-legal 
attributions of the president, who decided to apply 'selective democracy' criteria, 
recognising, PAN victories but not the ones of the PRD, In exchange of the former 
party's support in the federal congress. Aziz-Nassif and Sýnchez (2003a) are right 
when the), argue that presidentialism has been restricted in the medium term by 
alten-iation. The presence of governments With alternative projects to that of the 
president has promoted a fuller use of the sub-national governments' prerogatives, 
stý-nulating the emergence of balances to the presidency. There is evidence that 
Mexican federalism is, being re, %,, ltahsed because the federal government has begun to 
weaken with regard to the states. The relation with the municipahties has yet to be 
123 
transformed, yet they will play a greater role in the overall political system if this 
tendency continues (Gibbins, 2001). 
Alternation has also prompted the reassessment of municipahties' real capacity to 
produce significant changes in a single government period. For 20 years, opposition 
parties concentrated in bettering the electoral system in order to compete with the 
PRI in level circumstances. Now that alternation Is a fact, parties are shifting their 
attention to more effective government models (Azlz-Nassif, 1996a). In this sense, it 
appears that the problem of Mexican democracy is not to secure fair elections, as it 
was one and a half decades ago, but how to consohdate the municipal institutions 
and make them more responsive to a party's project of government (Aziz-Nassif, 
2003). In order to do that, municipalities have begun establishing horizontal policy- 
sharing networks. Innovative policies are advertised and promoted in municipal 
associations, congressional conw-nissions, and through academic activities. 'fhe cases 
of the PAN and PRD are the most noteworthy, for the programmes apphed in many 
of their municipalities have been designed in a small number of local governments, 
like Tijuana and Le6n for the case of the PAN14, and -Xico (\Teracruz) and Mexico 
City for the PRD15. 
Incorporation qf new actors 
Financial dependenC)7 from federal government js unlikely to change in the near 
future. However, the criteria used for transfers' aflocation ha-ve become more 
1413risefio, F. Personal intemevv. Onzaba. 1211, January 2001. 
15P6rez - Franco, A. Personal interview. 
Mexico City. 1 gthjanuan, 2005. 
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transparent With time and, in an effort to depoliticise them, the first federal 
legislature without a PRI ma)onty issued new regulations that require the 
incorporation of non-governmental actors to the policy process. The regulations do 
not speciý, the particular modality of this incorporation, which has allowed a certain 
degree of innovative policy-making based on networks. The particular forms that this 
partial shift to governance has taken are analysed in chapter four. 
The first Law of Fiscal Coordination (LFC) to explicitly state the criteria and 
formulae to assign transfers was implemented in 1998, by the first Chamber of 
Deputies to have an opposition majority. As Buira (1998: 186) explains, from that 
year on it was enough to look at the text of the LFC to calculate the approximate 
amount of transfers to be received by a state government. Transfers are made 
directly to state governments through one transparent formula. 'Me 
states in turn wifl propose a formula for shanng these funds VAth 
municipalities. The public will know exactly the amount of transfers to 
state and municipal governments, and for the first time it will be able to 
hold the municipalities and the state governments accountable for their 
use (ibid. ). 
Bwra overstates the actual transparency derived from the publication of formulae 
whose exact results are difficult to repbcate16. However, once the procedure to obtain 
transfers is pubbshed, municipal associations lobby state governments and 
cong-resses for the most beneficial interpretation of the LFC of that year (Guti6rrez- 
16Bassols, M. Per, -,, onal conununication. 
T\le. xico City. Februan- 1999. 
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GonzOez, 2001). Bodies like the Association of Mexican Municipalities (AMMAC) 
and the Heriberto jara Centre of Municipal Services (CESENý, which have members 
in most states of the country, publish manuals and organise courses to deal I%qth the 
annual process of transfers' negotiation and administration. The negotiations, despite 
of being conducted through these associations, usuaHy represent the interests of their 
most important members, hke state capitalsl7. Lobbying has produced the 
revitalisation of the pol-itical discourse on federalism; but, unlike the discourse 
produced in the 1980s based on fiscal autonofnýT, the 'new federalism' discourse 
emphasises the mutual co-dependence and the possibilities to fund public works 
through innovative arrangements. This has produced, at local level, a scheme of 
tripartite funding in which federal agencies, municipahties, and citizens participate. 
The revival of the federalist discourse has also promoted lobbying throu h governors C-1 9 
(\\Tard and Rodriguez, 1999). Pressing the different states' cases has not excluded 
public demonstrations of disagreement about transfers' amounts. In the case of 
Zacatecas, for example, the PRD governor organised a series of protest marches in 
Mexico City, including a caravan that drove the 500 Km to the capital, because the 
federal government did not give his state enough funds to complete an important 
motorway. Despite that only 10 of the 57 municipalities of Zacatecas belonged to the 
PRD, all of them participated in the protests -which took place in the year 200018. 
Similar disagreements have occurred in other states, including some constitutional 
controversies presented in the Supreme Court of justice. 
17 N7ega - Marin- J. 0. Personal interview. 
Mexico City. 13tlý February 22001. 
Nfedina - Lizalde, J. L. Personal interview. 
Zacatecas. 16tlý Februarý, 2001. 
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This kind of behaviour is relatively new, and is a sign of increased interdependence 
among governmental actors of different levels and agencies (Ward and Rodri0ruez, I 
1999). As a consequence, federal government has developed more consensus- seeking 
policies than in the past, because state administrations have become real balances in 
some pohcy areas. Municipabdes, however, can bypass their governor if they 
consider him/tier to be inefficient. This direct lobbying is not well received in all 
states'9, but its mere eXistence has established patterns of non-hierarchical (but 
formal) exchanges among different actors in the governmental structure. These new 
patterns of interaction between sub-national governments explain in part the 
constant rise in transfers to the states, and the reduction of the federal executive's 
budget (see chart 2). 
Chart 2. Structure of federal oovernment's expenditure, 1993-2004 tn 
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127 
At the centre of the lobbying processes are the branches 28 and 33 of the federal 
expenses annual budget. Branch 28 funds [caRed paili(ipaciones] are the main part of 
federal transfers. They are redistributions of federal government's tax income, given 
to the states without any conditions about the way to be used, but under the 
supervision of the federal and local congresses (Patr6n, 1999). The formulae 
published in the LFC vary slightly from year to year, but usually consider the 
population, in absolute numbers, the amounts of federal tax collected in the temtorv, 
and the change in poverty indicators, in order to deternune the appropriate 
distribution coefficient (Campos-Orozco, and Lazos-Garcia, 2001). In practical 
terms, the Federal District, and the states of Mexico, T eracruz, j alisco, Nuevo Le6n, 
and Tabasco receive almost half of the branch 28 ftinds given their concentration of 
population and econornic actiVities. 
Branch 33 funds [called apoiYaa*ones] get more attention from local officials despite 
being earmarked by federal government. -Apodat70nes are intended to cover public 
infrastructure investment and public service provision, the second expenses' item in 
municipalities. Funding these policy areas N"th federal transfers leaves more spare 
resources (mainly branch 28 funds and local income) for administrative expenses. 
Branch 33 comprises seven funds: (ý the Fund for Basic Education and Teachers' 
'fraimng (FAEB); (II) the Fund for Health Senices (FASSA), (III) the Fund for 
Social Infrastructure (FAIS), which is made up by the FAIS for states and the FAIS 
for munIcipahties, (ný the Fund for the Strengthening of Municipahties 
(1`ýORTAMUN), (ýý the Fund for Multiple Contributions (FANI); (VI) the Fund for 
Public Safety (FASP); and (VII) the Fund for Technolo ical and Adult Education 91 
(FAETA) (Presidencia de la Rep6bhca, 22002). All but the municipal FAIS and 
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FORTAMUN are directly used by state governments, and include proVisions for 
administrative expenses, governmental employees' salaries and social securitý, 
payments2l 
Municipalities spend their share of FAIS and FORTAMUN directly. FAIS (also 
known as fund tbree) is distributed following four criteria: a) population earning less 
than two minimum wages, b) population of 15 years (or older) that does not read nor 
write in Spanish, c) population liVing in houses Without sewers, and d) population 
living In houses Without electricity supply (Patr6n, 1999). In this way, poorer states 
and municipalities receive higher transfers of FAIS. Pie municipal FAIS can only be 
used in direct expenses to introduce or give maintenance to potable water systems, 
sewers, pavements and roads, the introduction of electricity to poor neighbourhoods 
or rural areas, basic health and education infrastructure (mainly municipal hospitals 
and schools facilities), drainage systems, and agriculture -related infrastructure 
(Campos-Orozco, and Lazos-Garcia, 2001). 
FORTAMUN (also known asfundfour) is designed to help municipalities to pay their 
debt service and invest in their police forces (mainly by the purchasing of expensive 
equipment) (Presidencia de la Rep6blica, 2002). It can also be used in specific 
acquisitions, generally made only once (e. g. renovating the fleet of police cars)21. Both 
the municipal FAIS and FORTAMUN use a relevant percentage of the branch 33 
FAEB and FAETA are used for the running of elementary, technological, and adult- 
education schools, including the maintenance of *infrastructure, salaries, and bonuses for 
teachers. FASSA is only for medical infrastructure and personnel, FAM is employed mainly 
in food supplements for elementary school children and population 'in situation of poverty, 
and the maintenance and reconstruction of schools' and universities' facilities; finaflý-, FASP 
fund,, prisons, police forces, and public safety programmes (Presidencia de la Rep6bbca, 
21 Goytia - Robles, P. Personal iriterview. 
Zacatecas. 16, h Februan- 2001. 
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total funds, ranging from a combined 13-84 per cent in 1998 to 16.55 per cent in 
2004 (see table 13). 
Table 13. Structure of the branch 33 funds, 1998-2004 (percentages. ) 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Branch 33 Funds 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Fund for Basic Education and 
Teachers' Training (FAEB) 
69.74 64.06 63.70 60.88 61.67 56.90 57.73 
Fund for Health Services (FASSA) 12.07 11.96 12-10 12.60 12.24 12.19 12.59 
Fund for Social Infrastructure 
(FAIS), which is formed by: 
9.07 9.16 8.91 9.55 9.96 8.74 8.69 
FAIS for states 1.10 1.11 1.08 1.16 1.21 1.06 1.05 
FAIS for municipalities 7.97 8.05 7 . 83 8.39 8.75 7.68 7.64 
Fund for the Strengthening of 
Municipalities (FORTAMUN) 
5.87 8.61 8.37 9.79 10.21 8.95 8.91 
Fund for Multiple Contributions 
(FAM) 
3.24 3.00 2.90 3.11 3.24 2.32 1.21) 
Fund for Public Safetý, (FASP) 3.10 2.88 2.77 1.3- 0.98 0.92 
Fund for Technological and Adult 
Education (FAETA) 
0.10 1.14 1.30 1.31 1.18 1.18 
Sources: own calculations on data in Presidencia de la Repdbhca (2001), Escalante-Macin 
(2000), Cýjmra de Diputados (2000,2002), and INAFED 2005. Notes. FORTAMUN 
included the Federal District in 1998,2003 and 2004. In all the remainder cases it is 
excluded. FASP and FAETA were created in 1999. 
The LFC obliges municipalities to use FAIS and FORTAMUN in specific services 
and, at the same time, to organise citizens' consultations in order to legitimise the 
funds' particular use. Municipahties have to inform residents about the public works 
financed "th the branch 33, their cost, their objectives and beneficiaries (Estados 
Unidos Mexicanos, 2002a: art. 33 ý. Mayors also have to include benefited citizens in 
the planiung, execution, control, and final assessment of the funds' expenses (ibid: Z-) 
art. 33 11), all this supervised by local congresses. In this way, local governments are 
dependent on citizens' participation in order to get the apoda(, ionff. This change is 
important, tor it goes bevond the usual approach of the 'democratic planning' systern 
implemented in the 1980s, which was based on the use of discus sion -tables where 
municipal officials listened to citizens' participations on the c1tv's needs. 
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The LFC requirements, and the need to establish a party differential in the first 
opposition local administrations, prompted the implementation of varied forms of 
citizens' consultation, although in the end only some variants were adopted 
extensively (Cela-Martinez, 2002). Among them, neighbourhood comn-uttees, 
citizens' planning councils, independent planning institutes, and open City Council 
meetings are the most common. Some of these bodies have limited budgeting t) 
capacities, and in some states their decisions bind the City Councfl. They are 
described in detail in the f6floWing chapters. Here suffices to indicate that these 
innovative ways to make policy have introduced governance dynamisms that stand 
out against traditional governmental practices. 
Financial dependency and increased super-vision from local congresses have made 
local political systems more intricate than in the past. Citizens' participation and 
consultation de'vices limit mayors' manoeuvre space regarding public senqce policies. 
If in the 1980s it was enough for mayors to pay attention to state capitals, now they 
have to consider federal and local congressmen and networks of citizens required by 
the branch 33 regulations. In general, municipalities need more consensus building 
than in the past in order to be governed. They have grown more complex in the last 
decade, making them an appropriate environment to test some key founding 
assumptions of governance literature. 
Conclusions 
Pie traditional model of Mexican local goverriment is going through a process of 
transformation. -fl-ie introduction of NPM in some municipatities, and its Implied 
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technocratic rationality, has modified the customary pre-eminence of partisan politics 
in the design and implementation of policies. This shift has been motivated bN- the 
combined needs to solve increasingly complex urban problems, and to offer 
alternative governing models once City Councils' seats be an to be secured by non- 91 
PRI parties. Partisan alternation has been deternunant in the establishment of 
innovative strategies for problem solving and policy-making. It has fragmented the 
political landscape of local government, making it more complex at the same time. 
Finally, federal regulations designed to depoliticise the process of transfers' allocation 
has increased the number of actors that must participate in some policy sectors. 
The increase in lobbying practices with other levels of government (upwards'), and 
the requirement of citizens' consultations ('downwards') are symptoms of the 
dispersal of the traditional loci of power. WI-ile in the past the presidentialist systern 
emphasised top-down modes of hierarchical control, the revival of the federalist 
discourse, the decentralisation policies, and the increase of governors' relevance have 
introduced new balances to the presidential power. Municipalities have been 
benefited in the process, for they have obtained legal and fiscal capacities that have 
regained them a central place in local politics. This, however, has come at a price: 
City Councils now must deal with governors and the state agencies, but also with 
local and federal congresses, federal agencies, and an array of non-governmental 
actors in their day-to-day functioning. 
Municipal associations, and the formation of trans-state blocs of municipahties 
sharing successful programmes, denote the presence of horizontal networks that 
modifv traditional patterns of interaction. In addition, since municipal and state 
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governments have acquired a central role in policy definition, they are regarded as the 
responsible actors for policy results. In this way, it has been increasingly evident that 
the municipalities' performance is of primary concern to governors, regardless of 
their political party. The traditional top-down hierarchies are now being 
complemented with top-down dependencies and a revalorisation of bottom-up 
processes. 
These changes, however, have taken place in an uneven way. In general, urban 
municipalities are more capable of benefiting from the new transfer regulations than 
their rural counterparts. Innovative approaches to problem solving are constrained 
by a bureaucratic structure that allows the pre-ermnence of the mayor and, therefore, 
it secures a place of influence for his/her governing StýTle. Additionally, federal 
regulations require social consultations, but allow a considerable manoeuvre space 
for City Councils in deciding the particular means to enact this requirement. As a 
result, the mentioned process of transformation has been partial, affecting more 
some municipalities than others, and leaving some policy sectors untouched. It is 
certain that the transformation process has introduced new actors in policy-making, 
creating new interdependencies, and opening up procedures that in the past were 
controlled by the hegemonic partý, system; but this shift has been patchý. 
Some Mexican mu icipabties have begun to show governance dynamisms in some S ril I 
pohcy areas. In fl-ie particular case of local overnments implementing sophisticated 9 
systems of citizen participation, and the maintenance of networks for policy-making 
in pubhc sen-Ices financed xxith branch 33 funds, the image ,,, that of an 
'overcrowded state' in the expression of Cole and John The increased 
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number of actors relevant to policy processes, and the use of alternative, non- 
hierarchical, ways to legitimise policy are traits of govemance Uohn, 2001). 
The folloWing chapters will qualifý this assertion, arguing that this partial shift to 
local governance has taken particular forms according to local and other conditions. 
Chapters three, four, and five analyse the three studied municipalities (Onzaba, Le6n, 
and Zacatecas) according to some general qualities proposed býl governance 
understandings as features of governance. 
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Chapter Three 
Fragmentation and local governance 
Introduction 
As it is explained in the conclusion of chapter one, this dissertation considers 
government and governance not as a dichotomy of social-political orders, but as 
different paradigms of policy-making and implementation that involve dissimilar 
patterns of interaction between government and society. Governance patterns, as 
John (2001) argues, are characterised bý T flexible policy-making and implementation 
based on networks of institutions and individuals. 'Me interaction patterns of 
governance are both the cause and the result of a medium in which fragmentation of 
governmental and non-governmental bodies, blurredness between the public and 
private spheres of action, and self-organisation among non-governmental actors are 
higher than what is usually found in hierarchical interactions. However, the particular 
forms of government- society relations generated by this policy-making paradigm are 
shaped by context and, therefore, can only be established a posten'on* through 
empirical research. 
In chapter two, I argued that Mexican municipalities have experienced a partial and 
uneven sh-ift from traditional governmental patterns of functioning, and interaction 
with society, to local povernance ones. This chan e has been prompted by the Z-) 9 
inclusion of new governmental and non-governmental actors in some local pohcN, 
processes, which is the result of partisan alternation in City Counds, the presence of 
new balances to presidential power, and innovative transfer regulations. Tlus patchý 
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cgovernment to governance shift' is especlafly evident in some pubhc service areas, 
where a relatively fley-ible way of pohcy-making and implementation based on 
networks has been introduced. 
This chapter brings together the conclusions of the two preceding chapters to 
analyse the particular forms of local governance in the cases of study. It focuses 
primarily on some dimensions of bureaucratic and societal fragmentation which, 
according to the reviewed literature, are salient attributes of governance. In order to 
do this, this chapter analyses three complementing strate ies im lemented by the L-) 91 p 
studied municipalities. The first one is the proliferation of bureaucratic agencies and 
the resulting fragmentation of policy areas. The second is the tendency of municipal 
achTiinistrations to deal directly with individual citizens rather than with social 
orgo, anisations, avoiding in this way the social, partisan, or union intermediaries that 
were usual in the times of the PRI's hegemony. T'he third is the leadership of the 
mayor. This chapter argues that local governments in Mexico haN-e implemented 
policies that benefit from, but also seek to reinforce, a certain degree of bureaucratic 
and societal fragmentation in order to strengthen their pobtical, centrahty. 
The studied mutucipalities (Le6n, Orizaba, and Zacatecas) have fragmented their 
structures and engaged in direct government- to- citizen interactions in different 
degrees. In the three cases, however, bureaucratic and societal fragmentation has 
been used to ratifý' the mayor's leadership xvithin the bureaucratic structure, and 
Ills/her position as chief pubfic senice provider. In this sense, the mavors of Le6n, 
Orizaba, and Zacatecas counter the undesired effects, of fragmentation by developing 
strong leadership styles, -, -,. -lilch are necessan, to generate more coahtion-oriented 
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politics, as John (2001) argues. These three local adnairdstrations are especially 
interesting given that they belong to states that by the rmd-1990s were considered 
'political laboratories' where the model of the dominant party was in crisis, and 
alternative governing styles were emerging (Aziz-Nassif, 1996a). The chapter begins 
, Aqth a theoretical consideration of fragmentation, and continues \TVqth some sections 
about how it is verified in the three analysed municipalities. The conclusion raises 
some issues regarding the level of fragmentation in Le6n, Onzaba, and Zacatecas, 
and the role of the corresponding political partý, in office. 
Governance and fragmentation 
The concept of fragmentation plays an important role in most governance 
understandings. Its importance stems from the fact that fragmentation, both in its 
governmental and societal forms, has been one of the most influential factors in the 
transformation of traditional patterns of interaction between the state and society. In 
general, governance theoretical frameworks presuppose understandings of 
fragmentation that can be summarised in two basic approaches. Excluding the 
definitions of fragmentation as the state's territorial breaking-up (e. g. Okafor, 2000), 
and its related issues of international recognition and the legitimacy of the central 
authorities vis-ý-vis sub-national regions (e. g. Garcia-Guadifla, Rodriguez-Výzquez, 
and -Alvarez-1triago, 
2002), fragmentation in the hterature of sub-national 
governance is typically understood either as the proliferation of autonomous 
governmental agencies, or as the process of their hybridisation. 
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The first approach considers fragmentation as the combined effect of the 
atonlisation, or prohferation, of governmental agencies and their increased autonomy 
from central authorities to define pol-icy. This understanding usuaDy refers to the 
dispersal of lo(7* of power within public administrative structures in order to gain in 
fleXibility, diversity, and quickness of governmental responses, and the associated 
problems of lack of co-ordination and policy-coherence among governmental 
departments. The atoMisation and proliferation of agencies are part of the 
governmental answer to the perceived inadequacies of traditional bureaucratic 
structures and procedures, for these, 
organised as they have been around professional disciplines and 
functional departments, are increasingly found to be too n9ld and too 
inflexible to respond adequately to the complex problems and policý 
issues that cut across the boundaries and divisions between the vertical 
orgarusational skyscrapers of most pubhc senices (Bemngton, 2001: 
214). 
TI-ie insufficiencies of traditional public administration to address multi-level, cross- 
sectoral issues restrict the governmental capacities to adapt to new situations. This, in 
turn, increases the probabilitý, of excluding citizens from access to public services 
when their particular situations do not conform to the administrative or procedural 
boundanes of govemmental action. Govemments, tiýing to avold these legitimacv- 
damaging situations, have reacted generating an approach based on the specialisation 
ot policy sectors, expanding the scope of governmental responsibility to matters that 
, xcrc unthinkable 3o years ago, but concentrating the agencies' inten, entions on 
138 
c4rather narrow boundaries of [aI particular 'sub-arena' or 'specialised policy arena 
(Campbell, Baskin, Baumgartner and Halpern, 1989: 86). 
Fragmentation defined from this standpoint implies a higher degree of operational 
autonomy from central control in pohcy-making, implementation, and assessment in 
the interest of having a more effective correlation between governmental resources 
and citizens' needs (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Western industrialised countries have 
fragmented their structures in order to meet their citizens' heterogeneous demands 
more efficiently, matching specific requirements of societal groups With the 
responses of special-purpose bodies that interact "With them in a more direct way 
0ohn, 2001; Le Gales, 2002). In the process, governments increase their legitimacy 
and, ideally, their ability to construct consensus in the community, for the distance 
between policy designer and user is shortened (Marks, 1996). Fragmentation can be 
seen as an adaptation process to conditions of more societal complexity caused by 
the dis-integration of the traditional sources of legitimate representation, such as the 
pobtical parties, unions, or government itself (Pierre and Peters, 2000). Thus, 
fragmentation increases a very much needed governmental flexibibty, wl-ýich is 
required to interact in a socio-pohtical system in constant change. 
Ashby (1956: 206- 215) has argued the same for any kind of organisation that intends 
to influence other actors in order to maintain a certain outcome constant. The "Law 
of Requisite Variety", as he calls it, postulates that if an individual or organisational. 
regulator alms to steer a system, it must match the system's constant change. 
Adaptation to the extemal environment necessitates that some components in the 
regulator's behaviour are vanable enou h to respond to the emergent conditions 9 
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without endangering the regulator's preservation. Consequently, the requisite vanery 
is met in the difficult balance between the need for flexibility, diversit-v, and dispersed 
decision-making, on the one hand, and the essential n-unimurn of policy-coherence 
that limits the centrifugal tendencies of fragmentation, on the other (Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1998). 
Is in this delicate balance where fragmentation as an adaptation strategy has its main 
disadvantage. Fragmentation complicates governing processes because it generates 
power dependencies that accentuate the tensions between agencies and different 
levels of government, testing central government's capacities to co-ordinate and 
generate pohcy-coherence (Rhodes, 1997). Pierre and Peters (2000) presuppose a 
concept of fragmentation in this line of argument when they conceive the 
government-governance 'continuum' as a coflection of segmented policy sectors 
whose orientation cannot be defined by a single executive directive. Fragmentation 
augments when decentrahsation, locahsation, and devolution policies increase the 
agencies' legal capabihties and resources. The resulting, more numerous, bodies may 
have similar powers in their respective pohcy areas and, by being more autonomous 
from central authorities, thev can produce interactions that do not follow the top- 
down lo ic (Genschel, 1997). In their turn, these conditions may generate 91 
overlapping policy sectors and redundancy in programmes (Turner and Hulme, 
1997). 
Peters (1995: 18) finds fragmentation problematic for the same reasons. 
Fragmentation is present when government maintains a "nominal control" over 
agencies, but in practical terms these develop "pohcy stances of their o-wn" that 
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disperse and obstruct hierarchical exchanges. Fragmented governments are 
"centrifugal", with loci* of power dispersing in varýing degrees and speeds within its 
structure (Pierre, 2000a: 242). This dispersion of power brings in new non- 
hierarchical, non-vertical IGR_, which makes straightforward top-down control more 
difficult (Rhodes, 1997). This "horizontality" among governmental agencies may 
cause them to favour non- hierarchical interactions over top-down lines of command 
(Peters 1998a: 296). 
Other complications stem from the rise in numbers of significant actors in the policy 
process, which may modify the usual governing patterns and change the balances 
that make consensus and negotiation possible (Pierre, 1995). Consensus and 
negotiation are more expensiVe in financial, political, and social terms when dealing 
with more numerous and segmented actors (Peters, 1997a). The problem hes in the 
intrinsic difficulty of haNqng to deal with additional actors, and in the fact that 
governmental processes are made possible by standardisation, and fragmentation 
increases their heterogeneity (Rhodes, 2000). Clearly, interaction with more distinct 
intcrest groups, considered as potential political clients, demands from government 
an approach differentiated by the specific problems of the involved public service 
and target population, which is- more expensi-ve than the traditional prolkilsion of 
public senrices on a 'one-size-fits-all' basis. In sum, In fragmented bureaucracies, 
aton-)jsation and increased autonomy make them less controUable than more 
integrated adn-unistrative sýlsterns" (Peters, 1995: 35). In the light of these 
disadvantages, fragmentation defined as an adaptation strategy can only make sense 
as a trade off for increased legiumac). 
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The second definition of fragmentation used by the national and sub-national 
understandings of governance is related to the augmented influence of public-private 
policy networks, and the resultant hybridisation of the instruments employed by 
governments to steer. This approach understands fragmentation as the process by 
which heterogeneous societal actors and "spheres of action" rMx together generating 
"hybrid frameworks of participation" (Mlinar, 1995: 145). It assumes proliferation of 
agencies or interest groups, their increased autonomy, and a set of resulting non- 
hierarchical interactions, but on a public-pimte basis; i. e. the resulting fragmented 
units are made up by both governmental and non-governmental institutions and 
individuals. Kooffnan (1 993a), Marks et al. (1996), Rhodes (1997), and Wilson (1998) 
have introduced this understanding of fragmentation as an important trait of local 
governance. Most notably, Rhodes (1997,2000) proposes a governance 
understanding (that of the management of inter-organizational networks) that is 2_ý 
practicafly indistingIllshable from fragmentation defined in this way. The increased 
fragmentation in governance is apparent by the rising number of governments that 
implement 'contracting out' policies (Rhodes, 1994), introduce public-private 'special 
purpose bodies' that bypass the usual functioning channels of local government 
(Rhodes, 2000), and generate different kinds of public-private partnerships (Rhodes, 
1995). As a result, both government's and societý-'s roles appear to be less monolithic 
than what was thought in the past, with multiple possible combinations between 
them. 
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Padicipation and mayoral leaderrbýb 
The two aforesaid conceptions of fragmentation imply a significant change in what is 
expected from citizens' participation in its interaction with government. Part of the 
innovation of the understandings of sub-national governance hes in a certain notion 
of 'active citizenship' that is required in order to complement, or even replace, some 
aspects of governmental interventions (Le Gales and John, 1997). If, ultimatelý, 
governments fragment their structure and functioning to be more responsive to 
citizens' desires, and in this way improve public service delivery, it is necessary to 
have in&jiduals willing to engage with governmental officials and programmes in 
order to provide the required information and resources to define or implement 
policy (Blair, 2000). The actual performance of citizens in this aspect varies great]N,, 
and in the case of British and European local governments, schemes of consultation 
and participation, if indeed citizens participate at A, have not necessarily benefited 
the direct users of services and their representatives in city councils (Needham, 
2002). Nevertheless, the assumption of certain 'consumer responsiveness' is 
characteristic of the literature on sub-national governance, being this a feature where 
the argued difference between the paradigms of government and governance is more 
cNident. Uie traditional paradigm of public administration seems to imply a notion of 
participation rather restricted, %Xqth the emphasis put on consultation processes and 
tax-related obligations, while governance patterns of interaction have introduced 
numerous variants of participatiNe mechanisms. 
Both 'active citizenship' and governmental fragmentation are trends that governance 
understandings argue to be present in the European 'shift to governance'. However, 
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in the cities where these tendencies have generated trans-sectoral econonlIc and 
pohfical dynamisms that have been successfufly transformed into coDective projects, 
cactive citizenship' and governmental fragmentation have been complemented by the 
presence of influential leaders capable of reducing the unwanted effects of the 
proliferation of agencies and the citizens' direct interactions With government. Le 
Gales (2002: 264) argues that European cities have consolidated their places as "sites 
of governance" because they have managed to maintain their privileged position as 
lod of decision-making despite the increased fragmentation in both governments and 
societies. This, however, has been made possible in part by the enhanced role of the 
leadership of the urban ebtes, especially mayors With enlarged mandates and the 
legitimacy that results from being directly elected by citizens (ibid. ). 
Genschel (1997) argues that increased fragmentation does not necessarily entail a 
clear-cut and proportional reduction in the steering capabihties of regulators. 
Analysing the case of the telecommunications industry, he notices that as 
fragmentation increased in the industry's medium of action, regulators usually 
deployed unconventional mechanisms, mostli T reliant on innovative goveming styles, 
in order to Influence emerging networks of more autonomous actors. In other 
words, increased fragmentation appears to call for augmented leadership constructed 
on a non-hierarchical, non-traditional, basis. In the same line of argument, John 
(2001), Le Gales (2002), and Le Gales andjohn (1997), offer examples that show the 
importance of the role of the mayor, and of the regional authorities, m securing 
convergence over European cities' pobcles. Mayors in Europe are increasingly 
occupied in "sharing the vislon" , xljth governmental and non-governmental actors 
alike, in an effort to introduce guiding lines of action in the nuddle of increased 
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policy fragmentation. They use unconventional means such as the direct interaction 
with employees of all levels (and public service users) in order to reduce the 
centriftige propensity of European societies, strengthening their political status and, 
therefore, increasing their possibilities to influence autonomous actors (Bevir et al., 
2003a). 
The reviewed literature offers an explanation of European local governance that 
permits the construction of sophisticated accounts of fragmentation and its 
management. On the one hand, fragmentation can be considered an adaptation 
means to accommodate the disparate needs of society; but, on the other, this can 
only be sustainable if some effort in limiting its effects is implemented. Thus, the 
resulting picture of governance is not that of an atormsed society interacting with an 
atorMsed state but, rather, governance is characterised by the presence of clusters of 
governmental and non-governmental actors, re-arranged in a way that does not 
follow hierarchical structures, and maintained together by leaderships that are 
capable of creating convergence of interests around them. John (2001) and Le Gales 
(2002) assume that governance is not only the breaking-up and specialisation of 
policy sectors, but also the counteracting behaviour of politicians and adn-iimstrators 
who try to hold together multiple public-private interests, interactions, and policy 
sectors. Die role of fragmentation in local governance can be conceptuabsed as a 
tension between the need to make governmental responses more flexible, and the 
innovative means of regulators to steer an increasingly complex political 
environment. 
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Fragmentation in the three selected cases 
As in the European cases analysed by the local governance literature, governmental 
fragmentation, 'active citizenship' combined with a direct government-to-citizen 
interaction, and mayoral leadership are present in Orizaba, Le6n, and Zacatecas City. 
They, however, are verified in different degrees and have dissimilar effects over the 
respective patterns of governance. The collected evidence points at complementary 
dynamisms among these three tendencies, being especially important the role of the 
mayor, counteracting the lack of co-ordination of the increased policy-making 
dispersal. At least in some aspects, this centripetal role of the mayor is shaped by the 
general political orientation of the party to which he/she belongs. 
Some Mexican authors have argued a link between the rise in governmental 
fragmentation and political alternation in City Councils, especially during the decade 
of the 1990s. Hernindez-Vicencio (2000a), for example, argues that opposition 
(non-PRý governments in that decade typicaBy began the construction of a partisan 
differential in the exercise of government by modiýling the administrative and 
regulatory structure of the rnunicipahtýT. Once the new City Council was in functions, 
opposition mayors, trustees, and aldermen introduced policies to make 
administration more effective, which usuaBy implied some bureaucratic re-organising 
and the creation of new municipal departments, the intensive introduction or 
modification of municipal regulations, and vAdespread change in the administrative 
and operative staff (ibid. ). This general analysis is confirmed for the cases of 
Cluliuahua and Bala Cahfornia by Aziz-Na-, -, sif (1996) and Espinoza-Valle (2000a). 
respectively, , viio chart the changes introduced by the PAN once It -won those state 
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governments and their capitals. In Orizaba, the PAN also introduced substantial 
changes in the administrative structure and functioning of the municipality in two 
consecutive penods commencing in 1995 (VeUzquez-Garcia, 1999); changes that 
had to be revoked or assumed under a different political discourse once the PRI 
regained the municipality in 2001. In Le6n, the PAN implemented one of the most 
comprehensive plans of municipal transformation in the country (Bazdresh-Parada, 
2002; Negrete, 2002). In Zacatecas, the main administrative change was introduced 
by the state government (also from the PRD) establishing a municipal civil sen-ice 
(Guerrero and Gryl, 2004). 
Most of these contributions assume that different parties in office govern in different 
ways, producing distingUlshable patterns of governance and administrative change. 
They also presuppose that the basic explanation for this is a combination of pohtical 
ideology and intergovernmental relations: a given municipality in Mexico wffl receive 
preferential treatment if the governor of its state belongs to the same party. This 
allows the mayor to receive the necessary support to set up innovative programmes, 
or to complete expensive public works (Guj-H6n-L6pez and Ziccardi, 2004). Other 
analyses, on the other hand, tend to emphasise that current processes of 'municipal 
reform' are complex and that a categorisation by political party is risk--, ', for 
pioneering programmes in participation or innovative mayoral governing styles are 
ý, vjclespread regardless of the party (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2004a). Moreover, it seems 
that "there is not a direct connection bem, een specific contents of the [municipal] 
reform and specific political parties in -state governments" (Gwfl6n-L6pez and 
Ziccardi, 2004: 9), thus making predictions on governance patterns based on political 
party practically impossible. 
147 
This dissertation does not argue that patterns of local governance differ according to 
political partý, but, rather, that the general partisan orientation of the elected officials 
affects local governance in a relafire way. Arguing that two different municipalities 
will automatically produce similar patterns of governance because theN- are governed 
by the same party does not take in account the evidence proVided by the above- 
mentioned authors, and cannot be proved given the unevenness of the local contexts 
of the 2,435 municipalities in the country. Nevertheless, in the particular 
administrations studied in Le6n, Onzaba and Zacatecas, a partisan differential in 
local governance was developed as a reaction to previous administrations of other 
parties. The New PRI administration of Orizaba (2001-2004) was considered 
important because it succeeded two consecutive PAN administrations that, in their 
turn, were presented by this party as models of good government -. Le6n has been 
the municipal laboratory of the PAN since 1989, when the first opposition 
government was inaugurated. The 2000-2003 administration was considered a step 
further in the consolidation of a model of government that is different to the 
previous PRI governments Finafly, the studied Zacatecas administration (1998- 
2001) was regarded as a referential model because it was one of the first state capitals 
won by the PRD, and like Mexico City, it was indicative of what an opposition 
government could achieve (PRD, 2000). Local governance in the three cases is 
shaped by the political party in the sense that these particular adrmnistrations 
developed innovations With respect to the preceding governments of other partý 
affihations. '11-ie resulting patterns of governance have some commonahties but they 
also differ in some aspects, especiafly in the kind of networks that they estabhsh. 
12 1 Cf. Orizaba cia Red (2003). "La adrru'mstrac, 6n Onzabefia podria municipalizar trýnsito de 
no obsen-ar buenos resultados por parte del nuevo delegado". Oriýaba en Red, 1 Oth 
December. 
Escudero - Stadeh-nann, A. Personal interview. Orizaba. 18th January 2001. 
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AzIz-Nassif (1996) has found evidence that supports the relative importance of the 
political party in local governance outcomes. Analysing the case of the state 
government of Chihuahua in the 1990s, he argues that political alternation in City 
Councils broke the monopoly of local governments' professionals and allowed the 
arrival of new political operators, who introduced a certain change in the rules of the 
pohtical game. Notably among these rule changes, the introduction of bureaucratic 
fragmentation in the senses defined above has been present not only in Chihuahua, 
but also in other state opposition admin-istradons in the 1990s, like Bajja Cahfornla, 
Guanajuato, and Nuevo Le6n (Aziz-Nassif, 2000). 
Governmental fragmentation has provided a new framework that modifies 
traditional clientehstic practices. Nevertheless, these modifications, although 
important enough to establish a partisan differential in the exercise of government, 
have not changed the basic rules of local politics in Mexico (ibid. ). Many of the most 
innovative practices in Mexican local governance have been built over the old 
structures of corporatism and clientelism producing patterns of governance that, in 
spite of being different to the traditional way in which PRI governments worked, 
have resemblances vvith them. Many municipal programmes in the country based on 
C active citizenship' and fragmentation have been possible thanks to a tradition of 
intensive interaction between government and society (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003b). In 
this political environment, the fragmentation of bureaucratic structures has been 
instrumental in the redefinition of the new clientelistic practices of the studied 
municipahties. 
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Thejbrolý(eration ofgovernmental qTencies 
The main legal reference to detemune the responsibilities of municipalities regarding 
public services is the Article 115 of the federal constitution. It hsts the public services 
that are the competence of murucipal administrations and the broad policy sectors 
under the control of City Councils. The mentioned article does not explicitly state 
adnunistrative and clerical services that, nevertheless, have been traditionaRv 
provided by municipalities even before the constitutional amendment of 1983. These 
services are presupposed in the mandate of local governments, and usually comprise 
the Secretary of the Municipality, the Local Treasury, the Municipal Comptroller, and 
the Civil Registrar Office (which usuaUy is subordinated to the Secretary of the 
Municipality). This constitutional article, on the other hand, does give a specific list 
of urbanisation sen-ices that municipal administrations are required to proVide and 
supervise. If a local government is not equipped to meet these obligations, it is stiH 
obliged by federal law to establish an agreement WIth other municipalities, the state 
government, or Private companies to ensure that the service is provided. The federal 
constitution mentions nine municipal policy areas or public senrices that are 
mandatory: 1) potable water, sewers, street drains, and treatment of residual waters, 
2) public lighting, 3) sanitation, including garbage collection, recycling, and disposal, 
4) pubbc markets, 5) cemeteries, 6) abattoirs, 7) streets, parks, and pubbc gardens, 8) 
public safety, which includes the maintenance of a police corps and traffic police (it 
does not require municipahties to have a firemen corps), 8) and any other authorlsed 
by the respective local congress (Estados Utiidos Mexicanos, 20022). 
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Federal laws allow the corresponding state to regulate the concrete adminIstrative 
structure of its municipalities. The typical arrangement has a two-tier administrative 
structure directly dependent from the mayor. The upper der comprises the 
departments (called Secrelarias or Direcciones), which are di'Vided into directorates 
(usuaUy caUed Co-ordinaciones). TraditionaUy, there is a department for each pohcy 
sector defined in the federal constitution, with the sub-sectors of local policy handled 
by directorates. Citizens' councils, analysed in chapter four, are not part of the 
official administrative structure of the municipalities, but are established and 
managed by directorates, With which they have regular exchanges regulated by local 
laws. When these councils are especially influential, they can acquire a sernii-official 
status that is recognised by both municipal staff and citizens. Metropolitan 
municipalities like Le6n, Wnda, and Tijuana, have recently established this kind of 
semi-autonomous boches. These agencies,, usually planning institutes, have advisory 
functions and their directors are appointed to terms longer than those of the mayors, 
ir) and coherence between adri-iinistrations. ensuring a degree of pohcy continul 
Finally, it is important to note that the formal administrative structure is only a rough 
indication of the operative fragmentation of policy. As %XI'lltehead (2000: 16) argues, 
Mexican governmental agencies are very uneven in their performance, being 
-inflexible and oppressive in some areas and virtuaUy inoperative in others". 
Practicafly all the inten-iewees, regardless of their status as governmental officials or 
non-governmental actors, could enumerate new governmental agencies that were 
highly ineffectual in spite of having staff and a part in the budget. 
If the proliferation of autonomous agencies is considered, Le6n is the most 
fragn-iented among the studied cases, followed bv Orizaba and Zacatecas. Le6n has 
1 :51 
experienced a continuous rise in the number of departments and autonomous 
agencies since 1989. In the first PANista adrmnistration (1989-1991) the municipahly 
had 11 departments and 2,900 employees. They grew to 14 departments and 3,100 
employees in the 1992-1994 administration. In the period between 1995 and 1997, 
the mayor established another department, although he maintained the same number 
of employees (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999b). In the studied administration (2000-2003), 
the total number of departments was 21 (including six semi-autonomous agencies), in 
addition to three directorates and four citizens' councils that were conspicuous for 
their influence in public opinion 21 . To date, the municipahtý, has 4,054 employees (H. 
A), untan-iiento de Le6n, 2005). Some of these agencies deal VAth policy sectors that 
are atypical in Mexican municipalities, like public health, housing, and 
environment/ ecology. In this case, the process of frag-mentation cons'sted of both 
the aton-usation of agencies (i. e. the upgrading of directorates into departmental 
status, increasing their autonomy to shape policy), and the introduction of completely 
new ones, hke the semi-autonomous planning and service agencies such as the 
System of Potable Waters and Sewers of Le6n, the Municipal Institute for Housing, 
the Municipal Institute of Women, and most notably, the Municipal Institute for 
Planning (IMPLAN) (see table 14). 
24 Pedroza, 1-R. "Garantiza LFL-X continwdad en proý-ectos estratý icos". E/ Heraldo 91 
de 11 t" September. 
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Table 14. Municipal agencies in the studied municipalities compared with the 
federal constitution 
Federal Le6n Orizaba Zacatecas 
Constitution 
Administrative (D) Municipal Secretary (D) Municipal Secretan, (D) Municipal Secretary 
P) Municipal Comptroller P) Municipal Treasury P) Municipal Comptroller 
P) Municipal Treasury P) Provision and P) Municipal Treasury 
P) Planning (different to Maintenance 
IMPI. '-ýN) 
Potable water, (SAD) System of Potable P) Potable Water P) Public Works and 
sewers, drains, and Waters and Sewers of Le6n Services -oversees also 
treatment of (SAPAL) public lighting, sanitation, 
residual waters markets, cemeteries, 
abattoirs, and public safety. 
Public 4, hting P) Public works and 
urban management (also 
oversees streets, parks, 
public gardens) 
Sanitation, (D) Sanitation. It also (D) Sanitation (also 
including garbage supervises cemeteries supervises cemeteries and 
collection, abattoirs) 
recycling and 
disposal 
Public markets (d) Commerce. It also (D) Commerce 
supen, ises abattoirs. 
Cemeteries 
Abattoirs 
Streets, parks, and (D) Public Works. It also 
ubbc gardens oversees public lighting 
Public safety (D) Public Safety (D) Public Safety (police 
(municipal police (including municipal corporations) 
corps and traffic police, traffic police, a (D) Civic Safety 
police) special tactics corps, and (emergencies' 
emergencies' management) management) 
Any other P) Econorruc P) Economic (D) Economic 
authonsed by the Development Development Development 
local congress P) Social Development P) Governance (D) Citizens' participation 
(D) Environment and (D) Social Development P) Department of Family 
Ecolo-V P) Department of Family Assistance PIF) 
P) Education Assistance (DIF) (CC) Council of Municipal 
P) Promotion of Culture (CC) Council of Municipal Development 
P) Public Health Development (CODEMUN) 
(D) Rural Development (CODEMUN) 
(SAD) Department of 
Family Assistance (DIF) 
(SAD) Municipal Institute 
for Planning (IMPLý\N) 
(SAD) 1\111nicipal Institute 
for Housing 
(SAD) Municipal Institute 
for Women (gender issues) 
(SAD) The Centre for the 
Stud), of Le()n Urban 
Infrastructure 
(d) Spoke, ýperson Office 
(d) Sports andYouth 
153 
(CC) Planning Council for 
Municipal Development 
(COPLADENIUN) 
(CC) Council for the 
Annual State Fair 
(CC) Population Council 
(CC) Prevention of Drug 
Addictions 
(CC) Prevention of 
Children's abuse 
Source: Data in Estados UnIdos Mexicanos (2002), H. Ayuntamiento de Orizaba (2001), H. 
Ayuntarniento de Le6n (2000), H. Ayuntamiento de Zacatecas (2001a). Notes (D) are 
agencies of departmental level, (SAD) Semi-autonomous Departments, (d) directorates 
(second level bodies), and (CC), citizens' councils with a serni-official status. 
One of the first consequences of this intensive fragmentation has been the duplicity 
of functions. Rionda (2000), for example, mentions the redundancy caused by the 
IMPLAN with its interactions with the Planning Department, directly dependent 
from the mayor's office. Given that the decisions of the IMPLAN and the Planning 
Department are not legaRy binding, they stiH have to be approved by the City 
Council, but the positions of both agencies have equal rights of access to its sessions. 
This procedure complicates decision-making because the INTLAN is perceived as a 
21 'technical', almost neutral, bod y, while the Planning Department seeks to advance 
in the, more political, 'flagship programmes' of the administration. NaturaHv, their 
positions do not always coincide. 
A similar duplicity of functions is found in the new municipal policy sectors of health 
and housing, given that there are federal and state level agencies dealing With the 
same issues. A working arrangement has been reached haVing federal agencies to deal 
with citizen-, who are full-time employees (with complete social security n hts), while g 
state and municipal agencies have focused on the population that is part of the 
informal econon-iy and that does not have social secunty access. The effectiveness of 
2') Vega - Marin, j-0. 
Personal intemew. Me. mco City. 1 ')Ih February 2001. 
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this approach has not been proved, for it would be more rational to invest 
bettering and expanding the capabilities of already existing federal institutions than 
creating new local ones With essentially the same objectives. This is especially so 
when Le6n's health and housing agencies have been criticised for being understaffed 
and under-equipped 26 . This fact suggests that at least some aspects of the 
governmental fragmentation process in the municipality of Le6n are linked to the 
maintenance of the political capital resulting of proViding senrices that, in the past, 
were exclusive of the federal and state governments. Being able to establish hospital, 
housing, and other expensive programmes provides a certain prestige regardless of 
the actual performance of the services. 
In addition to this political rationale, Cabrero-Mendoza (1999b) has pointed out that 
Le6n's expansion and specialisation of policy sectors is also related to the need of 
more differentiated, localised, and focused instruments to deal With its increasing 
urban problems. Given the sole size of the involved population and territom 
Meyjcan metropolitan murucipalities, like Le6n, require a larger, more specialisecl, 
and therefore, more complex structure than medium-size municipalities (like Onzaba 
and Zacatecas) (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2004). Governmental fragmentation in large 
municipahties has gone hand in hand \Nqth an effort to maintain a constant expertise 
pool despite the change in adn-ýmstrations. A recent survey has showed that 36 per 
cent of the functionaries in large municipalities (with more than 500,000 inhabitants) 
have remained in their posts for two or more administrations, v, -hile in smafl (15,000 
to 100,000 inhabitants) and rural municipalities (up to 15,000) only 9 per cent of 
Cf Pedroza, R. (2003). "Garantiza LEA continwdad en proyectos estrat6 icos". El 91 
Heraldo de Leýn, 11 llý September. 
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officials are in the same situation (ibid.: 765-780). Tbe evidence suggests that large 
municipal bureaucracies in Mexico, given the absence of a civil sen-ice, are viable by 
sustained levels of officials' know-how acquired by permanence in the post. Le6n is 
an example of this trend because it has one of the most complex administrative 
structures in the country, and has been able to preserve civil service-like dynarnisms 
for more than three consecutive administrations (cf. Santos-Zavala, 1999). 
Agency proliferation justified for political and technical reasons, and the mentioned 
expertise pooling, have been accompanied in Le6n by a relevant business-sector 
component. At national level, businessmen run for mayors in an important 
proportion. In 1995,56 per cent of the country's mayors came from the business 
sector, while in 2000 the percentage was 51 (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2004: 769). 
However, municipal top officials (directors and chiefs of directorates) traditionaUy 
have come from the social sector or the partisan n-dbtancy. By the late 1990s, 53 per 
cent of Le6n's top officials, (including the mayor) came from the business sector, a 
proportion higher than the national average, and the one found m Aguascalientes 
City (17 per cent) and Naucalpan (18 per cent), both urban municipalities of a similar 
size to Le6n's and also governed by the PAN at the time (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999: 
78). This is significant, for the business component in Mexico has been hnked to the 
introduction of NPM policies, among which governmental fragmentation is one of 
the most important (cf. Ziccardi, 1995). 
Orizaba is the second most fragmented municipahty of the three cases. Unhke Leon, 
the literature on Mexican local govemment has not treated it in depth, and the few 
cxisting references analyse the changes introduced bv the PAN governments bet-ween 
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1995 and 2000. Sobrino (1999), for example, argues that partisan alternation in the 
1990s was instrumental to modify the traditional administrative structure and 
functioning of Orizaba. Most of these changes were kept in the 2001-2004 PRI's 
administration. However, being a city without the resources and problems of Le6n, 
the fragmentation process has been moderate and the administrative structure has 
closely followed the policy areas mandated by the federal constitution. 
Dunnt 
7, the studied administration, 
Orizaba kept a str-ucture with a department for 
each important policy sector - in total 14, including a planning citizens' council (see 
table 14). Among these, two are especially sign-Ificant. T'he first one is the 
Department of Governance, which has preponderantly political functions. It is in 
charge of the directorate of the spokesperson and the relations VAth the local media, 
but also supenises the distribution of public relations' information among the 
municipality's employees (VeUzquez-Garcia, 
1999)27 it is also in charge of the co- 
ordination of an acquisitions committee, the comptroller's office, and of dealing With 
the emergent political problems, many of which were related in this particular 
adnunistration to the application of the rules to sell alcoholic drinks, and other 
commerce related issues2'. 
'Fhe second noteworthy agency is the office of Commerce, which in Orizaba had a 
departmental status while in Le6n it is a second level body. This suggests a 
confirmation of the importance that traditionafly PRI governments have i en to the giv 
27 This article analyses the faculties of the Governance Department during the PANista 
administration that introduced it. Its basic functions, however, remained during the PRI's 
ý, rovernrnent, as the local press shows. Z 2,4 Orizaba en Red (2004). "El director de gobemac16n de OriZaba molesta a propietatios 
de bares y cantinas". Ot-, *,,: -qba en Red, 2511, anuary. 
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relations with street vendors and the cormnercial businesses in general, for both the 
departments of Governance and Commerce dealt with what was considered the most 
conflictive policy sector after urbanisation services in Orizaba 29. Fhe upgrading of the 
Department of Commerce was also, in part, a reaction to the criticised decision of 
the prevqous PAN admitustrations of concentrating a high number of directorates 
under a single department director. During the PAN governments, for example, the 
Department of Social Development alone oversaw all the matters related to 
education, promotion of cultural events and sports, youth issues, ecologic policies, 
and citizens' participation"', a fact that was known in the local press as the "super- 
departments"". Having a small number of very well paid departmental directors 
supervising a high number of programmes was considered to risk neglecting 
important pohfical actors 32 , and the Commerce and Governance Departments were 
created to give more detailed attention to potentiaUy conflictive policy areas. 
Orizaba has less departments than Le6n; it has not established any sen-ii- autonomous 
body, and the sole citizens' council with significant influence on overaU policy is the 
Council of Municipal Development (analysed in chapter four). Thus, proliferation, 
autonomy, and hybridisation -the variables used in the above-mentioned definitions 
of fragmentation- are lower than in Le6n. In the same wav, there is not evidence of a 
sigmificant level of duplicitv of functions among the departments, for the di\qslon of 
their tasks appears to be very straightforward (H. Ayuntanuento de Onzaba, 2001). 
Nevertheless, the process of agency proliferation implemented during the previous 
l" B isefio, F. Personal inten-lew, Onzaba. 12111 januan, 2001. ri 
,01 bid. 
11 Cadä, Y. Personal intervieu-. Orrzaba. 10111january 2001. 
32 Cruz -Arellano, E. Personal inteniew, Onzaba. 211dFebruary 2001. 
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PANista administrations, follo,,, -nng the model of Le6n 33 , increased the level of 
fragmentation that existed during the governments before 1995. The 2001-2004 PRI 
government did not return to the simpler administrative structure implemented 
during the pre-1995 PRI administrations, but retained the basic changes introduced 
by opposition. The Department of Governance, and progran-unes such as the Cifiýen 
Day -analysed in the following section of the chapter-, were kept by the PRI 
administration in spite of criticisms made during the 2000 campaign"'. Other policies 
announced by the PANista administrations, like the intention to establish a municipal 
Traffic Police Department -a service that in Onzaba is still provided by a state-level 
agency 35 - were taken by the PRI administration as a bargaining tool to obtain a more 
beneficial treatment from the state government. The mayor announced that his 
administration would seek to establish a municipal Traffic Police Department if the 
state agencý, s representation in the municipality continued 'harassing' local drivers" 
The PRI administration has a more political profile than the previous PANista ones 
in the sense that the justification for the possible increase in the number and 
autonomy of municipal agencies is less technical and more rehant in arguments of 
cmutucipal autonOM3, i37 
Finally, the studied PRI administration has a lower proportion of officials who come 
from the business sector than the immediately preceding ones. In spite that there are 
not exact figures in this respect, it was evident that the number of businessmen 
3" Escudero - Stadeh-nann, A. Personal interview. Orizaba. 18til January 2001. 
34 Orizaba en Red (2002). "El dia de ayer se celebr6 la pendlwm audiencia, Cludadana del 
aho". On'ýaba en Red, 1 Sth November. 
35 Orizaba en Red (2003). "La administrac16n OriZabefia podria municipalizar trýnsito de no 
obsen-ar buenos resultados por parte del nuevo delegado". Oriýaba eii Red, 1 Oth December. 
36 01 aba en Red (2003)). "Acusan autoridades cobros imdebidos de CFI-,, ". Oriýqba eti Red, nz 
1 st December. 
37 Ibid. 
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forrrUng part of the top echelon of administrative staff diminished significantly when 
the PRI administration commenced 3'. Drs. Tomýs Trueba and Angel Escudero, the 
previous PAN mayors, were weR known businessmen before entering politics (their 
families own an important hotel and a private hospital, respectively), and they 
brought in businessmen to occupy key administrative posts in their governments 
(Velýzquez-Garcia, 1999). Mr. Martin Cabrera, on the other hand, had a pohtical 
background (mostly in the PRI administrative structure) and when he was elected 
mayor he formed an administration with directors of similar background", being an 
exception the director of the Department of Econon-uc Development who was an 
important businessman. Despite this shift in the profile of the administration, maný, 
of the changes introduced by the more 'technical' PAN governments remained, as it 
was already mentioned, confirming a typical trait of the 'New PRY governments. 
'New PRF administrations usuafly introduce administrative and participative 
innovations that were in the past associated with the opposition governments, either 
because the municipaht), has experienced alternation in office, or because the PRI 
mayor won the elections With a small margin and he/she has to deal with a 
significant proportion of citizens that voted for other candidate (cf. Cabrero- 
Mendoza, 2002). In this sense, although the PRI recovered the government of 
Onzaba in 2001-2004, it did not implement a traditional PRI governing style but, 
rather, it developed governance dynamisms in some policy sectors, as it is explained 
below. 
38Cad6, Y. Personal interview. Orizaba. 1 Ot" j anuary 200 1. 
"' Dulowich, S. Personal intemew. OriZaba. 19thjanuary 2001. 
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Zacatecas City is the less fragmented municipality of the three cases if the number of 
municipal agencies and their levels of autonomy are considered; but it is the second, 
after Le6n, if one regards hybridisation introduced by public-private bodies (in this 
case, citizens' councils). Zacatecas has a very compact administrative structure, With 
only seven main departments (none of which is serni-autonomous) and one citizens' 
council relevant for decision-making on services funded by federal transfers (the 
Council of Municipal Development). The yearly Municipal reports deal With policy 
areas separately, folloWing basically the classification of the federal constitution: ciVil 
registrar office, legal department, public lighting, streets, public parks and gardens, 
potable water, cemeteries, public works, sanitation, public safety -comprising also 
municipal police-, social development -including citizens' participation-, culture, 
youth issues, social communication, regulation of commerce, and abattoirs (Ndfiez- 
Monreal, M., 1999; Goytia-Robles, P., 2000). Nevertheless, most of these areas are 
dealt With by second-level agencies, being especially important the directorates co- 
ordinated by the Department of Public Vorks and Services, which oversees almost 
all services related to urbanisation processes. With a relatively compact 
administration and a smaH number of department directors, the mayor and City 
Council of Zacatecas can exert a closer supervision and a more effective control over 
policy than in Orizaba; and definitely more than in Leon, where 10 out of 28 
municipal agencies have a considerable level of autonomy (see table 14). 
If Zacatecas has a relatively low level of fragmentation defined as proliferation of 
autonomous agencies, it has higher levels of fragmentation produced by 
hyb6disation. The Council of Municipal Development is a public-private body With 
planning functions that can produce binding decisions concerning the use of branch 
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33 funds. The council, made up by elected citizens and municipal Officials, decide 
over the priorities in the maintenance and introduction of basic urban services, and 
its decisions must be implemented by both the mayor and the Citý, Councfl4'. The 
actual fragmentation of policy produced by this change of the locus of power is 
limited, given that the mayor, the aldermen, and the directors of key departments are 
still able to influence the decisions of this council. Nevertheless, unlike x-,, hat happens 
in Onzaba and Le6n where similar public-private planning councils work, this 
citizens' council can issue mandatory gUldelines that even the City Councý must 
follow. The citizens' councils of the three municipalities are analysed in depth in the 
folloWing chapter. Here suffices to say that policy dispersal in Zacatecas has been 
accentuated, although still Within manageable levels, by the introduction of a hybrid 
body with powers over the City Council, albeit in a -,, cry specific and well defined 
pohc), area. 
As most opposition governments in the 1990s, the 1998-2001 PRD govemment of 
Zacatecas began by introducing management changes that secured the optirillsation 
of its local income, especially the estate tax. These included the updating and 
expansion of the tax-payer database and the simplification of the payment 
processes". This administrative re-engineering was complemented, as in the cases of 
Le6n and Orizaba, by a systematic lobbying xith state and federal agencies to obtain 
a more beneficial distribution of transfers", and to facilitate the estabbshment of 
agreements with state agencies and other murucipahties. In this respect, Zacatecas 
\vas one of the first municipahties in the region to estabhsh an agency of inter- 
40 juýrez - Idfaro, M. C. Personal Miterview. Zacatecas. -th januarv 200'ý 
41 Damasco, G. (1999). "Facilitan pago de uinpuesto predial". Alomento de Za,, atecas, I -i th June. 
4 '- Momento de Zacatecas (1999). "Realizan la Segunda reunion Estado - munliCiplos". 
, 
11omento dt, Zaial(vds, 19thJune. 
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mufflcipal co-ordination ('Mth the municipality of Guadalupe) in order to jointlY 
provide potable water and the treatment of residual waters, public fighting, sanitation, 
public security by a common police corps, and to have joint public sessions of the 
two City Counds 43 . One of the effects of 
fragmentation in Zacatecas has been the 
development of these honzontal relations With other municipahties, bý, passing state 
agencies 
It is interesting to note that in order to optimise local income and admimstradve 
resources the PRD government has introduced a certain technocratic rationality, 
which has produced policy specialisation without actuafly generating proliferation of 
municipal agencies. The business component that has been linked to fragmentation 
in Le6n, and in Orizaba during the PANista administrations, is not so important in 
Zacatecas, as most of the top officials come from the social and partisan sectors 45 
Zacatecas has a more pohtical management of fragmentation, using its, incapability to 
establish municipal departments, for example of potable water, in order to obtain a 
more favourable treatment from the federal agencies (in this case the cancellation of 
unpaid debts to the Federal ComnUssion of Waters)"'. Finally, having seven main 
departments X"th a straightfomard division of functions by directorates (cf. H. 
-ýyuntarniento de Zacatecas, 2001a) has kept redundancy lower than in Le6n. 
43EI Sol de Zacatecas (1999). "Firman alcaldesas convenio de colaborac16n de sen-iclOs". E/ 
Solde Za, ýxe, ý-as, 7th November. 
-ý4Robles, I ý. (1999). "Zacatecas a la cabeza de Desarrollo municipal". E/ Sol de Zacate, -as, 19th 
November. 
45 Goytia - Robles, P. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 16t" Februan- 2001. 
4(. Momento de Zacatecas (1999). "JLAPAZ pidi6 la condonac16n de pago de extraccl6n". 
, Aloviewo 
de Za, -ale, ws, 15th July. 
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Establisbin 
,g 
direa excbanges witb the citiý,, ens 
In addition to fragmenting their structures or policy sectors, the studied 
municipalities have implemented a strategy of establishing direct and formal 
interactions between top officials capable of decision-making and individual citizens, 
bypassing neighbourhood associations and other traditional social representatives 
that, in the past, were the usual channel to obtain solutions to problems related to 
public services. This strategy has been instrumental to modiý, the traditional patterns 
of cbentebsm that were politically beneficial to the mayor, but that could be 
unsustainable in technical terms. This approach, common to the three cases of studý , 
has also helped to link concrete citizens' needs With the correct municipal agency or 
agencies, increasing the speed and accuracy of governmental response. Besides, direct 
interaction with citizens has the value of reinforcing the role of the mayor and top 
officials of the municipality as main proViders of public sen-ices, augmenting at the 
same time acceptance to poficy. 
Direct local official-to-citizen interaction has been implemented in other Latin 
American countries as a deNTice to insert pubhc opinion in the orientation of local 
governance (Blair, 2000). The main aim of these interactions in the studied cases, 
however, has been to facilitate the meeting of citizens' needs VAth municipal 
resources in the middle of the increased complexitý, resulting from governmental 
fragmentation. As the literature on governance predicts, when complexitý, in the 
(rovernment-societv interactions increases, more non-hierarchical and direct, 'point- zn - 
to-point', links are established Oohn, 2001; Le Gales, 2002). In the three cases of 
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study, the direct interaction with citizens has reinforced the political pre-errunence of 
the mayor vis-ý-vis more autonomous and noteworthy municipal agencies. 
As it was mentioned above, one of the main benefits of establishing direct 
interactions with citizens is that local officials can bypass social (and even partisan) 
representatives in their dealings with public service issues. In the times of the 
hegemonic party system it was customary for presidents of neighbourhood 
associations, local or federal deputies, or union representatives to act as negotiators 
to obtain the introduction of urban services in poor neighbourhoods'l. They used to 
request specific neighbourhood improvements from the mayor and state officials 
(typically 
the paV ing of streets, or the introduction of public lighting or potable 
water) in exchange of political support'. Despite the fact that most public services 
were not directly proVided by local governmental agencies, the mayor always has 
been influential in deterrnining policy priorities and, therefore, which neighbourhood 
would have its needs ad&essed first". Chentelism was legitimised by a political 
culture that understood social and political representatives as valid interlocutors With 
local governments, and the interaction with them as a way to gain acceptance to 
pohcy. 
Cbentebsm was one of the first practices restrained by local governments during the 
1990s (cf. Ziccardi, 1995). Once the hegemonic party sN, stem was replaced by an 
operational electoral democracy, chentelistic practices began to be considered as a 
47 Conde, L E. Personal interview, Le6n. 10th January 2002, Cruz -Arellano, E. Personal 
intemew, Onzaba. 2iid February 22001, Medina - Lizalde, J. L. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 
160ý February 2001. 
48 1 bid. 
49 Vega - Marin, 0. Personal inten-lew. Mexico Cit=y. 1 Y, February 200 1. 
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possible source of governance problems Interviewed politicians see informaDy 
elected neighbourhood and social representatives as "non-part), politicians", more 
interested in their prospective pubhc careers than in solving the problems of their 
respective neighbourhoods"'. Not recognising their leadership is considered a way to 
fight corruption because negotiations conducted in closed policy networks, where 
only the mayor and social representatives participate, do not ensure accountabihty to 
the City Councfl" 
The three studied municipahties have implemented programmes to establish direct 
interaction VATith individual citizens. Among them, the Cifiýeli's Dq), [Dia Ciudadano] 
has been one of the most important. The CifiýZeii's Dqý, scheme deals With petitions 
related to public services using short personal interviews with local officials, 
including the mayor. The meetings are held in open spaces under the scrutiny of the 
local press, which is normally invited. The requests typically relate to poor quality in 
services and faults in their functioning, like the replacement of streetlamps, re-paving, 
or fixing leakages in the potable water network, but they also include more complex 
ones, like the complete introduction of urban sen-ices to neighbourhoods Without 
them. In order to participate, the person presenting a complaint or a petition must fill 
in a form asking for the intervie-w. If it is a communal petition, some evidence (in the 
form of a significant number of the neighbours' signatures) must be presented, so it 
can be pro-, red that the person asking for the intemew is not a "self-appointed" 
representative5'. Once in the interview, the rnaýTor or the director of the 
50 Guerrero, H. Personal ititerview. Le6n. 1 -)th February 2001, Ortiz, 0. Personal interview. 
Zacatecas. 1411, February 2003. Vega - Marin, J. 0. Personal mtenlew. Mexico Ciry. 1Y, 
Februan, 200 1, and Velasco - Pagaza, M. Personal mten-lew. Onzaba. 1911, January 200 1. 
51 Ose, (), ueda - Cruz, A. Personal interview-, Xalapa. 411 February 2001. 
5' Ah-arado - Nforalesj Personal intenliew. Orizaba. 1911, December 2001. 
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corresponding department deals With the petition in a direct way, many times isswng 
the necessary chrective while the petitioner is still in his/her presence. Finally, a 
follow-up mechanism evaluates the time and quality of the official's response. This 
basic model of interaction was designed during the last years of the 1989-1995 
PANista administration of the state of Baja California, more specificafly in the 
municipality of Tijuana, where a pilot programme was used to test the model". 
However, the first time the Cifiýyn's Da j, was implemented as a flagship programme, 
accompanied with a political discourse that proposed it as a means to fight 
chentelism, was January 11 th 1995, in Le6n (Bazdresh-Parada, 2002, and IntervIew of 
the previous footnote). 
The implementation of the CifiýZen's Day model, under different names, has allowed 
municipalities to have a picture of the societal level of satisfaction with the public 
scr6ces they provide. In the year 2000, the National Survey on Institutional 
Development of Municipalities asked citizens which were the most problematic 
pubbc services in their respective neighbourhoods (they could mention more than 
one), and in 59.7 per cent of the responses potable water was mentioned. -Mis was 
followed by sewers (38.3 per cent), sanitation, specifically garbage collection, (38 per 
cent), pubhc safety (37 per cent), street hghting (35.5 per cent), street sweeping (25.1 
per cent), pubbc transport (15.7 per cent), pubbc markets (14.1 per cent), the 
Department of Traffic Pohce (9.3 per cent), abattoirs (8 per cent), cemeteries (7.1 per 
cent), and public parks and gardens (3.3 per cent) (Garcia del Castil-lo, 2003). This 
structure of dissatisfaction is basicafly the same detected in the studied municipalities 
by their respective Cifiýen'ý Da),, as it is explained below. Nevertheless, useful as it is, 
5.1 P6rez - Franco, A. Personal interview. I\le\lco Citi-, I`ebruary '1005. 
167 
the Cifiýen's Dq), is centred in the municipality as a pubhc service provider, and has 
been designed under the assumption that citizens' participation in it is a positive 
measure of public service quality. This approach expects citizens to adapt to the 
particular mechanisms of participation offered by the municipality, which can be too 
inflexible as to answer to the expectations created by the possibility of having 
interviews with the mayor, and too focused on problem-solving as to be a reliable 
indicator of overall service quality. An important criticism made by Mexican scholars 
is that the programme avoids social participation in the strict sense of the term, for it 
only engages in interactions with indiVidual citizens. As a professor of an important 
pubbc university put it, the Citiýý, eii's Day generates 
no real citizens' participation. Citizens' participation is understood as 
individual citizens' participation, in concrete actions. That is, it is 
expected that citizens participate in programmes [ ... ] where the mayor 
and his/her staff go to the different neighbourhoods to sit \VIth locals to 
talk about their specific troubles. If there are holes in the paving, they are 
filled. If painting, sweeping, or building something is necessary, flus is 
done. T'his is evidently a move towards [solving] the people's problems. 
But social participation is not understood as the main means for 
ý-)ohtical] change. It might be, finaRy, only a means for reinforcing their 
good pohtical image 
54 
In spite of these shortcorMngs, the prograrnme was well received in Le6n, -, -, -here it 
was kno-wn as the Citiýens IT"ednesdqy. Dunng its first trienmum (1995-1997), 166,880 
540seguecla - Cruz, A. Personal inten-iexw,. ', I, 'alapa. 8th Febmarý- 2001. 
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petitions were presented (H Ayuntamiento de Le6n, 199ý. A similar number is 
reported for the fol-lolMng administration -approximately 170,000 made directIv and 
17,500 via a telephomc service (H. Ayuntarniento de Le6n, 2000). By 2000, mumcipal 
officials had maintained more than 400,000 interviews accumulated in two municipal 
administrations and the first year of the third (Cabrero-Mendoza et al., 2001), which 
is roughly equiValent to 35 per cent of the municipahty's population. The Cifi,, ený 
If-ednesday ils directly managed by the mayor's office, and ils considered the most 
important participation mecharnsm in the studied admiMstration (H. Ayuntarniento 
de Le6n, 2000). 
As Bazdresh-Parada (2002) argues, the Cifiýen ý If"ednesda y has had a positive irnpact 
in municipal administration because it is amply known as a relatively direct way to 
reach the mayor and influence policy, it has been continuously implemented since 
1995, and in almost 10 years it has dealt with problems related to public services in 
80 per cent of the citý, 's neighbourhoods. According to a survey applied in 2001 to 
the direct beneficiaries of the programme, 51 per cent considered that they had 
received a 'good treatment' to their petitions and 32 per cent 'very good treatment' 
(ibid. ). After almost a decade, however, the general impression among users is that 
their complaints are heard and paid attention to, but only during the hours on 
Wednesday when municipal officials are available (ibid. ). More importantly, the 
programme has experienced a stagnation in the number of participants given that the 
mayor and departmental directors have begun to send second-level officials to the 
ys when decision- intenrje\x-s, creating a distinction between 'real' Cifiýen'S If-edtiesda 
makers attend, and the meetings where lower-level officials are present (ibid. ) FinalIv, 
the problems originating the intervie-, vs in the first place have not been defi 'telv 
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soh-ed, for the), involve expensive investment in the urban infrastructure. The main 
problem in Le6n, the water supply, is the most frequent subject of the inteniews 
with municipal officials". It cannot be completely solved, however, Without drilling 
new wells in land that does not belong to the municipality, which was the subject of 
unsuccessftil negotiations With other Citý, Councils during, at least, two thirds of the 
56 
studied administration . 
The case of Le6n shows the difficulties of embarking in fragmenting policy sectors 
and the adrninistration of the municipahty while opening, at the same time, channels 
of participation. As Santos-Zavala (1999) argues, the PANista model of Le6n has 
tried to curb clientelistic practices b)T focusing policy sectors and making the petition 
process transparent. Nevertheless, the interaction itself of the Cifiýený Irednesdqy is 
based on the traditional presupposition that the citizen must reach out to the mayor 
in order to obtain access to public senqces. The mayor, as main responsible for 
service provision, distributes benefits based on an equal access policy and without 
conditioning them to receiNTing political support. Dealing in an interview with a 
particular (individual) problem, however, is made necessary because the normal 
mechanisms of public service coverage are unable to detect and solve them. The 
), is designed to deal With the extra-ordinary problems related to Citken's 11--ednesda 
service Provision that can be damaging to the governmental public image. In this 
sense, the programme works on the basis of an extended clientele, which includes all 
citizens capable of requesting an interview xvith municipal officials, but that could be 
55A1derete, A. (220022). "Molesta a gualefios ohldo de autoridades municipales". Ei Sol de 
Le(in, 
-? 
3rd Mav. 
ýý(, Guevara, S. (2002). "Continuarä SAPAL extracc16n de agua de pozos ron-u'tenses". Ei Sol 
de 1-, e(; zi, 21 '11 1\Iaýý. 
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as pohticaflý, beneficial to mayors as traditional chentelism was for the PR-l before the 
1990S. 
In Orizaba the programme was introduced in 1996 as the result of an official visit of 
its aldermen to Le6n 57 . The programme, called Cifi, -, en's Tuffday, was implemented 
during the rest of the 1995-1997 administration, and in the follo"ng one. In 2000, 
the candidate of the PRI cnticised the programme as not being accessible to persons 
of all soclo-econornic strata, and announced that it would be cancelled if he won the 
election. Once Mr. Cabrera was elected mayor, he decided to keep the programme 
calling it Citiýens'Audience", and combined it with public sessions of the City Council 
(Cabildo Abierto) in different neighbourhoods of the city". The City Council usuaUy 
had its public sessions in schools or parks, Vnth the possibility of having short 
questions or statements from a previously defined number of citizens in attendance. 
After the session's end, the mayor and the department directors continued with a 
small number of interviews that also included collective ones 60 . 
It is interesting to note that in Orizaba, the aforesaid 'active citizenship' presupposed 
in some governance models (cf. Le Gales and John, 1997), x, -hich makes possible the 
interactions of the Cifi5, -ens'Audiemes, has been linked to the participatory tradition of 
the unions of the region. Osegueda (2000), for example, has argued that the late 
1980s decline of the Regional Confederation of ", X'orkers and Peasants (CROC) in 
Orizaba, Rio Blanco, and Ciudad Mendoza was concorn1tant to the strengthening of 
57 Brisefio, F. Personal intemew, Onzaba. 12th januan, 2001. 
58 Dulowich, S. Personal intemew. Onzaba. 19 tlý January 200 1. 
S') Orizaba en Red (2002). "El dia de ayer se celebr6 la pendlnma audiencia cludadana del 
afio". On': ýýiba en Red, 1 Sth November. 
Ibid. 
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the partisan life of the PRID and the PAN in these municipalities. It certainly has not 
been demonstrated that the social mobilisation produced by this partisan 
revitalisation substituted the role or influence of the brewery and textile unions of the 
reWon affiliated to the CROC, nor that the partisan revitahsation of the 1990s has 
encouraged the participation in the Cifi, ý, ens' Audiences after so many years. There is 
anecdotal evidence, however, mentioned by Osegueda (2000) and some 
interviewees6l that suggests that in Onzaba there is a cultural disposition to have an 
intensive interaction vnth local authorities (attending meetings at the City Hall, asking 
for interviews with aldermen, organising meetings in neighbourhoods) established by 
the actiVity of the union of the Cuauht6moc-Moctezuma brewery, the second oldest 
brewery in the country and the largest employer in the municipahty. This relationship 
has still to be confirmed. Nevertheless, the two preceding PAN administrations 
considered the Cifiý-en's Tuesday as a means to deblhtate the influence of the former 
union leaders in neighbourhoods, and to direct citizens' participation into a more 
62 
transparent relation mth municipal officials 
), received a total of 6,161 During the 1995-1997 admirustration, the Cifiýen'S Tuesda 
petitions concerning mostly potable water, street paving, the municipal police, and 
regulations for commerce and pubbc events (H. Ayuntamiento Constituclonal de 
Orizaba, 1997). In the following administration, approximately 9,850 inten-lews were 
conducted in its three-year period (H. Ayuntarnjento Constituclonal de Onzaba, 
2000, and interview of the previous footnote). By the first quarter of the last year of 
the PRI adtiunistration, the mayor and the departmental directors had orgarused 106 
(d iz in Cuahua, J. Personal inten-lew. Or' aba. 1 -11, J anuary 2002; Espi oza de los Monteros, 
Personal Interview. Orizaba. 2011, December 2001. 
(, 2 Escudero - Stadehnann, A. Personal miterview. Orizaba. 1811, January 2o0l. 
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public audiences with a total estimate of 48,970 persons received in individual and 
collective interviews". If the numbers are accurate, this would mean that in a period 
of 8 years, municipal officials of the three administrations met with almost 55 per 
cent of the population of Orizaba. The disproportion between the number of 
interviewed persons in the PRI and the PAN administrations can be explaMed by 
their somewhat different approach. While the PAN governments made an explicit 
policy not to accept social representatives, and therefore conducting only individual 
interviews, the PRI mayor developed a more flexible approach, accepting citizens' 
groups in the audiences and recognising, their representatives as presenters of a 
petition 64 . Nevertheless, there is not evidence that such representatives were given 
the role of interlocutors or negotiators with local government, as it was traditional in 
the old PRI administratims. 
When the CiliýZen's Tuesdqy was introduced, the great majority of the petitions were 
addressed to the mayor and were related, as it was already mentioned, to problems of 
potable water and other public services, such as street lighting 65 . As demands 
concerning basic pubbc services were dealt WIth, the petitions moved to problems of 
land-use regulation, pubbc transport, and requests to implement economic 
development programmes for smafl and medium sized businesses (VeUzquez -Garcia, 
1999). During the first years of the PRI administration, the main concerns among the 
population attending to the audiences ý, vere garbage collection, pubhc safety, street 
lighting, and the participation in federal programmes such as the scholarships of the 
61 Orizaba en Red (2004). "Atienden a 040 cludadanos en al pnmera audiencla pdbhca del 
afio". On*wba en Red, 4th March. 
(4 Orizaba en Red (2003). "Atienden autoriclades a 300 personas en audiencia p6bhca en El 
F', spinal". Or7'f, -aba en Red, 17 th ju IN . 
(, 5 Brisefio, F. Personal intenliew. OnZaba. 4t'ý September 1998. 
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Federal Secretariat of Social Development (SEDESOL) 66 ; but as the months passed 
by there was a sensible shift to direct appeals made to the mayor to implement 
policies to promote the creation of local jobs by attracting investmentS67, and by 
opening more positions in the municipal administration, particularly in the 
departments that reqwre no previous techn. ical expertise like the Police Corps, 
ProVision and Maintenance, and Pubhc Works and Urban Management". The more 
political profile of Mr. Cabrera, mentioned above, is also shown in the kind of 
petitions accepted by his administration. If there was not recognition of 
representatives as valid negotiators to obtain public services, on the other hand the 
mayor chd intervene in favour of some local organisation's petitions, negotiating VAth 
private companies and other levels of government. There are examples such as the 
negotiation of more concessions of taxis (which are regulated by the state 
government) 69, the negotiation With the state government and the owners of an 
important chemical factory to avoid a strike"', and the attempt to convince a 
neighbouring municipality to Jointly donate a land propertýT to the CROC in order to 
build low-priced houses for this union's members 71 
OnZaba en Red (2002). "El dia de ayer se celebr6 la pendltima audiencia Ciudadana del 
afio". On'ý-aba en Red. 1 Sth November. 
67 Orizaba en Red (2003). "Demandan clUdadanos empleo en audiencia p6blica". On*f, -aba en 
Red, 28th Mav. 
61 OnZaba en Red (2003). "Atienclen autoriclades a 292 personas en audiencia pdblica en 
palacio municipal". On*f-aba en Red, 19th June. 
Onzaba en Red (2003) 
1 st November. 
7o Orizaba en Red (-'00')) 
71 Orizaba en Red (2003) 
construir -,,, -i-, iendas at 
September. 
"Serin para el CRIO 3 concesiones de taxis: I\ICZ". Orifqba en Red, 
"Confirmado: reabren FERMEX-I". On'f, -aba en Red, 22nd October. 
. "Pide la CROC a alcaldes de Onzaba e Ixtac donen un predio para 
rabaladores al servicio del ayuntarniento". Oriý, -qba en Red, 24th 
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The CifiýZen's Tuffdaj and the public audiences reinforced the mayor's position not 
only as service provider and top political negotiator, but also as gatekeeper of and 
conductor to other sections of the municipal bureaucracy. One of the most apparent 
functions of the mayor is to direct petitioners to the correct municipal department. 
Most petitioners would seek to talk with the mayor first, as they want to express their 
concern directly to him, "even over department directors and aldermen" 72 who most 
of the time can solve the petition more directly. Aldermen and directors eventually 
have to deal w1th the petitions, but after the mayor has knowledge of them. This is 
very time-consuming for the mayor but is a practice that has persisted since the time 
of the PAN admimstrations: 
In the Cifiýeii's W, ednesdqy you are outdoors to receive e-, -erybodv. Some 
would ask for favours: a loan, a medicine, etc. In most of the cases they 
would inform you about a situation without giving you alternative 
solutions. But because I was always with the directors of my 
departments, my main job was to remind people that the Citý, Hall opens 
its doors every weekday; that they did not need to come especlaBy on a 
single day in order to formulate a petition. And then I would send them 
to the appropriate department. Do you want to solve a problem related 
to potablc water? Then go first to the Potable Water Department. If the 
boss of the department or the co-ordinator of the directorate does not 
solve your problem, then you can come to me [ ... ] That is my main job: 
72 Orizaba en Red (2002). "EI dia de ayer se celebr6 la penýlItima auchencia ciudadana del 
afio". 0 *ý-aba en Reii, 18th November. 
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to direct citizens to the appropriate office, so they can be listened to 
without the need of a powerful intermediary making all the decisions 71 
In Zacatecas the programme was caHed Public Audience, and was introduced in the 
studied PRD administration. During its three year period, the government received 
roughly 6,000 registered petitions through individual and collective interviews in the 
City Hall and the mayor's visits to the neighbourhoods, making th-is the smallest 
prograrnme in the case studies (Ndfiez-Monreal, 1999; Goytia-Robles, 2000; and 
interview with Ortiz, 0.7"' January 2002). As in the other two municipahties, the 
Public Audience programme is managed directly by the mayor's office, although the 
Directorate of Social Management (Gestidn Sotiaý, part of the Department of 
Citizens' Participation, usually deals With the practicalities of arranging the interviews. 
In the case of Zacatecas, this is a strategy not only to secure that the mayor's 
decisions will effectively shape the performance of this flagship programme, but also 
to ensure that the departmental directors and aldermen will pay attention to the 
petitions, knowing that the mayor is informed about them 74 
The chrectorate of Social Management is in charge of sorting out the interviews, 
trying to direct requests to other departments before they reach the mayor". This 
directorate also co-ordinates much of the chanty work that the municipality carries 
out in the PlIblic-Alldiences. Zacatecas, like the PRI adn-lifUstration of Onzaba, has kept 
76 
need-based schemes of direct assistance to poor neighbourhood., . PRD politicians 
73Escudero -Stadehnann, A. Personal intemew. Orizaba. 181hjanuary 2001. 
74Mufioz - L6pez, A. Personal interview. Le6n. 1911, Febman- -2001. 75 OrtiZ, 0. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. ", t1i j anuary 2002. 
71ý Momento de Zacatecas (1999). -Aý, untamiento apoya a Nueva Australia". Alomento de 
Za, -die, -as, 18thjulý. 
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argue that poor neighbourhoods expect some kind of help in any case, and that it is 
better to regulate it so the exchanges are more transparent T'he Social Management 
directorate distributes construction time-materials (bricks, tiles, metal sheets, and 
cement, in packages to complete self-build houses), amounts of money to fund 
funerals, scholarships for children in elementary school, and food. Up to januarý 
2002 Zacatecas had given 400 of such aid packages 78 
As it is explained in chapter four, this time-material sharing scheme has its immediate 
predecessor in the National Programme of Solidarity (PRONASOL). The aid is 
assigned according to a priority list prepared by social workers that conduct 
interviews and determine if it can be repaid. When the recipients are able to repaý, 
they usually give ten per cent of the cost of the materials, or they do some hours of 
community work". Finafly, it is interesting to note that unlike Le6n and Orizaba, 
where the petitions have begun to move towards training and job-seeking services, in 
Zacatecas most petitions deal with basic urban-isation services, like potable water, 
sewers, and street lighting 80 . The mayor of Zacatecas, Mr. Goytia-Robles, like Mr. 
Cabrera of Onzaba, has played a role in negotiating social petitions With other levels 
of government", xvithout actuafly recognising independent associations as negotiators 
to obtain pubhc senices from the municipahty. 
77 Medina - Lizalde, _1 - 
L. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 16th February 2001. 
78 Ortiz, 0. Personal interview. Zacatecas. -ti, January 2002. 
Ibid. 
Momento de Zacatecas (1999). "Ayuntarmento apoya a Nueva Australia". Alomento de 
18thjuly. 
81 Momento de Zacatecas (1999). "Colonlas piden ayuda del H. Ayuntarruento". Alomento de 
Zacalt,, -as, 9th July. 
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Using an approach that fragments policy sectors and the interactions with citizens, 
preferring individual exchanges over social ones, has several advantages for the 
studied municipalities. The most apparent one is that in spite of increasing the 
number of actors, it reduces their relative importance. Atorrusing interactions 
between citizens and local officials requires procedural changes that increase 
adrnini'strative complexity. Now mayors must rely more in decisions taken without 
their direct involvement in a greater number of departments and directorates, which 
have to deal with more specialised policy networks and communities. However, 
dealing With particular citizens presenting indiVidual requests is less demanding on 
political resources than the traditional practices based on serni-official exchanges 
with social organisations. The political pressure that social orgamsations (recognised 
as negotiators of public services) can exert is undeniably higher than the one 
exercised by an individual. In this sense, governmental fragmentation can be 
instrumental in augmenting the government's political manoeuvre space. Orizaba, 
Le6n, and Zacatecas, being confronted xxith scarcity of resources and increased 
citizens' demands, have diminished the risk of social confrontation by excluding 
community representatives from the management of public service problems. In 
addition, fragmenting participation has also increased the perception that proxi'tT 
to local officials is greater than in the past. These programmes al-low the 
establishment of direct networks between local officials and users of services, wl-ýich 
can be helpful to the growth of the acceptance of municipal policies. 
178 
The ma ' leadershi yor s 
_p 
The third relevant element in the process of governmental fragmentation of Onzaba, 
Le6n, and Zacatecas is mayoral leadership. This has been instrumental in reducing 
some of the unwanted effects of fragmentation, like policy incoherence and 
redundancy, by placing the mayor's person at the centre of the hierarchical and non- 
hierarchical interactions between departments, directorates, and individual citizens. 
The mayor's influence, exerted by non -bureaucratic means, is especlaDy important to 
develop governing styles that enable citizens to establish differences between political 
parties in office. At the same time, a change in a governing style is easily identifiable, 
and certainly less expensive than implementing structural changes. From this 
standpoint, practicaBy A intemewees argue that A mayors behave differently in 
office and that this general orientation is somehow influenced by the party to which 
the), belong. This rather imprecise notion, present in most conducted interviews, is 
probably more related to cultural perceptions of the corresponding political party. 
However, there is some anecdotal evidence that suggests that there is a link between 
the general discursive orientation of a political party and the kind of means used to 
maintain and establish networks. This still has to be demonstrated bv a study on 
Mexican municipal political culture, but the style of the PANista mayor of Le6n is 
usually characterised as business-bke. Mr. Luis E. Ayala-Torres is a former 
businessman and behaves like one, establishing close networks with conu-nerce 
chambers, introducing productivity criteria in pubhc ach-ninistration (assessing pohcý 
according a cost-benefit relation), and lacking the "pobtical sensitivity" to ensure the 
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support of traditional institutions such as the umons2. In Orizaba, Dr. Escudero 
(from the PAN) was criticised for not being responsive to the "pohtical sensitivities 
of the local media and the brewery union, attracting unnecessarv bad press" ". Mr. 
Cabrera, on the other hand, is a politician of the PRI's school: he quickly developed 
close relations with the local press (inviting a pronUnent )oumahst to head his 
spokesperson office), and with other local interest groups, inviting almost all 
important socio-political actors to his period's inauguration4. Mr. Goytia-Robles, on 
the other hand, was considered a person especially close to social orgamsations that 
backed up the PRD in the elections for governor in 2000"'. 
The particular governing stýyle and political sympathies of the mayors of the three 
analysed municipalities have shaped their leaderships. John (2001: 14-16) has pointed 
out that one of the characteristics of governance is the development of "more 
prominent forms of executive leadership", given that traditional policy co-ordination 
is not as effective as it used to be in the rni'ddle of increased governmental 
fragmentation. As it was explained in chapter two, mayors in Mexico have 
traditionally occupied the centre of local politics, for municipal government's 
structure reproduces some of the conditions that have generated presidentialism at 
national level. Nevertheless, the evidence discussed above suggests that in Onzaba, 
Le6n, and Zacatecas there has been a partial shift towards governance in the role of 
the mavor: if in the past his/her centrahtv was maintained mostly by hierarchy and a 
hegemotuc party systern, now it also has to be supported by non-Ilierarcl-i-ical, 
circumventing, direct interactions \-, Ith a number of governmental and non- 
-y, 1 '11, February 200 1. 4' Vega - Marin, 1.0. Personal intemew. Mexico Cit D 
Kuri - Rosado, S. Personal mterview. OrIzaba. 23r, ' Januarv 2001. 
84Cad6, Y. Personal intervievv. Orizaba. 1 Otlý january 2001. 
85Ruiz - Ramirez, N1. Personal intemew. 
Zacatecas. 1611, February 2001. 
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governmental actors. The Mowing chapters analyse the role of these networks in 
developing governance modalities. 
The proximity between the mayor and citizens, developed in programmes like the 
Cifiýyn's Day, helps to legitimise administrations in exchange for improvements in 
public services. Mayors use social rituals, like appearing outdoors expediting services 
to which citizens are entitled anyway, in order establish networks that link them With 
policy areas that are politically important. But at the same time, networks Within 
bureaucracy help them to bypass administrative diVisions that can be constraining to 
problem solving. Having in the same place A departmental chiefis, citizens, and 
politicians InNTolved in a petition or complaint does not ensure efficiency, but it places 
all resources at the disposal of the person in charge of making decisions. Mayoral 
leadership also helps to limit autonomy among fragmented governmental agencies 
and citizens' participation. Networks established by Cifiýen ý Dq), and other 
programmes have, in the end, the mayor as the main actor. But, unlike more 
traditional policy networks, they are short-lived and created around specific and 
relatively small public service issues. Plat forces municipalities to maintain a constant 
interaction tqing to attract participation and, consequentIv, sustain le itimacv. In this 91 
way, Onzaba, Le6n, and Zacatecas have implemented programmes that, having the 
mayor as their centre, try to reach citizens that do not attend to public audiences. 
The mayors of the three cases of study usuaUv visit neighbourhoods, as thev used to 
do during their respective campaigns, in order to be in contact with citizens and 
inauo, urate public works, many of which are built using schemes of social co- 11 
operation. 
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Conclusions 
Onzaba, Le6n and Zacatecas have fragmented their bureaucratic structures to 
different degrees in an effort to specialise policy-making and respond more qwckly to 
citizens' demands. They also have promoted fragmented citizens' participation as a 
means to reinforce their pre-eminence as service providers, not giving social 
representatives the status of negotiators in public sen-Ice issues. FinaHy, the mayor's 
office has developed more flexibility in its interactions vnthin the bureaucratic 
structure and with citizens in general. 'ne crux of the approach found in the three 
case studies seems to be the centralisation of programmes that have more 
legitimising potential, like the ones where there is direct interaction between the 
mayor, seen as provider of services, and the citizens, considered as clients. At the 
same time, the mayor's office has delegated day-to-day functions to the departmental 
directors. In this way, the mayor is able to link and avoid sections of the bureaucratic 
structure or social groups according to his/her convenience, which would be 
extremely difficult to do using the traditional muMcipalitiesway to operate. 
Out of the three case studies, Le6n has the higher fragmentation levels defined as the 
increased number and autonom), of agencies proposed by CampbeH et A (1989), 
John (2001), Le Gales (2002), and Pierre and Peters (2000). Onzaba and Zacatecas 
have lower dispersal of pol-icy-making produced by proliferation and autonomy, 
being the latter the studied municipahty XXIth the most compact municipal 
admin-istration. If fragmentation is, defined in terms of ffie introduction of public- 
private bodies (as Mlinar, 1995; Rhodes, 1997, and Wflson, 1998 do), Le6n is also 
more fragmented than Orizaba and Zacatecas, although this last municipahty has the 
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potential of increasing in fragmentation quickly, gi-ving that its citizens' planning 
council is capable of issuing binding decisions to the City Council. Orizaba has the 
lower levels of fragmentation defined in both senses of the term. 
An important implication of this differendated level of fragmentation is that if this 
attribute is considered a defining variable in the pat-terns of governance, as John 
(2001), Le Gales (2002), Pierre and Peters (2000), and Rhodes (1997) presuppose, 
then the shift from government to governance in the three cases of study has been 
verified at different speeds and in different degrees. As the analysed literature argues, 
fragmentation plays an important role in introducing new governmental and non- 
governmental actors in policy processes, bringing in innovative government 
mechanisms and modalities that rely on networks, as the definition of John (2001) 
proposes. The interesting point raised by the studied municipalities is that the 
different ways to address governmental fragmentation found in these local 
governments is related to the political part), in office. Certainly, it can not be proved 
that murlicipalities of the same party govern in simýar ways in all re ions of the 91 
country regardless of their particular local contexts, as the work of Cabrero-Mendoza 
(2004) demonstrates. The snyularities between the PAN administrations of Onzaba 
and Le6n are rather explained by the explicit policy of the 1995-1997 and 1998-2000 
administrations of Onzaba to implement a model of governance that is relatively 
advanced in both its design and implementation process, and that is amply advertised 
by the PAN among its governments (VeUzquez- Garcia, 1999). 
To be more precise, pofitical party in office has shaped governance patterns in the 
three cases by establishing a degree of difference -, Aldi traditional PRI governments. 
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The three local governments manage their bureaucracies,, engage in interactions With 
petitioners, and develop governing styles that are different to old PRI administrations. 
Le6n has numerous agencies and citizens' councils that have increased 
fragmentation, which is different to the unified administration controlled by the 
mayor that was usual in the times of the hegemotuc party system. The PRI 
administration of Orizaba, on the other hand, has reacted to changes introduced by 
the PAN by maintairung the increased level of policy specialisation, and the approach 
of the public audiences based on more fragmented interactions. In this sense, 
although the PRI returned to OrlZaba, it was not the same old PRI. Finally, 
Zacatecas has developed an approach that has maintained bureaucratic fragmentation 
at low levels, but increased the relevance of the decisions of its citizens' planning 
council. The conclusions argued in this chapter are smular to the ones reached by 
Raco (2002: 452) for the LK, who has found that local governments have introduced 
mechanisms of interaction with citizens but in a rather "circumscribed and selective 
manner". As Cabrero-Mendoza (2003a) argues, Mexican mulUcipahties have aflowed 
policy-making to be guided by citizens' demands, as it appears to be in the studied 
cases but, typically, the mayors have selected those public service problems whose 
solution might be possible in their three-year government period. In this sense, the 
shift to governance indicated by fragmentation has been partial in the three case 
studies. 
'n-ie folloVAng chapter deals further \"th the processes of opemng up policy-making 
by the incorporation of citizens' networks as decision-makers, and not only as 
informants or petitioners. 
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Chapter Four 
"Blurring boundaries" and local governance 
Introduction 
In chapter one, I argue that the analysed definitions of governance (understood as 
paradigms of policy-making and implementation) propose increased governmental 
fragmentation, the 'blurring of boundaries' between the public and prIVate spheres, 
and augmented self-organisation among non-governmental actors as common 
attributes of governance. These attributes are shaped by local and national contexts 
Oohn, 2001; Le Gales, 2002) generating variants that, nevertheless, can still be 
categonsed as cases of governance. Therefore, a reference to local and national 
contexts is a requirement to attain differentiated and sophisticated accounts of the 
(shift to governance' argued by the reNlewed hterature. Chapter two is an initial 
approach to the Mexican context, focusing on the emergent trends of governance 
that, although developing in man), local governments, are neither present in all 
municipalities nor in all policy sectors. Chapter three centres its argument in 
governmental fragmentation, one of the aforesaid traits of governance according to 
the literature. In this preceding chapter, I argue that the three cases of study have 
fragmented their pobcy sectors and corresponchng dealings With citizens in an effort 
to speed up their response to societal demands, and modiý, traditional clientelistic 
practices. At the same time, mayoral leadersl-dp has been instrumental in hn-uting 
some of the unwanted effects of this fragmentation, such as severe policy dispersal 
or incoherence. 
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This chapter continues With the analysis of governance trends in the case studies, but 
this time focusing on the 'blurring of boundaries' between the public and private 
spheres. 'llie core argument of this chapter is that the 'blurredness' between the 
traditional roles of governmental and non-governmental actors has augmented in the 
three studied municipalities as the result of the formal incorporation of networks of 
citizens into the policy-making and implementation processes. Orizaba, Le6n, and 
Zacatecas have augmented their respective reliance on citizens' networks in order to 
design policy and implement some municipal programmes. These networks, unlike 
the maintained by neighbours' associations and unions co-opted by the PRI in the 
past, are estabhshed at the municipality's initiative, and are comparatively open, not 
conditioning their membership on the support or affiliation to a partisan 
organisation. The rehance on this kind of network in the three municipahties, 
however, is verified for the most part in the policy sectors related to basic 
urbanisation services, especially in the processes involved in their introduction in 
neighbourhoods that are undersupplied. The studied municipalities make use of 
networks in different degrees and modalities, ranging from traditional consultation 
for planning, to decision-making about services funded by federal transfers. In 
general, the interactions Within these policy networks are shaped by the policy sector 
in which they work, how loose they are, and the procedures established for their 
operation. 
If governance is the "flexible pattern of public decision-making based on loose 
networks of individuals" Uohn, 2001: 9), then the above-mentioned dynanusms 
emerging in the case studies show an apparent shift from government to governance 
in the paradigms of poky-making, although a Enuted one. Ibe interactions between 
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municipal officials and citizens' bodies analysed in tHis chapter indicate a rise in the 
flexibility of governmental procedures and in the openness of policy conununities 
related to public services' performance. Having said that, it is important to note that 
as the function. Ing of the citizens' bodies becomes more instirutionalised, their 
members acquire a semi-official status that reduce the looseness' of the networks in 
which they participate. In this sense, the above-mentioned governance understanding 
of John (2001) is more appropriate for the citizens' bodies that work at micro level, 
in the neighbourhoods of the three municipalities. As the participatory public-private 
bodies increase in complexity, as the case of Le6n illustrates, the interactions 
between government officials and citizens become more bureaucratised, and 
governance dynamisms develop some of the inter-organizational characteristics 
argued by Cole andjohn (2001), and Rhodes (1997). 
This chapter elaborates on this argument by analysing the Neighbourhood 
Coninuttees, the Comrruttees of Public NVorks, and the Citizens' Councils put into 
operation in the three murlIcipalities to assist authorities in planning and decision- 
making on pubtic services. It begins with the consideration of networks as an 
explanatorý, variable in the governance understandings, in order to follow with the 
analysis of the above-mentioned citizens' bodies as exemplars of the three 
mutu cipah ties' reliance on nemorks. The final sections of the chapter consider some 
implications of the introduction of networks as a policy-making mechanism over 
accountability, and the different factors that shape governance variants. 
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Governance and networks 
The concept of network is an important component of the different understandings 
of sub-national and national governance. Authors such as Daly (2003), John (2001), 
and Rhodes (1997) argue that the main difference between government and 
governance as paradigms of policy-making is the latter's extensive use of networks 
(made up by individual citizens, social groups, or organizations) as a mechanism to 
co-ordinate and steer fragmented polities. 
At the same time, governance understandings propose that the dynamisms 
introduced by networks in pohCý7-making blur the distinction between the roles of 
public, private, and third sector actors. Governance is characterised by the 'blurring 
of boundaries' among the governmental, social, and market sectors not onlv because 
the increased societal complexitýý has redefined some of their traditional functions, 
making this tripartite classification too n id to analyse hybrid or border dynan-usms 91 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000), but also because it is becoming increasingly evident that 
complex pohcy issues require an inter-sectoral and multi-level approach that focuses 
on resources and lodof power dispersed among a great diversity of actors, regardless 
of the sectors in wl-Lich they have been classified traditionally, or the issues being 
considered (Koolman, 1993a). Ilie analysed hterature presupposes that governance, 
net-works, and the resulting blurredness are inter-hnked phenomena, being an 
important research topic to establish the circumstances in which this assumption is 
verified in contexts outside western industrialised countries. 
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TT)e concept of the 'blurring of boundaries' is, in part, the result of acknowledging 
that the above-mentioned tripartite classification of actors is not totally operative in 
contexts where there is a high interdependence among them. As Koolman (2()()2: 9- 
10) argues, most of the normative theories about the government-society interactions 
take for granted that 
the state, market or civil society [ ... ] are expected to deal With major 
societal issues by themselves and not in conjunction xvith one another. 
[] One of the distinguishing features of this ideology is the 
supposition that the regulation of collective and public issues is the 
exclusive responsibility of the government (and/or the state), whereas 
market actors have limited (public) responsibility. 
The 'power dependence' that comes from resource interdependence is the basis for 
the shared responsibibty over pubhc matters (KoolMan, 1993a). Shanng pubhc 
responsibilities with private actors has, as imrnediate requirement, the establishment 
of channels for the exchange of information and other kind of resources With 
citizens, among which nemorks have a place of importance. In this way, governance 
as a policy-making model has been defined as a "network form of control" (Daly, 
2003: 115), and as the set of interaction patterns that results from "self- organising" 
and "inter-orgamational" networks (Rhodes, 1997: 15). As Rhodes (1996: 66) 
argues, conceptuahsing government-societv interactions in terms of pohcy networks "I C) ý) - 
can blur, even dissolve, flie distinction between state and ci-61 society 
Ilie state becomes a collection of inter-organizational networks made 
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up of governmental and societal actors With no sovereign actor able to 
steer or regulate. 
Here it may be pertinent to point out that the 'blurring of boundaries' mentioned by 
Rhodes (1996) can be interpreted in, basically, two wavs. The first is the product of 
fuzzy edges between the sectors' boundaries, which does not permit to make clear 
distinctions between them. The second corresponds to the image of the overlapping 
areas of influence, where we can distin . sh actors according to sectors, but thev gUl 
operate in the same pohcy areas at the same time. In this way, the neighbourhood 
comnuttees analysed in the folloWing sections of the chapter display patterns of 
blurredness according to tl-. Lis second sense, while the citizens' counci]s have 'blurring 
boundaries' according to the first one. 
Governance theoretical understandings normally focus on the blurredness resulting ZD 
from the interactions of pobc), and inter- organiz ati onal networks, and pohcy 
communities. PoLicy networks can be defined as the "ties" that exist between the 
"bodies relevant to a policy area" Uordan, 1990: 333). 'Mey are týTically formed of 
officials in position of defining 
pohC37 
and interest groups concerned with its 
outcome, or as \Valker (1989: 2) says, by "policy professionals" and its "advocates". 
Pohcy networks are the consequence of fragmentation and speciahsation in policy- 
making, which gives them certain "sub-government" character (CampbeU et A 
1989). Tbey can be composed of indi%qdual officials, governmental departments, and 
citizens; however, when the network is mostly formed by both governmental and 
non-governmental organizations, pobcy network, -, are better defined as inter- 
organizational' netvvorks (Miodes, 1997). Pohcv and networks ID inter-orgatu 
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usuaHy function on an ad boc basis, for their membership is relativeIV open, thev are 
not very cohesive, and are established or dissolved according to specific policy issues 
that remain under the citizens' attention With varying time-spans (Rhodes and Marsh, 
1992). This kind of networks introduces a high degree of volatihty in the 
government- society interactions, given that they are usually estabhshed and 
disbanded in short time periods and the matter of their exchanges is subject to 
continuous change. 
When policy or in ter- organiz ational networks consolidate themselves to the point of 
attaining a high level of continwt), and stability in their interactions, they become 
policy communIties (RI-iodes, 1990). Unlike the mentioned networks, pohcý 
communities tend to be more restrictive in their membership; they display patterns 
of vertical interdependence based on shared responsibilities, and are insulated from 
other networks and the general public (ibid. ). For purposes of sirnplicity, this chapter 
does not differentiate between policy and inter-organizational networks, assunung 
that they share basically the same kind of interactions with governmental institutions. 
Policy communities, on the other hand, display characteristics that make them closer 
to public-private orgamsations and, thus, are dealt with in a differentiated way. This 
is pointed out in the foHowing sections of the chapter, where neighbourhood 
comrmttees are treated separately to citizens' councils. 
Governance theoretical frameworks argue that, from the government's perspective, 
policy networks and communities perform two main functions: on the one hand, 
they are instrumental in legitin-using policy; on the other, the), supply governmental 
institutions -\\Ilth resources that are not easflN- obtainable using conventional 
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governing methods. -Ile first function is performed by policy networks and 
communities through the interactions among their members, which permit 
authorities to know pri'ma fatie the citizens' demands, make the necessary policy 
adjustments and definitions, and pool resources in order to sustain a given 
governmental programme or augment the acceptance to it (Rhodes and Marsh, 
1992). As Ben-ington (2001: 204) argues, networks managed by government 
may provide an opportunity to co-opt a wider range of potendafly 
competing or conflicting interests into responsibility for governance and 
management of the increasing complex, cross-cutting problems facing 
society, and an alternative form of legitimation for the actions and the 
interventions of the state, given the erosion of confidence in elected 
representation (Benington, 2001: 204). 
In this way, governance definitions assume a dynamic conceptuahsation of 
legitimacy, where democratic elections and a general framework of legality are just 
the foundations over which acceptance of policy is built (X-ing, 2003). Policy 
legitimacy is increasingly dependent from consensus- seeking and negotiation 
processes between the different fractions of the state and the interest groups Uordan 
and Schubert, 1992). The acknowledgement of this need for policy negotiation with 
non-governmental actors is certainly not a novelty. \XIat is innovative in governance 
understandings is the argument that, in a more fragmented polity, the policy areas 
that require these negotiation and consensus are more numerous. The more 
fragmented a government is, the more networking , xllth citizens is required to 
ovnerate pobcy "zones of acceptance" (Bogason and Toonen, 1998: '14). These 
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policy "zones of acceptance" are constructed by establishing direct exchanges 
between the fragmented governmental and non-governmental actors in order to 
incorporate them into the pobcy process (ibid. ). In this sense, "modem pohcy- 
making" is "in ter- organizational" by definition (Hanf and O'Toole, 1992: 167). 
The second important function performed by policy networks and communities is to 
obtain resources that are not easily available when using traditional hierarchical 
methods of control. Usually, most of these resources are informational, and relate to 
citizens' participation in the detection of problems, the design of policies, and the 
evaluation of their outcome, all of which has, ultimately, legifin-lising purposes 
(Bardach, 2001). However, there is an increasing trend to use networks' resources in 
portions of the policy process that in the past were exclusive to government, such as 
the actual implementation of programmes (ibid. ), or the pooling of monetary funds 
in order to finance public works (as the case studies suggest). Gulati and Gargiulo 
(1999) see in this combination of resources con-ling from diverse social-political 
actors a symptom of the 'power dependence' and interdependence that exist among 
them, xvhIch (in some policy sectors) can be severe. This interdependence, unlike 
traditional lobbying, establishes a multidirectional swapping of goods that cannot be 
easily catalogued as public or priVate (ýIan Waarden, 1992). 
Networks' resources are also relevant to the "problem solving capacity of the state 
under conditions of complexity and uncertainty" (Benington 2001: 210). Bringing 
together resources from the non-govemmental actors ir=ediatelv affected by a 
given problem can be helpful in its resolution. Networks can provide not only the 
necessary knowledge to address problems more efficiently, but also the 
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complementary resources required to accomplish a policy objective. This is 
important, for networks can provide not only the explanatory variable for 
government- society interactions that go beyond the aforementioned tripartite 
classification of actors, but they can also be the implementation units of policies that 
cannot be conveniently monitored or evaluated using traditional governmental 
systems (Nfilward and Provan, 1998). Social, family, and other kind of networks, for 
example, are currently used to reach persons Not in Employment, Education or 
Train. ing (NEEl) in some western industrialised countries. 
etwork-f inprach . ce 
The literature on national and sub-national governance has analysed the 
incorporation of networks into policy processes in practice, and its conclusions point 
at some significant problems. 
In the first place, there is the issue of the actual degree of networks' operation in 
policy processes, and their level of influence over them. After comparing several 
European cities, Le Gales (2002) points out that the mechanisms for citizens to be 
included in policy decisions are a basic feature of contemporary political discourse, 
but the actual power of networks to influence policy fluctuates according to several 
factors, such as the power of the network itself, the policy issue, the willingness of 
authorities to open up policy processes, and even the technical difficulties to translate 
users' demands into practice. Desal and Imrie (1998) argue that governments in 
India, and else'\x-here, usually try to lirrýt the lnfluence of policy networks and 
communities by inviting citi7ens' involvement in non-strategic sectors, while the 
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Important ones remain under the control of closed policy communities, formed 
almost exclusiVely by government officials. Governments prevent having policy 
networks and communities difficult to steer by controlling "seerrungly neutral 
proceedings, like timing and conduct of meetings" of their members "to determine 
who gains access and under which conditions". (Lowndes and Wilson, 2001: 639). 
The governmental reticence to deal with very influential policy networks can be 
explained by the complex exchanges that theNI produce, which are difficult to manage 
(Benington, 2001). Networks' interactions are generated in the context of their 
respective policy sectors, but one significant difficulty is how to link these tý 
interactions to the formal processes of policy-making and agenda setting while, at the 
same time, enabling an inclusiVe and participatory debate about these matters 
(Geddes and Rust, 2000). Most of the analysed hterature assumes that there is a 
causal relationship between the growth of autonomy in inter-organizational networks 
and the deterioration of the governmental capacity to steer them. According to 
Rhodes (1995: 10) "integrated networks resist government steering, develop their 
own policies and mould their enNTJ_ronments". Inter- organi z ati onal networks do not 
respond to managers as if they were sý T stem controflers, but rather, these must adapt 
to the conditions of hiLyh fraLymentation and act as facilitators of co-operation among 
the different social-pohtical actors (ibid. ). 
In the second place, the analysed literature has pointed out that powerful pohcý 
networks and communities can compromise their accountabibty to the state, and 
cven to society. It is interesting to note that, after the introduction of scrutiny 
conin'Uttees and other participator'NT mechatusms in the UK and other countries, I 
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some authors have argued that these devices can cause CM- Councils to be "more 
remote, not less" from society (Gaster, 2002-. 110). As Benington (2001: 209) argues, 
the complex interactions present in powerful pohcy networks can generate "multiple 
lines of accountability" which usually imply "reporting to many, but final 
accountabihty to none". The pubhc-private structure of networks weakens 
accountability, it is argued, because it makes difficult to "establish a causal 
connection between damage done and culpable behaxIllour" Pe Brwjn and Ringeling, 
1999: 162). This is worsened in the case of influential pohcy conununities because, 
claiming superiority of expertise, they can become real, serm-autonomous, "private 
governments" (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992: 200). These "private governments" can 
isolate themselves from the usual accountability mechanisms and, effectively, be out 
of reach from democratic control (B6rzel, 1998). 
TI'U,, point offers an illustration of the unportance of the theoretical approach of 
governance understandings. Authors such as Blair (2000) consider governance from 
a normative perspective, arguing that there is a linkage between citizens' involvement 
in policy-making processes, and the improvement in effectiveness of public service 
deliverý,. His main assumption is that citizens' participation is one of the main means, 
to make governments accountable, although the actual results vary according to 
v6der variables, such as the overall quality of the judiciary, fair elections, and free- 
press (ibid. ). Blair proposes that citizens' involvement in the pohtical arena should be 
as numerous as possible (ibid.: 35) Nevertheless, his position contrasts xith the 
conceptuabsation of pobcy networks that warns agalnst the posslbibty of them 
becon-ling a "la\,, - into themselves" (Clapharn and Xjntrea, 2000: 535) and the 
accountability related problem, mentioned above. 
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This discussion is beyond the scope of this dissertation and has to be addressed in a 
specific research evaluating the potential input of policy networks and communities 
in democratisation processes. To what extent influential networks damage 
accountabihty, and in doing so, impair democratic participation cannot be answered 
without reference to particular contexts. Here it suffices to say that, in theoretical 
terms, the citizens' involvement proposed by the hterature on democratic local 
governance is understood in a broad manner, including ways of participation that go 
beyond the policy networks' bmits (e. g. voting). We are dealing here with a subtle 
difference of approach: while the literature on democratic local governance (e. g. 
Blair, 2000; Lowndes and W711son, 2001; Needham, 2002) deals With how to make 
local government accountable to societý-, the concern of the analysed governance 
understandings is how to make policy networks accountable to the state. If one 
thinks, like Rhodes (1997), that the state has fragmented itself to the point of 
becorning a collection of pubhc-pnVate policy networks, then making networks 
accountable to the state is a requirement to put states in a position to answer for their 
actions. If the legal framework that enforces accountability is unable to distinguish 
between the officials' decisions and the ones proceeding from non-governmental 
actors involved in policy-making, exclusively punishing or rewarding officials, it is in 
the same officials' best interest to assure that the policy networks generate decisions 
compatible with legality, the officials' policy strategies, and the good 
poliCýT outcomes 
that voters expect from them. The problem hes in determining to what extent the 
citizens' involvement in policy decisions, 'which according to Blair (2000) helps to 
increase accountability levels by augmenting public awareness, is equal to the actions 
of pohcy networks and communities; or, in other words, how compatible are pobcy 
networks with civil societý, participation. N ovvi thstan ding, as it was mentioned, this 
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cannot be properly answered without reference to concrete mteractions of networks 
acting in concrete social-political contexts. 
As it was said above, this problem is beyond the scope of this chapter. It, however, 
makes a brief consideration of the implications of networks' interactions in the 
overafl capacity of municipalities to enforce accountability. The e, %qdence discussed 
below suggests that policy networks in the studied municipalities cannot be made 
accountable for good or bad planning decisions, but their performance is under 
increasing scrutiny and supervision from local congresses and City Councils, 
especially when public funds are involved. This has reduced substantially the degree 
of freedom of choice of networks. 
Policy networks and communities in the case studies 
Pol. icy networks and communities have been constantly present in the Mexican post- 
revolutionary political system; nevertheless, in recent years the), have become more 
open and important in a greater number of policy sectors. As Cabrero-Mendoza 
(2003a) argues, the use of the concept of network itself is relatively new in Mexican 
local government studies; however, there has been a long tradition of analyses that 
used network-like concepts, such as the camarilla, or informal political group, as 
explanatory factors in Mexican policy-making. Camp (1996) argues that in the times 
of the hegemonic partN, system, the caviarilla (formed of like-minded politicians who .I 
sought to advance their respective political careers bý 7 mutual help) was an important I 
ingredient of policy-making. -fl-iis, kind of informal network, formed mostlY of 
authorities in the three levels of government, union and partisan officials, , vas a 
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closed community in which i ortant policy decisions were made. These almost IMP 
impenetrable circles used to establish chentelistic and corporatist networks with 
citizens to deal with the petitions concerning public senices, especially the ones 
related to the introduction of services in poor neighbourhoods (Heredia, 1994). 
These networks could be affiliated to the PRI or a PRIista union in order to ensure a 
fast-track treatment of their requests (ibid. ). 
Orizaba offers an example to illustrate the point. During most of the 1970s, the 
CROC developed an important influence over policy-making by negotiating 
candidacies to City Council seats in exchange of political support for the PRI"'. Once 
they were members of the Cabildo, the new aldermen would maintain close 
relationships With the CROC president, Mr. Daniel Sierra Rivera. Petitioners, in 
order to resolve a problem under the jurisdiction of local government, would usually 
seek intemews with Don Daniel in addition to local officials. This suggests that, at 
least in this particular case, the CROC remained an influential member of the local 
pobc)--making community unffl the nud 1980s (Osegueda, 2000). A sunilar 
characteristic is identified by Espinoza-Valle (2000) for the state of Baja Caldfornia, 
where local political dynanusms could no be explained without the influence exerted 
by the state branches of federal governmental agencies and unions. In Le6n and 
Zacatecas, on the other hand, pro-PRI labour or peasants' unlons did not develop 
such an influential role in local policy-making; in these municipahties, the main 
members of policy nemorks xere the relevant local, state, and federal officlals, the 
PRI bureaucrats, and the neighbourhood associations affffiated to the PRI" 
Cuahua, J. Personal interview. Orizaba. 1711, January 2002. 
87 Medina - Lzalde, J. L., and 1\, Iufioz - L6pez, A. Personal intemews. Zacatecas, 16th 
Februan- 200 1, and Le6n, 1911ý February 2001 respectivelý . 
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Evidence collected at national level by Cabrero-Mendoza (1996,1999b, 2000,2000a, 
2002,2003b, and 2004a) shows that the decline of political partisanship and 
corporatism of the last two decades has been parallel to the emergence of policy 
networks and communities that match the above-mentioned literature's description 
more easily. In general, contemporary Mexican policy networks tend to be more 
open and inter- organiz ational than in the past. This means that their members are 
more diverse, including governmental officials of different levels and jurisdictions, 
private citizens, NGOs, and representatives of local conunerce chambers. As it was 
mentioned in chapter two, the deterioration of partisan and corporatist control has 
of the pohtical centraht-, of the mayor, who coincided with the strengtheni 
circumvents traditional social representatives that, in the past, played a role in 
chentelistic exchanges with local authorities. A sort of 'soft' clientelism has appeared 
in many municipalities as a result, vnth the "strong patron" being the mayor, and in 
some cases the chief-, of departments and aldermen, and the "weak clients" all 
citizens (according to the classification of Schneider, 1992: 113). 
The opening up of policy networks to citizens' participation has brought in some 
changes in the traditional role of local authorities and citizens. On the side of the 
local officials, there has been a shift in the discourse of the studied municipalities 
promoting citizens' participation as a means to democratise policy-mal6ng and 
implementation, Improve pubbc senices by employing problem-solving strategies 
close to neighbours, and generating a social frame of mind in which government is 
no longer "expected to accomplish its mandate xvithout the people's active 
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involvement"". Local officials in Le6n, Orizaba, and Zacatecas implement 
participatory programmes expecting Citizens to join in; they, however, acknowledge 
that this required 'active citizenship' (Le Gales and John, 1997) is not always present 
among potential participants, given a natural scepticism about getting involved in 
consults and committees that, it is argued among some citizens, could give legitimacy 
to decisions taken beforehand in the City Hall. Participation, when it occurs, has 
become more transparent, but also more bureaucratised. TI-ie participatory 
mechanisms analysed below show a modification of the traditional informality of 
chentelistic networks established in the past (cf. Camp, 1996). In the process, citizens 
have increased their possibility of influencing some policy sectors. 
The following sections of the chapter analyse three pubhc-pnvate participatory 
bodies introduced in the case studies, namely, the Neighbourhood Committees, the 
Committees of Public Works, and the Citizens' Councils. I consider first the norms 
and general conditions of their functioning, and then continue xith an analysis of 
their influence on policy decisions. 
J Nei abbourbood Committeff and Committees of Public IF'orks 
Neighbourhood Comnuttees (NCs) and Comnuttees of Pubhc V"orks (CP\X's) are 
basically citizens' policy networks established and supervised by municipal officials, 
with the objective of including citizens in the decisions on public services directly 
88 Brisefio, F., Guerrero, H., Escudero-Stadelmann, A., and Medina - Lr/alde, J. L. Personal 
interviews. OnZaba, 1901 January 2001; Le6n, 12th February 2001; Orizaba, 18t" January 2001; 
and Zacatecas, 1611, February 2601; respectively. The quote belongs to the first interviewee. 
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, Wljbours' affecting them. NCs have different names in the studied mutucipalities 
(Nei 
Committee in Le6n, Communi_ýy Committee in Orizaba, and Committee of Sotial Paditipation 
in Zacatecas), but they basicaUy perform the same functions. 'I'he CPW (Comiti de 
Obra Nblica) is an ad hoc NC established to supervise the completion of a specific 
pubhc work carried out with pubhc-pnvate funding. NormaHv, once the pubhc work Z7) 
is completed the CP"N" is dissolved. 
Both NCs and CPVs have as immediate antecedent the National Progamme of 
Sohdarity (PRONASOL). The programme was intended as a palliative measure to 
complement neo-hberal federal policies during the administration of president Salinas 
(1988-1994). It modified some of the traditional chentelistic practices substituting 
them With a community-based approach; instead of favouring some neighbourhoods, 
or sections of them, on the basis of partisan or corporatist priorities, public senqces 
were introduced to rural communities or marginalised neighbourhoods in urban 
murlIcipalities using p overty- reduction criteria (Dresser, 1997). This was done under 
two conditions: the basic urbanisation public works were funded mostly by federal 
money, adminIstered through a structure that was parallel to the state and municipal 
levels of government; and citizens were expected to complement federal funds With 
unpaid labour or fees given in instalments. Citizens' participation was co-ordinated 
through the Committeff qf Solidariý, (CoS), which were very similar to the current NCs 
and CP\X's. 
In practice, PRONASOL revitabsed the PRI and the federal agencies at the expense 
of local governments as providers of public services, for it offered an alternative 
source of funding through NA-uch orgatused citizens could circumvent local ý7) 
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authorities unwilling or unable to finance improvements in basic urbanisation 
senTices (Assies and Ramirez, 1999). During President Zediflo's administration 
(1994-2000) the CoS were disbanded. However, in 1997, the new federal congress 
decided to decentrahse branch 33 funds, especial, FAIS, and supervise them using 
mechanisms of citizens' participation. As a result, most states decided to implement 
variants of the CoS, producing the present NCs and CPWs. Un]ike the CoS, present- 
day comrruttees have strengthened the mayor's political position, for they allow 
him/her to have an intensive communication with deprived neighbourhoods and to 
co-opt potentially dissenting citizens' groups, while, at the same time, introducing 
pubhc services to undersupphed communities. 
The LFC, mentioned in chapter two, explicitly states that when municipalities receive 
FAIS transfers, they must incorporate citizens into policy decisions. Local officials 
must 
1) Let the inhabitants know the amount of transfers received, the 
planned public works, the cost of each one, and where they will be 
done; 2) promote the participation of the benefited communities in the 
programming, implementation, supervision, control, and assessment of 
the pubLic works funded by the FAIS of branch 33; 3) inform citizens 
about the results; 4) inform SEDESOL about the spending, and 5) plan 
public works compatible with the government's environmental criteria 
(Estados UlUdos Nlexicanos, 2002a, art. ")3). 
Supen-islon of these procedures is left in the hands of local congresses, v. -l-, ich in 
their turn report results to the SEDESOL. Tbus, in their own interest, state 
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congresses have modified their OrTanic Municipal Laws (ONffis) to ensure that the 
functioning of NCs and CP\X, s follows the rules of the LFC. In this way, the OMLs 
of the three states to which the exarruned municipalities belong have explicit 
references to NCs and CP%X's, being the state of Zacatecas the most specific 
regarding their functioning (Estado de Guanajuato, 2002; Estado de Veracruz 
Llave, 2002; and Estado de Zacatecas, 2002). In addition to the federal and state 
regulations, Le6n, Onzaba, and Zacatecas have published sets of guidelines for NCs 
and CMX's, which are intended to be reviewed at the start of each adrninistration. 
NCs are usuafly composed of a minimum of five and a maximum of 10 elected 
members, using the neighbourhood as the basic territorial unit. The actual size of the 
neighbourhood, and thus the number of represented inhabitants per NC, varies in 
the three case studies. In Le6n, the Department of Social Development PSD) calls 
for the election of a NC if it can represent a minimum of 500 families, or 1,500 
inhabitants (COPLADEM, 2002). In Onzaba and Zacatecas, on the other hand, it is 
1cft to the discretion of the DSD and the Department of Citizens' Participation 
(DCP), respectively, to establish the ratio between represented population and 
number of NCs"'. UsuaHy, the DSD or the DCP summons a neighbourhood 
meeting, using the radio or the distribution of leaflets, announcing the election of a 
NC. In the election day, a municipal official organises the voting among the 
89 The DSD of Onzaba organises NCs according to the following list of territorial units, all 
of them with the right to elect a NC: 55 neighbourhoods (medium/upper class or 
commercial zones), 2_2 working-class neighbourhoods (bam'o. r), 28 council houses' units 
(ilnidades hal2ilaCionale. r), 14 irregular neighbourhoods (slums or shanty-towns, fractwnamientos 
popularrs), and 416 wcindades, self-contained buildings with several families living in them 
(Alvarado- Morales, 
, 
J. Personal interview. Onzaba. 191h December 2001). Thus, it is not 
unusual that there can be a NC for as few as 100/120 families (Espinoza de los Monteros, 1. 
11crsonal interview. Orizaba. 2011, December 2001). Zacatecas uses a territorial system based 
on the traditional limit-, of its 198 neighbourhoods or bam'os (Ortiz, 0. Personal interview. 
Zacatcca,,. 1411, February 2001). 
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neighbours present, who elect a president, a secretary, a treasurer, and a varying 
number of voting members in charge of assessing the quality of public services in the 
neighbourhood. In order to be elected a NC member, the three municipalities require 
citizens not to be municipal bureaucrats, politicians currently in office, religious 
ministers, or political parties' officials. In addition, Le6n expects NC officials to be 
propert)ý owners in the neighbourhood. NC members are usually elected for one-year 
periods, with the possibihty of re-election; the posts are ad bonorem (without aný 
stipend), although members usuafly expect to receive some secretarial support from 
the municipal departments dealing With citizens' participation (COPI--ýDEM, 2002, 
Alvarado-Morales, J., and Ortiz, 0. Personal interviews; Orizaba, 1 gth December 
2001, and Zacatecas, 14"' February 2003, respectivel)). 
Formally, the responsibilities of NCs are six: They must a) consult neighbours about 
public services' priorities, b) propose public works to municipal departments, c) 
evaluate the quahty of pubhc services, d) participate in citizens' councils, e) inform 
neighbours, in public meetings carried out every three months, about the public 
works done in the neighbourhood, and, in the case of CPWs, f) to supen-ise that 
public works WIth pubbc-private funding are completed on time (COPLADEM, 
2002, Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999b; H. Ayuntan-iiento de Zacatecas, 2001; Alvarado- 
Morales, J., and Ortiz, 0. Personal interviews; Orizaba, 19'hDecember 2001; and 
Zacatecas, 14"' February 2003, respectively). NCs are expected to priontise public 
works needed in the neighbourhood, including the introduction of undersupplied 
senlices or their improvement, and subn-ut that hst at the beginning of the year. Once 
priorities are set and submitted to the DSD or DCP, NCs continue functioning 
during the year as bnkages bet-,, -een municipal departments and neighbours. NC 
2J5 
members usuallv have monthly meetings in the City Hafl where they are briefed on 
the government's actions, and attend seminars organised by voting member areas in 
which departmental directors are present. In the case of Le6n, between 60 and 80 per 
cent of NC officials usually attended these meetings during the first third of the 
administration". In Orizaba and Zacatecas, it is only NC presidents who are 
expected to be in close contact With municipal staff members. The three 
municipahties, however, require NC members to organise the mayor's visits to their 
respective neighbourhoods. It is usual that the mayor visits one, and sometimes two, 
neighbourhoods per week dunng the year. 
CPWs are elected and function in similar ways to the NCs, but under a considerable 
level of superv1sion. After the election is completed, an official memorandum is 
written, certified by the muMcIpal official present, and sent to the state congress, 
where a file on the municipalitý, 's works by co-operation is opened. Once the CPW 
agrees on the public work that is going to be requested from local authorities, a 
signed statement is also sent to the local congress, attaching a technical 
file (made by 
the DSD, DCP, or the corresponding municipal department) containing a 
description of the work to be done, costs, contractors to be hired, and its specific 
modality of pubhc-pnvate funding". After that, the project enters a waiting list. 
VIen the City Council has approved the public work to be included in the yearly 
budget, the murUcipalit-v prints pronussory notes that are distributed by the CP\V 
-ibours. 'Fhe usual is that the FAIS pay, among the neigl , 80 percent of the cost and 
90 Ramirez, A. Personal interview. Le6n. 11 th januan, 2002 
Alvarado - Morales, J., Ramirez, A., and Ortiz, 
0. Personal interviews. Onzaba, 19th 
and Zacatecas, 14thFebnian, December 2200 
1; Le6n, II th Januan, 2002 3, respectively. 
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neighbours the rest, although there are other modalities of co-operation". Sometimes 
the mumcipality buys the material and neighbours do the work. In any case, I 
neighbours, have the right to negotiate their own instalment interval (usuaflý 
monthly). In Orizaba for example, by 2001, neighbours were asked to pay 7/ 5 pesos 
per square meter of new paving (approximately ý5.00) and were given a year or more 
to do it9'. CP\X"s members do not deal with neighbours' payments directly, for these 
have to be done in the MunIcipal Treasury. 
'17he CPXX's perform an informal supervisory role, in addition to the formal 
inspections made by local officials. If the public work is not completed according to 
the timetable submitted by the contractor, CPWs can complain to the DSD or DCP. 
Finally, when the work is completed, a final report is sent to the local congress and 
the CPW is dissolved. In its turn, once per year the local congress exarnines the way 
in which the municipality made use of federal transfers and citizens' contributions, 
and confirms that the pubhc works were in effect completed9' 
NCs and CPkX's performance 
In general, it appears that establishing NCs and CPW"s is relatively easy for the three 
studied municipalities, regardless of the size of neighbourhoods or administrative 
structures necessary to run them. The proportion of neighbourhoods vnth a NC is 
In Le6n the percentage is 7/ 0-30 or even 50-50 (Conde, L. E. Personal interview. Le6n. 
loth 
_January 
2002). In other municipalities in the North of the country the funding is 
tripartite: 60-30-10 per cent from the FAIS, the municipalitv, and citizens respectively 
(Arana-Murrieta, 1998). 
')', Espinoza de los Monteros, 1. Personal interview. Ornizaba. 20t" December 2001. 
94 MN-arado - Morales, J., Ramirez., A., and Ortiz, 0. Personal interviews. Onzaba, 19til 
December 2200 
1; Le6n, 11 t" januarv 2002, and Zacatecas, 14th Februan- 2003, respectiveh 
'I()- 
high in the three municipahties, ranging from 60.32 per cent (Le6n) to 7-5.25 per cent 
(Zacatecas). Le6n is the municipality with the highest number of NC officials (2,250), 
although proportionately, Zacatecas has more (745 or 0.60 per cent of its 
population). In total, Le6n has established 450 NCs, while Onzaba and Zacatecas 
have 80 and 149 respectively (see table 15). The high percentage of NCs suggests 
that, at least initially, citizens' participation is facilitated bv the expectation of 
obtaining improvements in public services. Tbus, participation is potential-ly higher M 
neighbourhoods of lower socio-political strata, where is more probable to find 
deficient public services' coverage. This general impression was confirmed by key 
interviewees, who complained about the difficulties experienced in neighbourhoods 
with good-quahty services to estabhsh NCs and get their members to attend City HaR 
meetings"'. As one interviewee put it, "affluent people do not participate in 
Neighbourhood Committees"96 for, among other reasons, they usual-ly have formal 
Jobs (i. e. not in the informal economy) and cannot get involved in activities that 
normally take place during office-hours 
97 
. 
Table 15. Number of neighbourhood committees compared to total number of 
neighbourhoods and population* 
Le6n Orizaba Zacatecas 
Population't' 1,134,842 118,593 123,899 
Neighbourhoods or territorial units entitled to 746 119 198 
elect a NC 
NCs 450 80 149 
Percentage of neighbourhoods"qth NCs 60.32 6 -7.2 3 75.25 
Number of NC members 22,2 50 320 -45 
Percentage of inhabitants that are members of 0.20 0.27 0.60 
NCs 
Source: own calculations and data from Goý-Ua-Robles, 2()00; 14. Aý-untanvento, 
Constitucional. de Onzaba, 2001,14 Aý, untanvento de Le6n, 2002; INAFED 2002, and 
Q., 
ý Alvarado - Morales, J., Conde, L. E., and Ortiz, 0. Personal inten-lews. Orizaba. 1 gth 
December 
22001, 
Le6n. I 0111.1anuary 2002, and Zacatecas. 7tlý January 2002 respectivel) - 
')(, Ramirez, A. Personal interview. Le6n. 1 1thjanuary 2002. 
97 Nfufloz - L6pez, A. Personal inter-, ievv. Le6n. 19tlý Februarv 2001. 
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personal interviews. Notes: * CP\X's are not considered, **the population fig-ures are for 
2000, ***tecindades are not considered. 
Whfle the three municipalities keep records about the number of NCs and their 
members, they lack precise accounts on the percentage of NCs officials that actual1v 
get involved in the required activities, such as attending neighbourhood and City Hal. ] 
meetings, and how this participation rate has changed with time. This information 
gap has to be addressed by a specific research, possibly involving long periods of 
participatory observation in the three municipalities, in order to be able to link the 
participation rate in the conunittees to the NCs actual level of influence over policy. 
However, the evidence coflected in interviews and in the prinlary and secondalý, 
literature suggests that participation in the NCs of the three case studies peaked by 
the late 1990s and currently, although still important, is decreasing. 
In the decade between 1990 and 2000, Le6n, Onzaba, and Zacatecas expenenced a 
noticeable improvement in their coverage of basic urbanisation services. In 1990, the 
three municipalities had a combined average of 91.72 per cent of households With 
potable water in the property, electricity, and toilet facil-ities connected to sewers 
(either street sewers or septic tanks). Zacatecas had the highest percentage of these 
services' coverage (93.50), while in Le6n only 88.94 per cent of households had the 
three of them. Regarding single services, Zacatecas had the highest rate of provision 
of any of the three mentioned, with 96.61 per cent of households having electricity 
supply. Le6n, on the other hand, had the lowest, With 14.29 per cent of households 
lacking 
,, access to sewers 
(see table 16). 
By the studied municipahties had improved particularly in the number of 
houses connected to sevvers (Le6n augmented in 5.40 percentage points, while 
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Orizaba and Zacatecas increased their coverage in 4.47 and 5.78 percentage points, 
respectively). That decade's administrations also augmented their electricity supply 
and their respective potable water networks (in the latter sen-ice, Le6n and Zacatecas 
improved their coverage in less than a percentage point, but Orizaba increased it in 
6.25 points, which is the highest growth rate of any of the three services). In 2000, 
the provision of potable water, electricity, and sewers were high in the three cases, 
especially in Onzaba, where 97.06 per cent of households had access to the three 
semces (in Zacatecas the percentage of provision was 95.97 and in Le6n, 92.67) (see 
table 16). The national trend towards the increase of the provision of basic urban 
senqces in the first half of the 1990s is explained, in part, by the PRONASOL and its 
approach based on the introduction of infrastructure services. The CoS, and later in 
that decade the NCs and CPXX's, were instrumental in this increase, although the 
actual services receiving high prioritý, vaned according to local conditions, like the 
agenda of first-time opposition administrations, or the overall quahty of public 
ser\qces in the municipality. 
Table 16. Percentages of households with basic urban services in the case 
studies, 1990 and 2000 
Municipality Total Households with Households Households Combined 
number of potable water (in with with toilets average of 
households the property) electricity connected the three 
to sewers* services 
1990 
Le6n 100.00 88.21 92.90 85.71 88.94 
Orizaba 100.00 89.80 96-01 92.35 92.72 
Zacatecas 100.00 95.13 96.61 88.77 93.50 
2000 
Le6n 100.00 89.19 97.70 91.11 92-67 
Orizaba 100.00 96.05 98.31 96.82 97.06 
Zacatecas 100.00 95.17 98.21 94.54 95.97 
1990-2000 growth in percentage points 
Le6n 0.98 4.79 5.40 3.77 2 
Orizaba 6.25 2.30 4.47 4.34 
Zacatecas 0.04 1.60 5.7 8 2.47, 
Source: own calculations on INEGI (22005). Note: 'Includes street sewers and septic tanks. 
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Taking in account these provision percentages, one can have a rough indicator of 
participation and involvement levels in NCs, given that their main concern has been 
usuaUy to expedite the introduction of urban infrastructure. In this way, Le6n has a 
potential for higher participation in neighbourhood comnuttees than Orizaba, for in 
the first municipality 7.33 per cent of households did not have access to potable 
water, electricity, and sewers in 2000, while in the second only 2.94 per cent of 
households were in the same situation. 
In Le6n, citizens' participation in NCs and CPWs has been significant since it was 
introduced in the late 1980s (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996,1999b), although it appears 
that it has dirrunished in recent years. The first 72 NCs were established in the 
murIlcipality in 1989, and at one point they functioned siMUltaneously With the CoS. 
By 1994 there were 200 NCs (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996: 82), and in 2001 there were 
450". Dunng the first complete administration in which the NC programme was 
implemented (1991-1994), the 200 NCs had a total of 1,093 individual and coflective 
meetings With municipal officials, or 5.4 meetings per NC in the three-year period 
(Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996: 82). In the studied admmistration (2000-2003), 
participation in City Hall meetings fluctuated between 60 and 80 per cent, as it was 
mentioned", which means that an average of 1,575 NCs officials had interaction \Nqth 
the DSD in order to estabbsh neighbourhoods' priorities in senices and request 
specific pubbc works. 
`8 Ramirez, A. Personal intemew. Le6n. 11 11, January 2002. 
99 Ibid. 
211 
In 2002, when the administration had completed its first half, 2,644 meetings of NCs 
officials and their neighbours had been conducted (an average of 5.8 meetin(-, s per 11 
NC in a year and a halý, in addition to 564 informative assemblies in the CM- HaN 
(including sen-unars With departmental stafo, and 350 ad boc participatory diagnostic 
meetings (1-1. Ayuntamiento de Le6n, 2002). Nevertheless, if measured bý- the 
number of new households with basic urban infrastructure services, the 
aforementioned officials' actions produced a 0.30 increase in electricity supply and a 
per cent augment in the number of houses with toilet facilities connected to street 
sewers 100 , which is considerably 
lower than the growth experienced in the 1990s. By 
2002, the administration had been able to complete only 30 per cent of the public 
works prioritised by the NCs, man), of which consisted of the introduction of basic 
infrastructure services, such as pa-, qng"" 
It is true that the completion of public works does not depend solely from the 
participation of NCs and CP\X's, for the amount of transfers and the capacities of 
local officials play a more important role'()2. However, NCs have lost some of their 
initial appeal as an efficient means to channel citizens' demands, for the link between 
participation in them and pubhc works carried out has become less apparent With 
time (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999b). The complex participation system of Le6n might be 
shoWling the first signs of exhaustion, given that pubbc services do not improve at 
the same rate or speed at which NCs are estabbshed: there are more NCs than in the 
mid 1990s, but not more completed public works (ibid. ). It is symptomatic that by 
, (0 Pedroza, 
-1. 
R. (2003). "Garantiza LEA contin i ad en provectos estratý icos". EI Heraldo uld 91 
de Ledii, 110' September. 
1()l Conde, L. 1: 7. Personal intenliew. Le6n. 1 Otil J anuary 2002. 
Silva, A. (2003). "Quedarän Mconclusas obras püblicas". EI Heraldo de Le6ii, 18111 
September. 
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the end of the 2000-2003 government, the Integral System of Public Transport (SIT) 
-the main urban project of the administration- was cntiCised for not being consistent 
with the priorities defined in the NCs and in other consultations"'. Discrepanc3 
between decisions reached in NCs and the municipal policies, in the long term, 
discourages involvement in such participatory mechanisms. 
Citizens' monetary contributions to public works have also begun to decrease. In the 
period between 2000 and 2002, branch 33 transfers represented roughly one fifth of 
Le6n's income. This is relevant for, as it was mentioned in chapter two, the 
municipality is compelled to consult NCs in order to prioritise the use of the FAIS, 
which can only be employed in potable water systems, sewers, paving, electricity 
I inage svstems, and a 'culture- supplý, basic health and education infrastructure, dra' g- 
9r, 
related public works (Campos-Orozco, and Lazos-Garcia, 2001). Although most of 
Le6n's branch 3") income is composed of FAIS funds, it is unclear how much of it 
was actually spent in new public works and not just maintenance of existing sen-ices, 
and therefore, the real level of influence of NCs over policy-making is difficult to 
cleterm. ine. A better way to measure PrIvate input in policy implementation is the 
number of public works financed by public-private co-operation. As it can be seen in 
table 17, the relative importance of citizens' contributions in Le6n have decreased 
from 0.33 per cent of gross income in 1998 to 0.06 in 2002, wl-ých is below the 
national average that has gone from 0.52 to 0-39 per cent in the same period (see 
table 8). Despite that the model of Le6n is one of the main reference points for 
'()' Mel6ndez, F. (2003). "Interrumpe cludadano a autoridades durante sesi6n de informaci6n 
'ýIT". El Heraldo de L. -ýii, 1811, September. The SIT aims at UME Milg the routes, ticket prices, 
and regulations of all public transport means in the muriicipahtý,, including buses, micro- 
buses, and the construction of a train-like bus system using the central lanes of the main 
avenue in the c1tv. See also 'Silva, A. (2003). "Quedarýn inconclusas obras piiblicas". E/ 
Ht, raldo dc, 18 01 September. 
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citizens' participation at national level (Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999b) the contributions 
made by neighbours have never exceeded 1.5 percentage points of the murliCipahty's 
gross income (INEGI, 2005). The fact that citizens' contributions are diminishing in 
relative terms suggests a reduction of participation levels in NCs and CP\X-s, or a 
growth rate that has not kept pace with the increase of transfers and local income. 
It is interesting to note that, while the citizens' contributions have diminished their 
relative importance if compared with other sources of municipal income, some 
neighbours that do co-operate with authorities are beginning to pay a higher share of 
the public services' cost. In the 1990s it was customary to have citizens pay 30 per 
cent of the cost of a public work, which was higher than the national average; but 
during the administration of mayor Ayala-Torres the proportion rose to 50 per cent 
in some neighbourhoods considered not so poor. In 2002, the Trust for Public 
Works by Co-operation (FIDOC) reported having spent 55 million pesos 
(approXimately (3,660,600 at the time) in, mainly, paving 64 streets under a 
combined scheme of 70-30 and 50-50 shares 104 . In 2003, the FIDOC announced that 
in the 2000-2003 administration, a total of 223 streets had been paved at a cost of 
221 Milhon pesos (roughly, (14,730,300), out of which 84 milhon had been given by 
citizens'O'. This means that citizens, organised through NCs and CPWs, supplied 
rough]), 38 per cent of the cost of introducing basic urban infrastructure services in 
the municipality, which is considerably higher than what was asked from nelghbours 
in Orizaba and Zacatecas. 
l(4 EI Sol de Lebn. (20022)- "Este afio se pavirnentarän menos caUes que en 2001 ". EI Sol de 
22 ... 1 May. 
l(15 EI Ileraldo de Le6n. (2003). "Entrega edil mäs obras de pa-, -iMentaciän". EI Heraldo de 
1-. z, ol. 12t'ý September. 
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The important issue here is that local authorities in the studied administration treated 
Le6n's citizens as clients, in the sense that their incapacity or unwillingness to pay the 
required fee was now more significant than in the past to determine the feasibihty of 
public works, just because the citizens' share was larger. There is anecdotal evidence 
that suggests that communities unable to contribute with their share cbd not recel, %, e 
expeclite attention of their requests'". In addition, the studied administration 
displayed a significant tendency to differentiate potential beneficiaries of co- 
operation funding schemes by socio-econon-nc stratum, asking for higher citizens' L-ý 
I ()- 
contributions when it was considered feasible '. In this sense, the picture resulting 
from this research is compatible with the initial analyses of Le6n's PANista 
administrations during the 1990s, which characterised them as exemplars of the 
44municipality-enterprise", i. e. a local government where NPM criteria is implemented 
(Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996: 53). Finally, Mr. Ayala-Torres's administration hnilted 
CPWs involvement to paving, basicafly, while at the same time, he promoted NCs 
actions in a sectoral (not territorial) basis. One example of this new approach is the 
admini. s trafi on's security programme, which linked policemen working in 
neighbourhoods , xith their respective NCs in order to obtain better information and 
invite young men to join a new police corps specialised in dealing With gangs 
(Cabrero- Mendoza et al., 2001). 
1116AIderete, A. (2002). "Molesta a guajefios olvido de autondades muracipales". E/ Sol de 
L, e(; ii, 23rd May. 
10-, See Don-iing-uez, E. "1,600 mdp para obras pýibhcas en Guanajuato". ElHeraldo de 
L-ýii, 9tlý September. Velizquez, L. (2001). "9.8 mdp, para obras munIcipales". ElHeraldo de 
Lx(; ii, 9t' September; and Velizquez, L. (2003). "Le6n con la mejor pohcia: LEA". E/ Heraldo 
dt, 1. -ýn, 1911, September. 
"1 
Table 17. Federal transfers and citizens' contributions as percentages of gross 
income in the case studies, 1998 - 2002 
Municipality Year Gross Federal transfers Citizens' 
income contributions 
Branch 28 Branch 33 
(partic#7aciones) (aportaciones) 
1998 100.00 37.18 6.18 0.33 
1999 100.00 26-46 0.00 0.23 
Le6n 2000 100.00 38.87 25-65 0.21 
2001 100.00 37 . 2-1 22.43 0.03 
2002 100.00 28.46 20.49 0.06 
1998 100.00 66.97 0.00 1.40 
1999 100.00 
Orizaba 2000 100.00 
66.34 0.00 1.83 
70.02 0.00 2.32 
2001 100.00 45.95 17.95 0.64 
2002 100.00 36.50 16.45 0.14 
1998 100.00 58.51 0.00 0.00 
1999 100.00 61.60 0.42 0.00 
Zacatecas 2000 100.00 47.14 26.03 0.00 
2001 100.00 48.67 25.91 0.00 
2002 100.00 42.41 27-48 0.00 
Source: own elaboration on data from INEGI (2005). 
Unlike the case of Le6n, Orizaba's administrations have been hardh, anahýsed in 
depth by the Mexican literature on local governance (the only relevant studies being 
Osegueda, 2000; and VelAzquez-Garcia, 1999). For that reason, and because the 
municipality does not publish its records on attendance to activities organized by the 
DSD, it is difficult to establish the level of participation in NCs and CPV's and their 
influence in policy-making. Nevertheless, there is evidence that indicates that 
participation levels were high during the 1990s like in Le6n, as the result of an C. -I tj 
aggressive policy focused on introducing basic urbanisation services. During the 
PRlista administration (2001-2004) local authorities changed their approach, 
emphasisilig the advisonT role of NCs and reducing the share of citizens' 
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contributions to fund the introduction of public services, generating in the process a 
governance style different to that of Le6n. 
The fact that by 2000 Orizaba had the best proVision of basic urbanisation senices 
(97.06 per cent of households With potable water, electricity, and sewers) and the 
highest growth rate of these services among the case stuches (4.34 percentage points 
in the previous decade) -see table 16- is compatible with interviewees' information 
that participation in CoS first, and in NCs and CP\X, 's afterwards, was high during the 
1990s)08. By 'high' I mean that slightly more than 50 per cent of the 320 NCs offici Is la 
of the municipality regularly attended meetings convened by the DSD"'9. This was 
helpful for the rapid coverage of basic infrastructure services, for the municipality is 
small (40.06 square kilometres), the population is not so large as the one of Le6n or 
Zacatecas (INAFED, 2004), and the two consecutive PANista administrations 
(1995-2000) complemented their efforts to pave and introduce water and sewers at 
the same time"". The PRlista administration in 2001 found the municipality with 
on]), 2.94 of households lacking basic senTices, and with the highest HDI of the three 
case studies (INAFED, 2004) which explains the kind of requests received in the 
Cifiýens' Aliditw, -es, more onented to ensure access to employment, education, or 
training than to basic infrastructure services, as it was mentioned in chapter three. 
Differently from Le6n, Orizaba has managed to obtain a higher proportion of 
branch 28 funds (paificipa(7'ones) which, as it was mentioned in chapter tvo, are not 
earmarked for specific sen-Ices but are intended to cover any kind of municipal 
108 Brisefto, F. Personal intenlew. Orizaba. 1911, januaiý, 2001. 
Espinoza de los Monteros, 1. Personal inten-lew. OnZaba. 200, December 2001. 
Escudero - Stadelmann, A. Personal inteniew. Orizaba. 1 8t', _I anuary 
200 1. 
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expense as long as it is approved by the City Council. 66.97 per cent of Onzaba's 
income was composed of branch 28 funds in 1998; while in 2000 it peaked, reaching 
70.02 per cent. These percentages are well above the national average that in 1998 
was of 62.20 and in 2000,68.72 per cent considering branch 28 and 33 together (see 
tables 17 and 8). In exchange for this privileged treatment ftom the governor and the 
local congress, between 1998 and 2000 the municipality did not receive any funds 
from branch 33 and therefore, it was not obliged by law to establish NCs, consult .1 
citizens about neighbourhood's priorities, or report on specific public works to the 
local congress. Nevertheless, the PANista administrations decided to iMplement 
Le6n's NCs model and establish CPW's because this party had as a strategic priority 
the completion of highINT %qsible pubhc works (like pa, %qng) '", and in order to 
accomplish this, it needed citizens' contributions. 
Between 1998 and 2000, citizens' contributions to public works went from 1.40 to 
2.32 per cent of Orizaba's income, which are well above the national averages. 
Particularly ifnportant is the relative weight of citizens' contributions in 2000, which 
is almost five times the corresponding national average (see tables 17 and 8). This is 
important, for the 1995-1997 and 1998-2000 administrations expected citizens to 
collaborate in the public works' cost in a significant way, as the analysed 
adtinnistration in Le6n. On the other hand, the 'New PRF adminIstration of Mr. 
Cabrera- Zavaleta relied on lower amounts of federal transfers, which were given to 
the municipality in branch 28 and branch 33 funds. In 2001 and 2002,17.95 and 
16.45 per cent of Orizaba's income consisted of branch 3') funds, respectivelv. The 
total of federal transfers during the first half of the PRIista administration 
"I Brisefio, F. Personal intemew. OriZaba. 19ti-january 2001. 
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represented 63.9 per cent (2001) and 52.95 per cent (2002) of total income, which 
were lower than in the two preceding adrrunistrationsill. As a complementing 
strategy, Mr. Cabrera- Zavaleta augmented local revenue in order to be able to 
dirninish citizens' contributions. In this way, these contributions have decreased to 
0.64 and 0.14 per cent in 2001 and 2002 respectively; percentages that are similar to 
those found in Le6n (see table 17). 
Citizens' contributions are diminishing, wltich suggests a decreasing level of 
participation in NCs and CPWs. This phenomenon, however, appears to be linked to 
the lower infrastructure needs of Orizaba and to a policy shift conducted during the 
first year of the PRI's administration. In 2001, public works began to be funded 
almost exclusiVely using federal transfers and local income, with a lower financial 
participation of citizens. As a consequence, the influence of most NCs and CP\X's 
has been limited to advisory and supervisor), roles, With the locus of decision-making 
being fundamentafly vnthin the municipabty's bureaucracy. As an intenTiewee put it, 
-power is to be exercised, not to be shared"' 13 , and Orizaba's officials 
have stressed 
the constitutional mandate of pubhc senice proVision regardless of citizens' 
willingness or capacity to contribute with funds. In this way, public works funded by 
branch 33 are advertised with few references to the participation of NCs, 
emphasising the mayor's position as main negotiator of transfers VAth state and 
federal governments. In 2002, local newspapers reported the completion of 56 pubbc 
works during 2001 and the first half of 2002, including 18 newly paved streets, all 
financed using 40 million pesos coming from branch 33 (approximately f2,600,600 
I'- argument that the PRlista ' This, by the way, appears to disnuss the two PANista mayors' 
(. )r()Nrernor of Veracruz favoured municipal govermnents of his partý- in detriMent of 
opposition local governments. 
Cruz, Nrellano, E. Personal mtervieýw, Onzaba. 2nd February 2001. 
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at the time) . In addition, they indicate the use of a 
fund of 100,000 pesos (roughly I 
ý6,600) for direct donations to poor famihes"'. During 2003 and 2004, the overafl 
rate of public works appears to have diminished, although there was a more explicit 
focus on schools' facilities"'. In the mentioned newspaper articles, there is no 
mention of a link between the performance of NCs and completed public works. 
In general terms, the approach of this administration to NCs and CPV's as policy 
networks is rather traditional, if compared to the PANista administrations of Lee)n 
and Orizaba. Here, the citizens' committees perform a legitin-using role through, 
mostly, informational resources: they give the necessary problem-solVIng knowledge 
on what are the neighbourhood's needs to the authorities and, in exchange, local 
officials prioritise public works accordingly, in the process, information to 91 
NCs on the overaU strategies of the municipality to which the ordinary citiven does 
not have access 
117 
. 
Zacatecas City, like Onzaba, has few references in the literature on Mexican local 
governance, and the existing ones focus mostly on the legal dimensions of citizens' 
participation mechanIsms, given that Zacatecas is one of the smaH number of states 
114 OriZaba en Red (2002). "Entregan autoridades dos obras mis de infraestructura 
educativa". Onýwba eii Red, 1 Sth November; OnZaba en Red (2002). "Inaugura alcalde obras 
pot rnýs de 3 millones de pesos". On*ýZqba en Red, 30th December; and Santos-Carrera, J. 
(2002). "ll Infortne de Gobierno pot parte del alcalde". On'f, -aba en Red, 1911, December. 
"I Onzaba en Red (2002). "Dispondria Ayuntarruento de 100 mil Pesos para Apoyo de 
I 'arnihas". On*ýZglya en Red, 13th December. 
I", Orizaba en Red (2003). "Entregan autondades infraestructura educativa pot rnýs de 1 
mill6n de pesos". Or7*fal)a en Red, 27, th October; OnZaba en Red (2003). "Entreg6 ayer alcalde 
oriZabefio mobiliario a cuatro escuelas de la cludad". Ori! Zaba en Red, 17th December; OrlZaba 
en Red (2003). "Inauguran autondades paquete de obras pot 2 millones 398 mil pesos". 
OriýZqba en Red, 19th December; OnZaba en Red (2004). "Inauguran autoridades obras pot 3.5 
mdp en beneficio de 12 niil cludadanos". 017*ýqba eii Red, 1, t October; Onzaba en Red (2004). 
"Entregan autoridades el 61timo paquete de obras a los cludadanos". On*ýqba en Red, 14th 
December. 
I'-, AIvarado - Nlorales, j. Personal interview. OriZaba. 19tlý December 2001. 
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that have mochfied their OMJL to incorporate NCs into the murucipal-wide planning 
of public works and the elaboration of the MDP (cf. Cabrero-Mendoza et al., 2001). 
In addition to this literature gap, the municipality does not publish the attendance 
rates of its 745 NC members to activities organised by the DCP, which makes it 
difficult to establish the levels of actual participation and influence over policy. This 
is particularly problematic because Zacatecas, in spite of implementing co-operative I 
schemes in public works, does not collect monetarv contributions from citizens, 
which are an approximate measure of neighbours' chrect involvement in micro 
policy-making and implementation. Of the three cases, Zacatecas is the most difficult 
to classify because it has not established an entrepreneurial approach to lack of funds 
(like Le6n), but it has neither resorted to federal transfers to diminish the amount of 
citizens' contributions (like Orizaba). Zacatecas has combined a traditional approach 
to pohcy-making through NCs With a significant rehance on neighbours' unpaid 
labour in order to lower the costs of public works. 
During the 1990s, Zacatecas had the lowest gro,. N-th rate of basic urban infrastructure 
of the three cases (2.47 percentage points) which gave tl-iis municipality in 2000 a 
coverage of 95.97 per cent of households With access to potable water, electricity, 
and sewers (see table 16). This means that if Zacatecas did not have at the time the 
greater rates of service provision present in Orizaba, it neither had the considerable 
needs, of Le6n, where 7.33 per cent of households lacked basic urban services. With 
4.03 per cent of the population lacking access to basic sen-ices, one could expect a 
potentially greater participation than the one present in Orizaba. The growth in the . I-) 
access to sewers, which in the mentioned decade was of 5.78 percentage points (just 
second to potable water in Onzaba), suggests that participation was indeed 
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considerable in the 1990s (see table 16). This is, in part, explained by the 
PRONASOL national policy of favouring the paving of streets, and %xith it the 
introduction of potable water and sewers Presser, 1997). More importantly, from 
the mid 1998-2001 adrninistration, the municipality began to receive branch 33 funds 
in a proportion higher than in Orizaba and Le6n, reaching in average more than one 
forth of its revenue (see table 17). This indicates a considerable level of NCs and 
CPWs participation; even it was only for purposes of providing information on the 
neighbourhoods' priorities. According to the mayor, slightly less than 40 per cent of 
the public works proposed by the NCs was in fact completed during the 
adn-unistration"'. 
Unlike Le6n and Orizaba, Zacatecas has made an explicit policy of not charging fees 
to users for the introduction of new public services, which is the reason why the 
municipality did not receive any citizens' contributions between 1998 and 2002 (see 
table 17). It is true that co-operative schemes have been implemented; requiting 
citizens to repay between 20 and 30 per cent of the value of public works, but this is 
done most]), through the unpaid labour of directly benefited users 119 . Mr. Goytia- 
Robles, the mayor, has pointed out that here lies one the most problematic issues in 
the pnvate-pubhc schemes of coflaboration, for NC requests are not normaH3, made 
vnth "an attached payment at the same time" and thu-,, there is an important time 
gap between NC consultations and the actual completion of the pubbc work, because 
the proper funds have to be secured first 
120 
(-', oN-tia - Robles, P. Personal mterviexv. Zacatecas. 1611ý Februan- 2001. 
119 Orti7,0. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 14t" February 2003. 
120 Ibid. 
This PRD administration, for example, has conducted the cleansing of sewers and 
rivers with the co-operation of volunteers'2', and has signed agreements xkqth unions 
of street vendors, issuing pern-uts to seH in the historic centre of the city in exchange 
of the nlý, Yhtlv sweeping of the streets in which the flea-markets establish during the I 
day I- . By the end of the administration, it was customary for the municipahty to give 
either half of the materials or half the hours-men of labour necessary to complete the 
public work in poor neighbourhoods 121 . Finally, the studied administration also 
resorted to subsidising staple food products in order to improve general conditions 
in neighbourhoods. The Programme of Dairy Products for the General Population 
(PALPA) was especially important, selling 95,000 litres of milk per month plus a 
variable quantity of cheeses at 20 per cent of the market value. This benefited more 
than 31,000 families in 56 neighbourhoods (Cabrero-Mendoza, et al., 2001). 
The introduction of NCs and CP\X's in the policy-making and implementation of 
ser\Tlces in areas financed by branch 33 transfers, or in need for complementary 
monetary resources from citizens, has augmented the blurredness between the 
traditional roles of local authorities and public senrice users. As, the NC and CPW 
sN'stems have been consolidated, it has become increasingly difficult to establish the 
limit,, - of the respective influence of municipal officials, on the one hand, and 
committees' members, on the other, in the definition of poky priorities for 
neighbourhoods. However, in a general way, the three case studies display a higher L 
level of citizens' influence over policy-making at n-ucro level than in the times of the 
121 Momento de Zacatecas (1999). "Desazolva alcantarillados y arroyos del mulucipio". 
, ýlonieiilo 
de Zacatec-as, Sth June. 
clu ia Momento de Zacatecas (1999). "Pepenadores v tianguistas a favor de una i dad limpi 
. Alovientodt- Za, witvas, '4thjune. 
12' El Sc)l de Zacatecas. (200 1). "Supervisa alcalde obras en colonias y comunidades". El Sol 
de Zacale, ws, 5 11 ýj uly - 
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hegemonic party system. Either through the paying of complementary fees, the 
provision of problem- solving information more adequate for specific needs, or the 
giving of unpaid labour hours, neighbours have augmented their presence in the 
processes of introduction of urban infrastructure services. 
NC networks in this specific policy area have become looser than in the past, when 
decisions were a matter of closed pohcy communities formed of officials from 
government, the PRL) unions, and other PRI co-opted organisations. As a result, 
although still in a very lin-Lited way, the three municipalities have experienced 
dynarnisms of what an interviewee called a "political culture of co-responsibility' 
ý124 
. 
Having said this, it is important to note that the introduction of NC networks in the 
mentioned policy processes has been done xxqthout a significant displacement of the 
loo* of power, which, although modified, are still Within the mayor's sphere of 
influence. This is the result of the explicit policy of municipal officials of Onzaba, 
Le6n, and Zacatecas to avoid extremely self-organised and fragmented decision 
processes, which could seriously impair their ability to govern. 
Overall, NCs and CP\X's have a relatively small influence in municipal policy. The 
substantial work in public senices is not carried out through them, and the income 
provided by them, in monetarv resources or unpaid labour hours, has been 
traditionally small. Nevertheless, NCs are important because they show a significant 
paradigm change in the , vay policy-making had been traditionally done in Mexican 
municipalities. As GwII6. n-L6pez (1999a) argues about Tijuana in the nud 199(),,, the 
introduction of NCs Irnphes a new model of government that presupposes a 
1-4 1 ' Dulm6ch, S. Personal interview. Orizaba. 1911, januar-\ 2001. 
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proactive, participant society and a municipality that designs pohcy as a reaction to 
societal activity. TI-iis paradigm shift, which has been verified by the establishment 
and maintenance of networks in the urban infrastructure pohcy areas, requires a new 
conceptuahsation of government- society interactions. 
Citizens'Councils 
In addition to NCs and CP%X's, the three studied municipalities have introduced 
Citizens' Councils (CCs) as a strategy to complement the informal (and micro) 
policy-making and implementation (carried out by the committees) with a 
municipality-Wide planning that takes into consideration the technical and financial 
capabilities of the corresponding local government. CCs can be either 'advisory' 
(consulthw) if all their members are appointed by the mayor, or 'for development' (de 
Desairollo) if at least some of them are elected. As it can be seen in table 14, Le6n has 
estabhshed five CCs (Annual State Fair, Population, Prevention of Drug Addictions, 
Prevention of Children's Abuse, and Planning). The latter, the Planning Council for 
Municipal Development (COPLADENý is the most important among Le6n's CCs- 
Si'lar bodies VAth a slightly different name (CODEMUN) have also been 
implemented in Orizaba and Zacatecas. CODEMUNs in these two municipalities are 
the only CCs that deal \"th most policy areas of local government. The 
COPLADEM and CODEMUNs are formed of three types of actors: pobticians (the 
mayor and aldermen), municipal staff (department directors and their techn-ical. 
personnel), and citizens elected among NCs members or appointed by the mayor. 
'fheir representation quotas vary but citizens are the majority in the three case 
studies. Unhke NCs and CP\X's, ,, -I-iich exl-Libit dynamisms of pohc), net-, vorks, these 
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Councils for Municipal Development are closed policy commun-ities that are 
especially relevant for establishing general expense prion I 'ties in the yearl) budgets. In 
general, the systems that produce the Councils for Municipal Development vary in 
their degree of compleywy, being Le6n the most intricate one. 
The COPL-1, DEM of Le6n was originafly an appointed CC, but in 1997 it became an 
elected one". This CC is composed of several Work Commissions and a Technical 
ConMTUssion. There are eight Work Conumssions in the COPLADEM: a) Economic 
Development, b) Pubhc Health, c) Education, d) Sports and Culture, e) Pubhc 
Services and Basic Infrastructure, 0 Law and justice, g) Ecology and Environment, 
and h) Public Transport and Safety. W'ork Commissions are established using the NC 
system. The 450 NCs of the municipalitý, are distributed in 27 territorial sectors" 
Each NC sends a delegate to the territorial sector meetings, which are organised 
according to the Work Commissions' pohcy areas. In these meetings a territorial 
sector representative is elected. Sector representatives, in addition to the 
corresponding policy area's alderman and the relevant departmental directors, 
establish a Work Con-irmssion; these function independently, holding monthlý 
meetings to prepare annual diagnostics on the policy area in their charge and to 
evaluate and propose munIcipal programmes (COPLADEM, 2000). 
The COPLADEM Technical Conu-nission, on the other hand, is composed of 27 
representatives of the territorial sectors (elected by NC delegates), the eight co- 
ordinators of the Work Comn-ussions (also citizens), one representative of the CP\X's, 
125 Guerrero, 1-1. Personal interview. Le6n. 12th February 2001. 
12(ý Ramirez, A. Personal inter-, ievv. Le6n. 1 lt"January 2002. 
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the mayor, the directors of the Planning Institute (INTLAN), the DSD, the 
Department of Public Works, the Department of Potable Water (SAPAL), the 
aldermen in charge of the policy areas to be discussed in specific meetings, and 
officials from the state government invited on an ad hoc basis (COPL-%DEM, 2000). 
There are in total 36 citizens elected to the Technical Conumssion and a varying 
number of politicians and administrative staff (normafly around 12). Citizens have 
voice and vote rights, while pohticians and administrative staff can address the 
council, but are not entitled to vote. Citizens and the Work Commissions' co- 
ordinators are elected for a minimurn of a year and can be re-elected for a maximum 
of three (cf. Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999b). The COPENDEM Technical Commission 
has as its main functions the approval of the MDP, the design of the overall priority 
criteria for public services' works, and the resolution of the conflicts between formal 
planning Oed by the IMEPLAN) and the informal planning (produced in the NCs) 
(COPLADEM, 2000). 
Since 2001, the COPL-kDEM Technical Cormussion has had hrrýted budgetary 
capabilities. Once the City Council has approved the annual expenditure budget, 
including the total sum to be spent in public services, the COPIADEM decides on 
the priority of public works for the city, regardless of whether they are funded by 
FAIS, other federal transfers, municipal money, or pubhc-pnvate scl-iemes2'. Its 
decisions shape the AOP, which is the short-term expenditure strategy of the 
municipality. Because COPI-ADEM Technical Comnussion's decisions are not 
legally binding, the City Council can veto any plan that does not have the support of 
aldermen. In practice, however, its decisions have been foRowed because pofificians 
12' Guerrero, fl. Personal mtervie\-, -. Le6n. 1211ý Februan- 2001. 
'27 
participate also in the discussions preceding voting, influencing in this way the 
elected citizens' choice. In addition, because discussions are not centred on the total 
sums to be spent but rather on the priorities for spending, consensus has proved less 
difficult to achieve than previously thought'2'. It seems that the criteria for the 
selection of priorities of elected citizens and government officials are not too 
different; both kinds of actors tend to favour policy decisions that have an effect on 
121 
the greatest possible number of neighbours . 
The CODEMUN in Orizaba, differently from the COPLADEM in Le6n, has its 
members appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the City Council. In practical 
terms many of them are NC presidents, although the presidents of the chambers of 
commerce and industry, and the principal businessmen of the citý- are also usually 
invited. The), are normally appointed for three years although in the 2001-2004 
administration they served for four. The CODEWN includes these appointed 
citizens (in this case 20), the mayor, the directors of the DSD and the Department of 
Pubhc \Vorks and Urban Management, and the aldermen concerned with the topics 
to be discussed. As in Le6n, afl attending members (normally 27) have voice rights, 
but only the 20 appointed citizens can vote"". Like in Le6n, CODEMUN's decisions 
are reached after discussions in . T,, Ii-ich the key municipal officials participate, shaping 
i'l them in an important way Being an appointed, advison- body to the mavor, 
CODEMUN's decisions are hn-ýted to propose improvements m pubhc ser"ces and 
priontise public works, and their decisions are not binding for the City Council. 
12,1 Ramirez, A. Personal interview. Le6n. 11 1- J anuarv 2002. 
Brisefio, F. Personal Mten-lew. OriZaba. 1911, januan, 2001. 
Espinoza de los Monteros, 1. Personal inter-, iew. Onzaba. 20t', December 2001. 
Ibid. 
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Nevertheless, the resulting prioritisation of public works is publicised and sent to the 
state congress in order to meet the LFC requirements on citizens' consultation 1; 2 
In Zacatecas, on the other hand, NCs officials elect their representatives to the 
CODEMUN. As in Le6n, NCs are grouped in territorial sectors (22) and each one 
elects its delegate to this planning council. In addition to these representatives, the 
mayor, the director of the DSD, some technical advisors, and aldermen (on a 
rotational basis) also participate in this planning council 133 . All CODEMUN',, 
members have voice rights (22 citizens and 12 municipal officials usually in 
attendance), but unlike what happens in Le6n and Orizaba, the mayor (in addition to 
1-4 
the citizens) has voting nghts, 1- 
The CODEMUN of Zacatecas has similar capacities to Le6n's COPLADEM. Its 
main tasks are to approve the NUDP, to decide priorities on the city's pubhc works, 
and to resolve, in main expense categories, how branch 33 income is going to be 
used. Once the Citý, Council is notified about the amount of transfers it will receive 
in the year, the CODEMUN makes the expenses' budget for street pavlng, pubhc 
lighting, sewers and other neighbourhood improvements. The CODENfUN also 
performs the role of advisory council to the mayor in health, sanitation, and 
education policles'35. The priorities decided by the CODENfLTN are sent directly to 
the Department of Public Works, although the Citý, Cound retalns the power to 
appro-ve each one of them separately", with an important exception. In the last year 
Espinoza de los Monteros, 1. Personal intemew. Orizaba. 1411, February 2()()3. 
Ortiz, 0. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 1411, February 2003. 
-'ý4) uarez - Alfaro, M. del C. Personal mterview. Zacatecas. 7111 -1 
anuan- 
Ibid. 
136 Ibid. 
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of the studied adnunistration it was decided that CODEMUN pnorities, should be 
binding to the City Council only in pubhc works funded by branch 33 1 17 . This CC has 
been the only one among the case studies to have the prerogative to compel 
aldermen to accept its priorities, albeit only during 2001, and in a ven- specific policy 
area. 
CCs and 12obcy-makin 
Assessing the impact of CCs is difficult because the City Cound retains (in the three 
cases) the prerogative of modifying policy priorities set by them when the specific 
public works are discussed in the Cabildo (exception made to branch 33 public works 
in Zacatecas during 2001). Nevertheless, City Councils tend to follow priorities 
defined in the COPLADEM and CODEMUNs given the gains in legitimacy that 
doing so entails and the important capacity of local officials to shape CCs decisions. 
It is important to note that is difficult to trace a causal link between choices taken in 
the CCs and the actual public works made during the year. The main obstacle to do 
this is the lack of access to information, for although CCs decisions are advertised, 
municipal records on COPLADEM and CODEMUNs reunions are not usually 
available, and their meetings are held behind closed doors. Tl-ýs does not facilitate 
deternuning the actual levels of influence over policy of representative citizens. 
At the , same time, 
blurredness levels within the COPL-ýDEM and CODET\IL-Ns 
appear to be especially IlIgh, not only because their coflegiate decisions are known 
but the voting records and positions of their members are not, but also because (in 
1-37 Ortiz, 0. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 14t'ý Februan, 2007). 
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practical terms) the opinions of representative citizens and municipal officials tend to 
converge118. This is plausible, given that CCs representative citizens normal1v have a 
back-ground of collaboration with municipal officials"' and, therefore, can be co- 
opted by authorities to support local policies more easily than regular citizens. 
Additionafly, the influence of local officials in the discussions of CCs is critical, for 
the prestige of the technical expertise of departmental directors and aldermen is 
added to their already high political status, making their opinions especially influential 
over member cidzens. It is symptomatic that during the three-year periods of the 
studied adn-unistrations, there are not dissenting statements in the local press of CCs 
members about their coflegiate decisions. 
Le6n's COPLADEM is the most important planning body in this municipality's 
multilayered system of participation. The n-ucro-planning is carried out býT the NCs 
and CPV's mentioned above, and its main focus is local problem- solving. The 
IMPLAN, on the other hand, conducts strategic planning using technical criteria, 
while the COPLADEM focuses on the general priorities of citizens and local officials, 
(cf. Cabrero-Mendoza, 1996; and Santos - Zavala, 1999). In practice, it is the 
141, COPL, ýDEM that has the highest influence over macro pobcy-making is 
important, for according to official reports, 61 per cent of all public works on basic 
infrastructure, 14 per cent of A econoMic development actions, and 25 per cent of 
all social development programmes in 2000 were carried out as a direct result of the 
pohcN- pnorities estabhshed in th-is CC (COPLNDEM, 2000). During most of the 
adrrunistration of Mr. Ayala-Torres, the COPI-NDEM has decided on the entirety of 
I. `, ' N'e, (ca - Marin, j-0. Personal interview. Mex-ico City. 1311, February 200 1. 
", " Ibid. 
140 Guerrero, H. Personal intenliew. Le6n. 12th Februan, 2001. 
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Le6n's public works, which have the highest proportion of municipal expenses 
among the three case studies. In 2001, they represented 35-46 per cent of the total 
municipal expenses, while in 2002 they were 32.60 per cent (see table 18). 
The presence of the COPIADEM in Le6n's pohcy-making is evident especlafly in 
the most important projects of the administration, like the above-mentioned SIT 
141 
, 
against which there were protests led by NCs members 142 ; the general policies to hold 
back corruption in public markets (against the irregular assignment of available places 
14-) 
to new vendors) , the cost of public transport tickets (they were not raised as the 
mayor had intended), " and the general policies on training courses for mutucipal 
employees and the public 
145 
In the case of Orizaba, the CODEMUN has never had any capacity to decide on the 
municipal budget, even though it can set the general service priorities for the city. In 
terms of the 'power dependence' that it creates within the municipal bureaucracy, 
this CC influence is quite hn-ýted, given that their members are appointed and that 
the City Council holds the last word on its proposals. In addition, the expense in 
public works between 1998 and 2002 was rather irregular, especially during the last 
PANista administration. In 2001, the first vear of the studied administration, the Citi, 
Council decided to approve expenses in public senlices that reached 16.70 per cent 
141 Guevara, S. (2002). "Va para largo tren interurbano". El Sol de Ledn 1-11, May. 
I" Mel6ndez, F. (2003). "Interrumpe ciudadano a autoridades durante sesion de informaci6n 
SIT". E/ Heraldo de Leýn, 1 St', September. 
14', Mvarado, A. (2002). "Persiste corrupci6n en los mercados: ARZ-. El Sol de Lxýn, 26th 
M"Iy. 
144 Pheoo, J. (2003). "Congela alcalde negociacion sobre aumento tarifano". E/ Heraldo de .1 -1 
L, (; n, l4tlý September. 
145 Velýzquez, L. (2003). "Capacita a 30 mý personas con 6 mdp". E/ Heraldo de Leýii, l9tlý 
September 
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of the total spending of that year. According to a municipal official, 71 9 per cent of 
the CODEWN proposals were accepted that year and incorporated into the 
A OpI46 . However, even if a similar rate of accepted proposals was kept in 2002, the 
overall percentage of public works' expenses diminished to 5.69 (see table 18). 
Table 18. Public works, social services, and aids in the case studies as 
percentages of their gross expenditure, 1998 - 2002 
Subsidies, 
Municipality Year Gross Public works transfers, and 
expenditure and social aids 
services 
1998 100.00 25.05 1.84 
1999 100.00 35.52 6.24 
Le6n 2000 100.00 40.99 6.65 
2001 100.00 35.46 8.95 
2002 100.00 32.60 9.20 
1998 100.00 10.95 3.16 
1999 100.00 2.19 1.45 
Orizaba 2000 100.00 5.16 4.23 
2001 100.00 16.70 5.08 
2002 100.00 5.69 0.00 
1998 100.00 8.47 0.00 
1999 100.00 12.42 0.86 
Zacatecas 2000 100.00 11.73 26-83 
2001 100.00 18.15 1.70 
2002 100.00 17-83 2.49 
Source: own elaboration on data from INEGI (2005) 
Official figures for the expense rate in works priontised by the CODEWN during 
the second half of the administration have been not produced, but information of 
local newspapers suggests that it diminished from the 40 million pesos spent during 
2001 and the first half of 200214'. This indicates that the influence of CODEMUN 
decisions on overall municipal pohcy declined as the administration reached it-, end. 
Alvarado - Morales, j. Personal inteniew. Orizaba. 19th December - 1-4, - 2001. 
147, Orizaba en Red (2003). "Entreggan autondades infraestructura educativa por rnýs de 1 
mill6n de pesos". On*f, -aba en Red, 27, th October; Onzaba en Red (200). "Entrc,, (') aver alcalde 
" ') 
-1) 
FinaHy, the CODEMUN of Zacatecas had an important role in estabhshing priority 
public works"', which reached 12.42 and 11.73 per cent of total expenditure in 1999 
and 2000, respectively. In 2001, the first year in which this CC began to issue 
compulsory decisions, public works' expense reached 18.15 per cent (see table 18). 
Exact statistics on the number of subn-atted proposals accepted by the City Council 
during the first two years of the administration do not exist, but an informant 
ýA 
Op, 149 suggests that at least half of them were incorporated into the corresponding 
The reafly significant percentage is the one of 2001, for the CODEMUN decided on Cj 
almost the totality of the mentioned 18.15 per cent of expenditure, given that for that 
year branch 33 income represented 25.91 per cent of the municipality's total revenue 
(see table 17) and that the total income and expenditure amounts of Zacatecas were 
the same (INEGI, 2005). In any case, local newspapers barely re ister the decisions, 91 
of the CODEMUN, which makes this CC the most closed policy community of the 
three cases. 
This last issue raises the problem of accountability. In general terms, the 
COPLADEM and CODEWNs influence is present in local policy-making, but it is 
extreme]), difficult to deterrrune its precise extent. Unlike NCs and CP\X's, which 
operate under the supervision of the DSD (or DCP) and the local congresses, CCs 
onZabefio mobiliano a cuatro escuelas de la cludad". On'ýqba en Red, 17th December; Onzaba 
en Red (2003). "Inauguran autondades paquete de obras por 2 millones 398 mil pesos". 
Orif-aba en Red, 19th December; OriZaba en Red (2004). "Inauguran autoridades obras por 3.5 
mdp en beneficio de 12 mil cludadanos". On'ýqba en Red, V October; Orizaba en Red (2004). 
"Entregan autoridades el 61timo paquete de obras a los ciudadanos". On'fyba en Red, 14th 
December. 
14ý1 El Sol de Zacatecas (1999). "Rindi6 su primer informe de labores Ana Laura Pascal de 
Nahle". E/ Sol de Zacatecas, 12th November. 
14')Ortiz, 0. Personal mteniew. Zacatecas. 14, h February 2-003. 
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operation is closed to the scrutiny of other governmental agencies. It is true that their 
decisions are communicated to the local congresses in riz i the cases of 01 aba and 
Zacatecas in order to comply with the requirements of the LFC; but because these 
CCs do not handle citizens' contributions (in combination with federal transfers and 
local income) their role is considered mostly consultative, and therefore, they are left 
to the corresponchng municipality's supen-ision. This sometimes causes CCs to be 
considered by the public as the mayor's private groups of advisers, which is 
strengthened when they are composed of appointed-only members. 
As Cole and John (2001) argue, accountability is comprormsed when local policy 
decisions are reached after elaborate negotiations between public bodies and citizens' 
representatives that are not made public. The problem hes In the possibility, pointed 
out by Blair (2000), that these closed policy communities are more interested in 
benefiting their own groups rather than the entire city. Local governance studies in 
Mexico have hardly touched the subject, given that the main concern during the 
1990s was how to open up participation spaces for citizen-,;,. Now that citizens are a 
component of complex participaton, systems, the issue has begun to be treated in the 
literature. Cabrero-Mendoza (2004a), for example, argues that citizens' participation 
in local policy-making is more important now than it was in the early 1990s, but that 
accountability has not improved, because these participatory sý, stems have produced 
pohcv commun1fies that can be as closed as they were in the times of the hegemotuc 
party system, but -with selected citizens instead of the traditional politicians. -flils 
matter lias to be addressed properly in a specific research, as it was mentioned above. 
Here suffices to say that, in spite of the lack of measures to ensure the accountabfljtý 
of CCs members to other govemmental agencies, the case studies display a van-ing 
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degree of openness to external scrutiny that is detemuned by the wilhngness of the 
corresponding mayor to pubbcise the hnk between CCs decisions and completed 
public works. This confirms the centrality of the role of the mayor but, at the same 
time, increases the probability of improving in accountability if this is an issue 
proposed by competing political parties in elections. As the case of Onzaba 
illustrates, a change in the policy approach to participation mechanisms can rapicUy 
modify the patterns of interaction among policy networks and communities. 
Conclusions 
In the first part of the chapter, blurredness was defined as the indistinctness between 
the traditional roles of governmental and non-governmental actors that results from 
the introduction of citizens' networks in processes of policy-making and 
implementation. The three case studies display a signifficant, although uneven, degree 
of involvement of citizens' networks in the definition of basic urban services' pohcý 
and its implementation. Unlike the traditional approach of local governments while 
the hegemonic party system was in operation, the approach found in the studied 
administrations is more open to non-governmental actors and citizens that do not 
come from the traditional pro-PRI organisations that shaped policy in the past. NCs, 
CPIX's, and CCs have been introduced in Le6n, OrlZaba, and Zacatecas as a means to 
comply Iv"th the LFC gwdehnes and to make direct beneficlarles of services 
participate in their priontisation and implementation. 
'Mese poh Cy networks and communities, however, have also been introduced and 
maintained in the case studies as a strategy to increase their legitimacy levels and 
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obtain resources to complete public works, conforming, in this wav, to the main 
purposes of networks identified by the analysed authors, such as Benington (2001), 
Gulati and Gargiulo (1999), Hanf and O'Toole (1992), Jordan and Schubert (1992), 
and King (2003), among others. In this sense, the three cases have experienced a 
certain shift from government to governance, for their policy-making processes rely 
more on citizens' networks than in the past, and they are the result of regular 
exchanges with policy communities, according to the above-mentioned 
understandings of governance of John (2001), and Cole and John (2001). 
The introduction of citizens' networks, however, has not been -,, erified in all policy 
sectors or in the same degree. As Desai and Imne (1998: 664) have pointed out, local 
governments implementing governance mechanisms, tend to "circumscribe 
participation to non-strategic spheres of operation", and in the three cases (with the 
exception of Zacatecas during a short period) the City Councfls retained the powers 
to estabbsh the initial amounts with which CCs elaborate budgets of pubhc services, 
and to veto particular public works resulting from the services' pnonties defined by 
the CCs. Nevertheless, there has been a significant involvement of citizens in NCs 
and CPkX's, which has been instrumental in the improvernent of potable water, 
electricity, and sewers provision. In general, policy networks and communities have 
become more relevant for local policy in the relatively narrow sector of basic urban 
services, either in the nucro problem- solving of specific neighbourhoods with 
undersupphed services, or the macro prioritisation of pubbc works for the city. 
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Policy networks and communities in the selected municipalities do not function in 
the same way, and there are three factors that appear to be especiaNy important to 
shape their interactions. 
The first one is the policy sector itself As Bevir et al., (2003: 10) argue, the shift from 
government to governance in Europe has taken the form of governments giving a 
"reduced and shared role in problem solving" to citizens. In the three cases, this role 
has been given to inhabitants of neighbourhoods With problems in the quality or 
supply of basic services. The participation of citizens, however, is not apparent in 
other important pohcy sectors, such as local economic development, the regulation 
of commerce, sanitation, public safetý-, or even internal administrative services such 
as the office of the Municipal Comptroller, or the Municipal Treasurer. In this sense, 
Le6n has a greater number of policy sectors open to citizens' participation, because 
this municipality has established CCs on subjects such as population and the 
prevention of addictions, as it was mentioned above. The three municipalities' most 
important CCs, however, are the COPLADEM and CODEMUNs analysed here. 
The second important factor in shaping governance interactions is how loose the 
involved pohcy networks are. As the three cases show, the (: hfferent dynamisms 
present in NCs and CMX's, on the one hand, and CCs on the other, can be partly 
explained by how open they are to accept new members. In general, the three cases 
display a high level of initial openness when dealing With NCs and CP\N-s, , -, -hich is 
related to a common approach to nUcro-problem solving. As the participatory bodies 
rise in the system, the), become more closed policy communities, as the cases of the 
COPIADEM and CODEMUNs confirm. 
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Finafly, the procedures for the functioning of NCs, CPW's, and CCs estabhshed by I 
the corresponding City Council are the most important factors to shape governance 
patterns. Le6n has established the most complex participatorv svstem of the three 
cases, in part, because it is the municipality with greater needs of basic urbanisation 
services. Le6n's participation system is very open at the bottom, requiring citizens to 
get involved, With demanding regularity, in the activities organised by the DSD and 
to pay their share in the cost of the introduction of basic semces. Orizaba, on the 
other hand, does not use primarily its NCs and CP\X"s as source of financial 
resources, but as a means to exchange problem-solving information. Finally, 
Zacatecas relies on unpaid labour from citizens, showing a more traditional approach 
to networks but using, at the same time, the social capital built during the Z-) 
PRONASOL years. These different governance styles show diverse priorities in the 
respective political discourse of the parties in office as well as the particular needs of 
the murucipahty. 
After recognising chfferent degrees of citizens' involvement in planning and pobc), 
implementation, the really important point is to find out to what extent this formal 
policy-making through networks includes the positions- of citizens, not participating 
in NCs, CP\X's, and CCs. Die following chapter deals With some aspects of this issue, 
analysing the commerce and industry chambers of these municipahties x-, -hich, 
normally, represent the most influential economic interests in the cities. 
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Chapter Five 
Self-organisation and local governance 
Introduction 
As it was established in chapter one, the analý, sed theoretical frameworks propose a 
com-monality of characteristics present in the different forms of governance. 
Governance, defined as a paradigm of policy-making "based on loose networks of 
individuals" Uohn, 2001: 9), generates patterns of government-societv 11-Iteractions I 
that are more fragmented, blurred, and self-organised than the ones produced by 
traditional governmental policy-making. Recent contributions to the literature on 
sub-national and national governance have emphasised the importance of local and 
national contexts as shaping factors of governance patterns. As a result, chapter two 
has considered the general traits of the Mexican national context, laying stress on the 
conditions that have enabled sub-national governments to incorporate non- 
governmental actors into processes of policy-making and implementation, using a 
variety of participatory mechanisms. Chapter three and four have analysed the case 
studies, focusing on these municipalities' processes of fragmentation (through the 
proliferation of governmental agencies and the specialisation of their dealings With 
the general public), and the blurredness between the public and pnVate spheres 
eme ig from the participation of NCs, CP\\'s, and Citizens' Councils in policy- rgin 
making. 
The general picture of the three case studies is one where the shift from government 
to the incorporation of networks in policy-making has been partial and uneven, being 
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introduced in policy areas that have a high legitimising potential (such as basic 
urbanisation services), and over which local officials have maintained a high level of 
influence, even if they lack the total control of the policy-making process. Onzaba, 
Le6n, and Zacatecas display diverse patterns of governance that are shaped by the 
stance of the corresponding party in office over the particular issues considered, the 
policy networks' sector, the looseness of these networks, and the procedures 
established for their operation by the relevant local officials. 
This chapter deals With self-organisation in the case studies, being this the third 
attribute of governance presupposed in the abovementioned theoretical frameworks. 
Self-organisation describes a state in which societal actors are autonomous and more 
self-governed and, therefore, less disposed to be steered by government (Rhodes, 
1997). The greater self-organisation, typical of governance, challenges traditional 
policy-making because it demands from government superior capabilities of 
adaptation, flexibility, and negotiation (Koolman, 1993). As a consequence, initial 
governance understandings (e. g. Rhodes, 1995) interpreted self-organisation as an 
obstacle to governmental steering, and therefore, as a condition that could generate 
incapacity to gain citizens5 acceptance of policy or as a factor that could originate 
failure to get concerted policies among governmental and non-governmental actors. 
More recent contributions to the literature on sub-national governance, however, 
have argued that if indeed self-organisation in governance interactions does not 
automatically ensure convergence and collaboration, it does produce a greater 
interdependence among public and private actors, which can in its turn generate 
stron dynamisms of collaboration (Cole and John, 2001). 9. 
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In the same way, this chapter argues that the three case studies display important 
patterns of interdependence between local governments and the local business 
sector, in spite that the latter is considerably self-orgatused. This is especiafly evident 
-1 
in the interactions between municipal governments and the commercial and 
industrial chambers. These chambers are among the most Influential actors that 
shape local policy, and the three cases show evidence of a considerable level of 
collaboration ýxqth City Councils, through the implementation of concerted policies. 
Scarcity of resources facilitates this collaboration; an aspect of governance that is 
endorsed by the Mexican political culture, which encourages exchanges between L-) 
politics and the business sector. By comparison, other NGOs have a less significant 
weight in local policy-making. These patterns of interaction, however, are not the 
same in the three municipahties: they are shaped by the particular issues in 
consideration and the general political stance of the corresponding party in office. 
'efl3 considers self-organisation In order to develop this argument, the chapter brI 
according to the analysed governance understandings, fol-lo"ng with the analysis of 
some social organisations and its comparison vnth local commerce and industrial 
chambers. Finafly, the conclusion elaborates on some of the factors that are relevant 
to explain the different approaches to governance found in the three case studies. 
Governance and self-organisation 
'Fhe ana]ýTsed governance understandin s, according to their different approaches and 9 
theoretical backgrounds, argue that self-organisation among non-governmental 
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actors is greater in the interaction patterns of governance than in the governmental 
ones. 
Basically, self-organisation can be defined as self-government and autonomy from 
the state (Rhodes, 1997). Self-organisation plays an important role in governance 
given that, in conditions of increased social-political complexity, governments have 
experienced a reduction in their capacities to exert control o-ver societal actors. As 
Kickert (1993) argues, the governmental capacities to effectively control and 
organise, especially non-governmental actors, has decreased as the result of 
insufficient levels of acceptance of policy, increased societal fragmentation, and the 
complications resulting from more intricate policy-making processes. In these 
conditions 
government does not have enough power to exert its wiH in other 
actors. Other social institutions are, to a great extent, autonomous. They 
are not controlled by any single superordinated actor, not even the 
government. They largely control themselves [ ... ] Deregulation, 
government Vnthdrawal and steering at a distance are A notions of 
less direct government regulation and control, which lead to more 
autonomy and self-governance for social institutions Jbid.: 275). 
Self-organisation is an attribute that is present among social-political actors to the 
extent that the)-, either competing or collaborating 'With the state, play a part in the 
overall organization of society (Koolman, 1993a). Self-orgarusation is an attnbute 
that "contributes to the governabIty of modem societies" because "many sectors in 
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present-day societies largely govern themselves" (Koolman, 2002: 15), as it is 
becorfUng increasingly apparent when the state retreats from some pohcv sectors or 
intervenes in them using unconventional means, redefining its traditional role. From 
the governmental perspective, self- organisation is more noticeable in the sectors 
where networks are incorporated into the pobcy-making process, especially xvhen 
they are inter-organizational and operate in a highly fragmented environment 
(Rhodes, 1997). Self- organisation among non-governmental actors produces 
polycentrism, for the networks of autonomous actors can accumulate a considerable 
amount of resources of manv kinds, which can put them in a position to compete 
with the state Uessop, 1998). 
Self-organisation also plays an important role in the non-hierarchical arrangements of 
networks that emerge in fragmented pohties. Once the traditional government- 
society interaction patterns (or systems of interest aggregation) divide, dispersed 
actors rearrange around new, many times non-governmental, locl of po,, -, -er (Rosenau, 
1997). Die resulting power dispersal hinders the government's steering capabilities 
because non-governmental autonomous actors introduce dynamisms of interaction 
that are not hierarchical, evolving along "paths marked by reversals, sideward 
movements, feedback loops, and a variety of non-linear dynamics that make it 
difficult to both practice and trace the exercise of governance" (Rosenau, 2000: 177). 
Early governance understandings consider that self-organisation, although not 
necessarilý- incompatible with pubhc interests, obstructs traditional governmental 
interventions. FJ-iodes (1995), for example, presupposes that self-organisation is a 
quality that belongs prinlarily to the non-governmental sector. ConsequentIv, self- 
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organised actors promote private interests (Rhodes, 2000) to the point that they can 
challenge the state's prerogatives if they become powerful (Rhodes, 1997). If self- 
organisation increases, then governability can only be sustained using a higher 
amount of governmental resources and introducing new forms of interaction with 
society (Mayntz, 1993). Especially at international level, governance is the realm of 
the governmental absence, where political consensus or negotiation is the result of 
the convergent choices of autonomous actors that cannot be compefled to act 
according to a single actor's determination (Rosenau and Czempiel, 1992). 
Nevertheless, more recent contributions to the literature on national and sub- 
national governance have pointed out that, in spite of the general increase of self- 
organisation among non-governmental indiVidual actors and inter-organizational 
policy networks, the "total sum of the state capabilities [remains] largely unchanged" 
(Pierre and Peters, 2000: 92-93) and, therefore, the state continues to be the most 
influential actor over societal affairs, albeit sometimes in manners and policy sectors 
that were unusual some decades ago. Accordingly, self-organisation is not 
automatically considered as opposite to governmental activity as a whole, but rather, 
as a condition incompatible \, kqth the traditional authontative means to exert control 
and ensure accountablty to the state (ibid. ). Moreover, Peters (2000) argues that 
regardless of the increased fragmentation and autonomy of some social-political 
actors (including inter-organizational networks), the actual degree of acceptance or 
opposition to public policy varies according to particular contexts. The introduction 
net-works into policy-making can generate, or make it more difficult to atta-tn, 
shared policies among governmental and non-governmental actors (Cole and John, 
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2001). What is common in these conflicting interaction patterns of governance ,,, that 
they are the expression of shared relations of dependence among social-political 
actors, which have increased with time. Given the differences among the governance 
patterns in western industrialised countries,, Cole and John (2001) reach the 
conclusion that governance 
does not mean convergence, [rather] is about greater interdependence 
between public and private sectors (Ibid.: 142-143). 
The folloWing sections of the chapter deal With the particular forms that this public- 
private interdependence takes in the three case studies, analysing the relations 
between the most important non-governmental actors and the respective local 
governments. 
Non-governmental actors in the three case studies 
In general, the two most relevant non-governmental actors in Mexican urban 
municipahties are social NGOs (i. e. non-profit citizens' associations which can be 
officially registered as such in order to receive deductible donations), and the local 
chambers of commerce and industry"'. However, the influence over local policy of 
social NGOs (also called Asociaciones CA-fles or "civic associations") is normally less 
significant than the one exerted by the commercial and industrial chambers; and 
when it arises, it has the tendency to be hn-ýted to the specific pohcy sectors in vvilich 
these NGOs work, wHe the chambers' influence tends to be more wide-ranging. 
Vep - Marin, Co 
C»ty, l'th Februarý 2001 
gý -j- 
0. Personal intenlejý,. Nlexi 1 
246 
There are several factors that play a role in the social NGOs inferior capacity to 
shape local policy in a considerable and sustained way. Among these, the fact that the 
Mexican political system has not modified its basic structure, which was designed to 
secure the pre-ennnence of a hegemonic party, is especlaUy important. In these 
circumstances, it is difficult to shape policy unless the social movement or NGO can 
influence several actors in different levels of government at the same time, or it is co- 
opted into the policy-making process. Having an effect on hierarchical actors other 
than the mayor exerts more pressure over him/her, functioning as an incentive to 
resolve in favour of the involved social organization"'. Co-optation increases the 
probabihty of a favourable treatment by government, given the resource exchange 
that is usual in chentelistic arrangements, and the reduced number of requests 
coming from an authorised social representative (as opposed to all social groups). 
In the three case studies few social organizations are able or willing to perform in this 
way, and as it was mentioned above, local governments tn, to circumvent 
autonomous social representatives by the introduction of direct interactions With 
citizens. As a result, local governments lack the disposition to constantly consult 
NGOs, or to invite them to policy implementation. In addition, social participation is 
usually defined in ven, narrow terms by municipalities, considering it as involvement 
in the participatory mechanisms described in the previous chapters. This discourages 
the commitment of constituted NGOs that are not willing to accommodate to the 
estabfished procedures (Espinoza-VaUe, 2000). 
151 Ibid. 
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The business sector, on the other hand, usuaHy has a greater and faster ImPact over 
matters of pubhc services and urban landscape, not only because an operative urban 
infrastructure is a requirement for the estabhshment of commerce and industn-, but 
also because established networks between businessmen and municipal officials tend 
to be more stable and less conflictive than the ones developed in NCs or citizens' 
councils. Tbus, the prevailing impression among the most important social-political 
actors in the three studied municipalities is that commercial and industrial chambers 
are influential in local policy-making, in spite that their presidents do not normallý, 
hold City Council seats while they are in office. 
The influence of commercial and industrial chambers is related to the economic 
importance of their members. Until the late 1990s, affiliation to the local industrial or 
commercial chamber was a federal requirement' 52, which ensured that governments 
had a reduced number of interlocutors when dealing with the private sector. Despite 
the fact that it is no longer COMPUISOnT to belong to the chambers, they have 
maintained their sectoral representative character, for there are not relevant 
alternative associations to these. As a result, the Confederation of National 
Chambers of Commerce, Services and Tourlsm (CON CANA C 0- SERV'ý-FU R: ) 
represents a substantial segment of the employed population of the Country. 
In the case of Le6n, the local branch of the CONCANACO-SERVYFUF, the 
National Chamber of Commerce and Services of Le6n (CANACO) groups together 
the medium and large commercial businesses in the municipality, which belong to a 
sector that overall represents 20.53 per cent of Le6n's jobs. In Orizaba, the local 
I-s- I -)'rd January 200 1 ' Kun - Rosado, S. Personal -tnter-, 
iew. Onzaba. 
248 
National Chamber of Commerce and Senices of Tourism (CANACO-SERNTi7U, Rý 
represents almost the totality of the companies and independent professionals 
involved in commerce, restaurants, and hotels (29.16 per cent of the entire emploved 
population of the city). In Zacatecas, the National Chamber of Commerce 
(CANAZAC) is composed of the great majority of the businesses in the same 
econorrUc activities, which are 28.87 per cent of the labour force (see table 19). 
CANAZAC is especially relevant because, in practical terms, it plays the role of a 
state commerce chamber. Most businesses of the important cities of the state 
traditionally affiliate to it, regardless of the local commerce chambers in their 
respective municipalities" 
Table 19. Employed population* in the three studied municipalities by main 
economic activity (percentages in 2000) 
Economic activity Le6n Orizaba Zacatecas 
Agriculture, activities related to livestock, and 
fishin 
. 
1.66 1.17 2.58 
Mining 
Z" 0.06 0.22 0. ý6 
Manufacturing industry 39.18 18.49 11.25 
Activities related to energy production and water 
bodies 
0.22 0.57 0.62 
Construction 6.30 7.46 9.44 
Commerce 20.53 22.31 19.77 
Transportation and cornmunIcations 4.08 5.04 5.28 
Finance services 1.08 0. T () 0.99 
Goverm-nent 2.04 3.61 9.94 
Entertainment and culture 0.81 0.81 1.35 
Personal professional services 1.96 2. -(8 2.39 
Real state 0.50 0.44 0.41 
Activities related to restaurants and hotels 4.37 6.85 6.10 
Other activities (excluding goverru-nent) 8.7/2 12.09 9.22 
Activities related to teclulical and other kinds of 
support to the business sector 
1.73 1.30 1.36 
Education sen-ices 3.94 9.2 5 11.61 
Health and Social assistance 2.82 6.91 6.93 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: own calculations on data in INAFED 200' )a. Note: ' "Employed population" stands 
for "Poblac16n Econ6micamente Activa (PEA) Ocupada". As it is knox-, -n, the INEGI 
considers in fl-lis categorý- both employees and self-employed professionals. 
15"Dý-, ila del Real, E. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 15th Februan, 2001- 
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Regarding manufacturing industries, the three studied murlIcipalities have branches 
of the National Chamber of the Industry of Transformation (C-ANACINTRA), 
which also represent most of the companies involved in that economic activity. 
Le6n, being the most important centre for leather-related businesses in the country, 
has a high percentage of labour force committed to manufacturing (39.18 per cent). 
Orizaba and Le6n have 18.49 and 11.25 per cent respectively (see table 19). 
CANACINTRA has traditionally played an important role in securing municipal 
contracts for public works, which gives this chamber a position of influence in local 
committees of acquisitions, mentioned below, and in advising citizens' councils. 
CANACINTR-A is the most important coRective actor of the secondary economic 
sector, 'ust as chambers of commerce are in the tertiarv one. The presidents of these 
associations are seen as spokespersons of their respective econonuc sectors, which 
combined encompass almost A the cities' economic activity (see table 20). 
Table 20. Employed population in the three studied municipalities by 
economic sector (percentages in 2000) 
Economic Le6n Orizaba Zacatecas 
sector 
1.71 1.39 3-14 
Secondary 45.70 26.52 21.31 
Tertiary 52.58 7 2.09 7/5.35 
Total 100 100 100 
Source: data in table 19 and econormc activitý, classification in INAFED 2000a 
The pre-en-unence of CANACO and CANACINTRA facihtates deahngs With the 
municipalities. It also explains the consideration traditionally iven to their presidents 1 91 
by mavors, and the relative ease with which government and chambers desIgn joint 
policies. Strong business -government relationships are also endorsed by a political 
culture that considers academic or business-related backgrounds as an additional 
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advantage, given that there is not a formal civil senice (Cabrero-Mendoza, 2003). 
Most mayors are inexperienced in government matters, for the mayoraltv is often 
considered as the first step in their political careers. Having a successful acadenuc or 
business occupation is seen as a way to acquire the necessary sUls to hold office, as 
it was mentioned in chapter three. This has produced a trend among municipal 
branches of political parties, which seek to attract businessmen and academics into 
partisan militancy and select them as candidates for City Council seats (Ziccardi, 
1995). 
This trend is also explained by the discredit of traditional politicians in local politics. 
As Camp (1996) points out, the usual sources for government officials xere the 
National University, in the case of the federal administration, and the workers' and 
teachers' unions, the army, and the partisan structures in the case of local 
(yovernments. The dissatisfaction of the electorate "th traditional politicians has 11 
introduced the informal requirement of a previous non-political career (cf. 
Hernýndez-Vicencio, 2000). Inten-jewees argue that this ensures that the new mayor 
will be more interested in solving the city's problems rather than in advancing 
his/her political career. The assumption is that a successful professional can always 
go back to his/her practice once the governmental period is over, securing a long- 
term income before entering politics. This, in addition, is expected to function as a 
measure against corruption. This kind of candidacies emphasises the proxin-uty 
between local officials and businessmen. In this wav, it is not uncommon for 
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industriahsts and retaflers to expect a favourable treatment from the mayor if he/she 
is a former chamber president"' 
Interviewed businessmen entering electoral politics argue that the rationale of their 
decision is traditional politics' failure. They propose new roles for municipal officials, 
and businessmen that require the estabhshment of permanent inter-sectoral 
networks. Businessmen going into politics assume that their connections with the 
private sector will help them to reach convergence over conflictive policy areas, like 
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the regulation of informal commerce, and to attract investments . _. NS a xhole, the 
commercial and industrial chambers have a significant disposition to get involved in 
local policy-making. 
So(ial oqoaniýafions and localgommments 
In the three studied municipalities, social NGOs establish official linkages With the 
local governments and sometimes participate in joint programmes, but their power 
to influence policy is relatively small and lin-ýited to the specific policy areas of their 
interest. Part of the explanation for this fact is the apolitical nature of most social 
NGOs in the country' 56. The oldest and most well known, like the Red Cross or 
Alcoholics Anonymous, have institutional relations \xrith the municipalities and 
collaborate in shared programmes, typically fundraising campaigns or the prevention 
of addictions. Die mayors of the three municipalities, for example, usually initiate the 
annual Red Cross Funds Appeal w1th a contribution of their own that is ,,, j-, -en in the 
1-54 Vega - Marin, , 
J. 0. Personal intemew. Mexico City, 13 311, February 2001- 
1 -s5Dývila del Real, E. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 15tlý Februan, 
200 1- 
15(, Medina - Lizalde, J. L. Personal intemew. Zacatecas. 1 6th 
February 200 1 
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City Hall and is amply publicised. However, especially after the mid 199()s (-,, -hen the 
partisan alternation in office consohdated), these organizations avold being 
associated with government in order to maintain their image of autonomy In that 
sense, their official position is not to be involved in local pohtiCS158, although they 
ordinari]y participate in citizens' councils and in programmes within their policy 
speciahsation. Besides these established NGOs, most social orgafUzations are short- 
lived, usually operative in years of federal elections and focused on matters related to 
electoral platforms"'. In many aspects, these ephemeral social organizations work 
like nodes of issue networks, assisting the interactions of the large number of actors 
that are involved in electoral affairs. As Heclo (1978) argues, this kind of networks 
can only be lightly administered given its informal and rapidly changing nature. Tbus, 
it is more probable that concrete collaboration in pohcy-making emerges among the 
established NGOs than with the other organizations. 
The citizens' participation model of Le6n has been crIticised for being, basicalIv, 
closed to any substantial collaboration "th NGOs that are not comphant "th the 
DSD criteria. Bazdresch-Parada (2002) points out that here lies one of the most 
important weaknesses of the PANista approach to the non-governmental sector, for 
it tends to exclude NGOs that are not closely related to the strategic policies of the 
adi-ninistration. Hernýndez-Vicencio (2000), after considering the cases of Chihuahua 
and Bala Cahfornia, argues that this Might be related to the particular orientation of 
the PANista admitustrations, , N-hicli tend to display a lesser 'political sensitivenessý 
than other parties' governments and, as a consequence, do not normafly engage in 
I -s-, N7e(-,, a - Marin J. 0. Personal interview. 1\, IeN,, lco Citýý, 13t', Februarý, 
2001- 
158 Alvarado - Morales, Ramirez, A., and Ortiz, 0. Personal interviews. 
Orizaba, 1911, 
December 2001; Le6n, lltlljanuarý, 2()()--); and Zacatecas, 1411ý Febraarý- 2003, respectively. 
")"Forres, Personal intenliew. OnZaba, 1-, thjanuarv 2001. 
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considerable exchanges with social organizations. This general impression has been 
confirmed for the first opposition governments of other northern municipalities of 
the country (Azlz-Nassif, 1996). Local newspapers in Le6n, for example, mention a 
history of difficult relationships With some social NGOs, including some established 
to fight the "neo-hberahst model employed in some [municipal] policies""'. 
In the studied administration, the most relevant social NGOs were the ones related 
to the treatment of persons With intellectual or physical disabilities. The official 
webpage of the government of Guanajuato advertises 22 NGOs in Le6n deahng With 
persons With mobility, hearing, Visual, and intellectual disabilities, especiaDy children 
(Estado de Guanajuato, 2005). These associations have usuafly received free 
promotion of their activities and monetary donations from the municipality"', which 
increased between 2000 and 2002 (see table 18). However, in addition to these 
NGOs, there is not evidence of the establishment of substantial agreements With 
other associations. 
In the case of Orizaba there is only a reduced number of NGOs that qualiý, as 
social. Until the late 1980s, the most important non-governmental associations were 
labour unions. Even now, the CROM (Revolutionary Confederation of Workers and 
Peasants), the CROC, and CTI\4 (Confederation of Mexican Workers) have some 
relevance given that their combined affiliates' number is close to 
Nonetheless, the city government, being a "New-PRI" administration, has been 
careful in avoiding traditional practices such as the explicit policy endorsement from 
16(1 Gonzälez, V. (2()02). "Pretende autoridad frenar lucha de la JOCOCA". E/ Sol de Ledn, 
"-, tI, May. 
161 Nlufioz - Lbpez, A. Personal inten71eu,. Leän. 190, 
Februan- 2001. 
Cruz -, -XreUaiio, E. Personal intenlevý 
Onzaba. 2, id Februarv 2001. 
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the unions, and in general, these have not been very relevant in poliq-making. Issues 
that are regarded as belonging to the 'public interest, on the other hand, have been 
relatively successful in obtaining the combined support of local authorities and 
NGOs. A recent example has been a non-governmental board of trustees [Patronato] 
that sought the change in the venue of Expon, the Industrial Fair of Onzaba. After 
some years of campaign, this association was able to influence municipal officials 
using ecological arguments, although the fact that some of the most prominent 
industrialists of the city are among its members was possibly more significant: 
The clubs work independently (Rotary, I-Aons, etc. ) But a successful 
experience was the board of trustees of the Poplar Grove Park 
[Alameda]. It was founded in the previous administration [1997-2000] 
and it continues to work trying to irnprove the park. They organised a 
campaign to assign another venue to Expon because the park and the 
Lamb FoothiE had begun to deteriorate. Now the fair is organised in 
the Onzaba Sports' Association fields. Other NGOs, hke Citizens' 
Option [Opci6n Cludadana] did nothing. The only thing they did was 
crIticise and trý, to condemn positive public works"' 
The Inter-Mumcipal Cound of Environmentahsts (CIMA) has been another body 
capable of influencing policy, in this case the conservation of the nver Onzaba. Its 
programmes have been implemented during at least two administrations, and it has 
been instrumental in keeping, the river bed free of rubbish in order to avold August's Z", 
floods. Cleansing the river banks has required the use of speciabsed machinery, 
16" Dulowich, S. Personal intemew. Orizaba. 19tI-january "Ool. 
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which has been proVided by the municipality 164 . Besides these two cases, there have 
been few occasions where sustained inter-sectoral coBaboration has occurred. One of 
them was the civic association that was founded after the kidnapping of the son of a 
prorninent doctor in 2000. Once his body was recovered, the association led the 
biggest demonstration in the city in twenty years; after that raUy the association was 
dissolved"' 
In the case of Zacatecas city, the PRID government has been able to maintain close 
links With social NGOs during and immediatelY after electoral campaigns. Ahanza 
Civica A. C. [CiVic Alliance], (a national NGO promoting anti-corruption measures), 
a couple of pro-Zapatista associations (supporting the uprising in the state of Z-1 
Chiapas), and the teachers' union backed a former PRI politician to become PRD 
candidate for governor in 1998. After being elected, governor Monreal made an 
official pohcy to keep those relationships"' and to estabhsh new ones With social 
organizations that in the past were PRI chents"'. In this way, most interviewees in 
Zacatecas argue that the PRD governments (in the municipabty and the state) react 
to social requests in a faster and more comprehensive way than in the PRI times. In 
reality, the closer linkages between government and NGOs are mostly discursive, for 
they do not appear to shape pobcy in a greater proportion than in Le6n or Onzaba. 
Take for example the rise of ticket prices in pubbc transport in 2000. Most 
inter\-iewees expected the mayor and governor to oppose the request from the 
private concessionaires to increase the price in more than 50 per cent. Ahanza Civica 
and the other mentioned associations orgamsed a campaign against the announced 
I 1ý4Ca&, Y. Personal lfitenlew. OnZaba. 1011, January 2001. 
165 lbid. 
16613arragýn - Montoya, F. Personal Mtenliew. Zacatecas. 14til February 
2001. 
16-, Nledina - Lizalde, J. L. Personal intervie-w. Zacatecas. WhFebruarý- 
2001 
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increase and lobbied the involved governmental agencies. In the end they were not 
able to influence this decision, despite that it was considered a test for the 
government to act in response to social petitions"'. Officials recognise the relevant 
role that Alianza Civica and the other associations played in the 1998 elections, when 
the state obtained an opposition government for the first time. However, thev 
criticise the lack of co-ordination among them and what they consider their 
unnecessary clisapproval of legitimate policies"' 
Dunng the studied adrrunistration in Zacatecas, the local newspapers do not report 
on aný, further si ificant dealings between the municipality and Alianza Civica. The gm 
Association of Street Vendors, on the other hand, played a more important role in 
shaping policy; its request for a greater number of permits to sell was denied in the 
first year of the administration, which initiated a series of negotiations conducted 
during an entire year in public sessions of the City Council"". The City Council 
granted the extension in the number of authonsed street vendors, but the association 
protested again, asking now for permission to sel-I near the Cathedral"'. Finallýl, the 
City Council agreed on this, in exchange for the collaboration of the street vendors in 
172. 
- ir the sweeping of the streets In the last two years of the PRID adm iistration, the 
dealings With this association decreased, although they were still present to the point 
of prompting a CANAZAC official protest for what tl-ýs association considered an 
168Barraon - Montoya, F. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 1411, February 
2001. 
10 Navarro-Ban-tielos, E. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 15thFebruarýy 22001. 
"() Guerrero,. ). C. (1999). "Comercio ambulante: un problema social". -A 
ImI,,;; 1o de 
14th June. 
171 Rocha, N. (1999). "Se rebelan tianguistas". El Sol de Za, -atecas, 24th November. 
1.2 El Sol de Zacatecas (1999). "Ventura Salazar y Arroyo de la Plata para el tiangms 
navidefio". ElSolde Zawtecas, 22-th November. 
22 D- 
unfair treatment of the established commerce businesses in favour of street 
vendors 
17ý 
In addition to the results of this research, there is evidence that suggests that the 
social NGOs capacity to shape local policy increases when the policy issue is 
considered of public interest, especially in emergencies or situations of social crisis 
(cf. Ziccardi, 1995). However, in ordinary situations or in cases of narrow policy 
issues, social NGOs influence over local policies declines. There have been some 
exceptions to this trend, especially when the social NGO members become local 
officials themselves, after entering a partý, that %'Vins the elections and that is will-ing to t-I 
adopt the NGO's alms as its official government's programme. In Texcatepec 
(Veracruz), for example, an association formed by the Zapatista Union of Farmers 
(UCZ) and the Committee of Farmers' Defence (CDC) were able to organise a 
successful campaign to recover lands taken illegal. ly by private companies. In the end, 
the negotiations With the federal and state authorities received the full backup of the 
municipabty officials, who were members of these associations 
174 
Another case in the same state is the municipahty of Zaragoza, a semi-urban 
community where the PRD initiated some of the participatory programmes that were 
later implemented in Ciudad Mendoza and Zacatecas. The Committee for the 
People's Defence of Zaragoza (CDP) was founded in the late 1980s ,, 6th the 
objective of improving the neighbourhoods' influence in public service poliCies. The 
difference with other approachcs -, vas the electoral focus. The leaders of the CDP 
"Di-, ila del Real- E. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 15til February 2001- 
1740segueda - Cruz, A. Personal intemexv. Xalapa. Sth Februan- 
2001. 
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became members of the PPS (later the PRD) in order to form a slate, which won in 
two non-consecutive occasions. The fact that the leader of the CDP was at the same 
time the mayor was Mstrumental in the implementation of programmes such as the 
open Cabildo and the Municipal Parliament. - These municipalities are rural and 
semi-urban, which suggests that the community size might be a factor in developing 
sustained collaboration between local governments and social NGOs. 
Commera*al and industrial cbambers 
As it was already mentioned, the greater influence of chambers in policy-making (if 
compared to social organizations) is partly explained by the economic importance of 
their members. 'ne fact that most chambers' affihates are from the middle or upper 
classes gives them more influence over urban issues, especially in matters related to 
the use of land. Typically, CANACO and CANACINTR-A members are middle-aged 
men, With university degrees, cars, and incomes above the average'7'. It is to meet the 
needs of these middle classes that the most expensive public works are usually done, 
incluchng the changes In urban composition that the larger numbers of cars entail. 
This, and the abovementioned closeness between the public and business sectors 
characteristic of Mexican politics, has given commercial and industrial chambers a 
pronunent place in local policy defiti-ition. 
In the case of Le6n, CANACO and the municipahtý, have worked closely in 
programmes to activate the establishment of smaH and meclium-sized businesses as a 
175 Guerrero, 11. Personal interview. Le6n. 1211, Februarv 2001; Ortiz, 0. Personal interview. 
Zacatecas. 140, February 2003; Vega - Marin, J. 0. Personal interview. Mexico 
Cit=y. 136, 
February 200 1, and Velasco - Pagaza, M. Personal interview. Orizaba. 1 gth j anuary 
200 1. 
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strategy to promote employment. The most pubhclsed programme assigned grants 
and soft credits to starting companies, which were financed bv the CANACO and 
the local government in equal parts' 76 . The Joint programme was considered of high 
priority by both the municipahty and the chamber of commerce for, days before to 
the official presentation of the programme, the CANACO had threatened to stop 
paying taxes if the government's policies on commerce did not improve In spite of 
this dispute, the Joint programme was continued. In addition, CANACO has 
agreements Vqth the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) and the Ministry of 
Economy to operate as an alternative assistance centre. Social Secunty in Mexico is 
funded jointly by government, the employer, who must pay an annual fee according 
to the number of full-time employees in 1-iis/her company, and the employees 
themselves through tax deductions. CANACO works as an information centre, 
focusing on taxes, IMSS fees, and ways to avoid fines. Moreover, its agreement with 
the federal government allows CANACO to be the underwriter of its members' 
debts: businessmen with outstanding IMSS fees are exempted from the customary 
deposit"'. 
CANACO has also implemented some programmes to help the municipality to have 
an updated register of street vendors, usually asking its affiliates to report them if 
thev try to sell their merchandise in unauthorised areas 179 . The constant complaints of 
this chamber to the Directorate of Conu-nerce have been instrumental in defirUng the 
administration's policies on street vendors, to the point of causing organised protests 
1,7(, G6mez, A. (2002). "Reactlvarýn pequefias y medianas empresas con financian-iiento". El 
Sol dt, L-(iii, 1911, May. 
17 G6mez, A. (2002). "Amenaza CANACO con delar de pagar impuestos". E/ Solk Lxdn, 
Ftlý May. 
178 Rodriguez, 1-1. Personal Mtenliew. Le6n. --'Stlý 
May 2003. 
1") Ibid. 
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of the vendors themselves against the municipahty and CAN-NCO"" 
CANACINTRA of Le6n works in a siafflar way, helping the municipality with its 
housing programmes. Using the experience of preN'lous coHaborative schemes With 
INFONAVIT (the Institute of the National Fund for the 'Torkers' Housing), this 
chamber has given constant advice to the Municipal Institute for Housing. In 
addition, CANACINTRA members With social security rights can obtain credits to 
buy a new or used house, buýd one, bad an extension to an existing property, and 
pay debts related to these matters using CANACINTRA as underwriter of the credit 
or debt (CANACINTRA, 2003). 
In the case of Orizaba, the mayor of the 1998-2000 administration lobbied members 
of CANA C O-SERV i'FU R in order to get land donations. The most important 
public work of the period was the Onzaba Avenue, a two-lane street parallel to the 
railroad tracks, which cross the city in its \Vest-East axis. Owners of the adjacent 
properties were against the project, for the Avenue required the use of some private 
land. T'he municipality, on the other hand, could not afford to pay the land's price if 
it decided to take possession of the properties. In the end, the mayor asked the most 
important industrialists of the city, some of which had estates in the area, to donate a 
part of them to the municipality so the Avenue could be constructed \"thout 
affecting Minor private owners. The estate portions were given to the local 
government and, after a minor direction change, the Avenue Nvas built"' 
Convergence over this point, however, was not only the result of personal networks. 
Some of the involved estates belong to member companies of CANACO- 
G6mez, A. (2002"'). "Se quejan comerciantes por hostiga=ento de inspectores". E/ Sol de 
IV, May. 
Dulowich, S. Personal intervievv. Orizaba. 19tlý januarv 2001. 
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SER\7-'i'fUR. This chamber's participation was instrumental in the subsequent 
campaign that convinced estate owners to donate smaU portions of them, or seU 
them under favourable conditions for the municipality" 
CANACO-SERVYTUR has also participated in the design of the commercial 
policies for the city. It is a non-spoken rule that its president has a seat in the 
CODEMUN, regardless of how the other voting members are elected. This chamber 
participates frequently in municipal programmes. In the pre-%, rious administration it 
19' 
was in contact with the municipal Department of Commerce on a daily basis '. In 
the studied administration, this commercial chamber and the municipality introduced 
a policy of zero-tolerance of illegal street vendors. Normally, the Department of 
Commerce assigns concessions to particular vendors or approves ad hoc agreements 
vnth street traders' unions using different criteria. In any case, the licence for selling 
in pedestrian areas is geographically limited and is temporary, awarded usually for the 
Fairs of June or the festivities between December and January"'. As a long-term 
strateM,, the municipality has tried to relocate street vendors in controlled street 
markets (set up on weekends or once during weekdays) or in the conventional 
185 
ones 
The implementation of the zero-tolerance pohcy required the involvement of 
CANA CC)-SERV-'. 1'FLTR affiliates. In the first place, the municipality stopped 
granting ficences for penods other than the mentioned ones. If vendors wanted to 
1,12 Cad6, Y. Personal 111tervie-w. OriZaba. 1 Oth January 2001. 
"I Kuri - Rosado, S. Personal intervie"A7. 
Orizaba. 23rd January 2001. 
1114 Orizaba en Red (2002). "Se mstala6 Feria deljuouete en alameda central". 01-fýi/)a en 
Red, 
"'3r, l December. 
185 OrIZaba en Red (20022). "Alcalde llama fuertemente la Atencion a t1an, (7ruistac". On"ýaba eii 
Red, 2011ý November. 
"6" 
continue selling, they had to apply for a place at a conventional market. 
Subsequently, the members of the commerce chamber received details about the 
programme and a series of telephone numbers to which the), could report 
irregularities. Given that the city is not divided into commercial or residential zones, 
there are businesses practicaDy in A neighbourhoods. If there is a street vendor in 
front of an established business, the owner can report him/her to the chamber, the 
Department of Commerce, or the pohce in order to have him/her fined and 
removed"' 
This pohcy protected the interests of the municipahtý, and the chamber of commerce. 
On the one hand, it allowed the director of the Department of Commerce to relocate 
vendor supervisors Finspectores] to the city centre, leaving a small number in the 
zones covered by CANACO-SERVi'FUR"'. On the other, the chamber benefited 
by the decrease in competition from informal retailers, which have initial 
advantageous conditions because they do not pay taxes or leases. Collaboration was 
possible given that the municipality does not have the necessary resources to enforce 
local regulations on conunerce, and CANACO-SERVYFUR has affiliates covering 
the municipahty's territory. 
In addition, CANACO-SERVYIUR, in similar collaborative schemes to those of 
Le6n, has sigped agreements ,. "th INFONAVIT and MlSS. The chamber of 
commerce obtained a loan from the federal housing agency in order to bad 15() two 
and three-bedroom houses. As in the case of Le6n, members can apply for a credit 
186 Kun - Rosado, ' S. Personal inter-, ieA,. Orizaba. 23rd January 2001 
Escudero - Stadelmann, A. Personal intemevv. OriZaba. 1 81h anuaný 
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directly to CANA CO- SERVYTUR with increased probabilities to obtain it, given the 
smaU number of applicants. Regarding IMSS fees, the chamber's members get their 
fines and interests condoned if they pay before a deadline, which is negotiated at the 
beginning of each year"'. CANACINTRA, the industrial chamber, has followed 
CANACO-SERV-'V'IUR in the sign-ing of contracts vqth federal and municipal C) C3. 
agencies. Its programmes include the establishment of a fund in order to grant small 
loans to industries of the city. The fund is financed by CANACINTRA and the 
municipahtý, in equal shares, and is part of the economy reactivation pohcles of the 
current adn-unistration"'. 
Finally, the chambers of Zacatecas have put into practice similar programmes to 
those implemented in Le6n and Orizaba. CANAZAC has assisted the municipahtý, in 
updating the street vendor records using a system like the one of Orizaba, where 
chamber members report any possible violation of the mulUcipal commerce 
regulations"". In Zacatecas, the negotiations With street vendor unions took longer 
than in Orizaba, but they led to the change of the permanent street markets of the 
city centre, converting them into temporary ones. In this issue, CANAZAC, the local 
CANACINTRA, and the municipality were able to generate convergence over policy 
because the city centre was being renovated. In 1993 it was included in the 
UNESCO World Hentage catalogue and, traditionally, municipal governments had 
encountered problems to maintain some pedestrian areas free of vendors. As a by- 
product of tl-Us collaboration, CANAZAC proposed a comprehensive strategic plan 
111 Kurl - Rosado, S. Personal Intervlew. OrrZaba. 23rd Januarv 
119 Velasco -Pagraza, NI. Personal niterview. Orizaba. 19111 j anuan- 
200 1. 
Ponce, D. (1999). "Rogeho San i ei: a falta de Empleo toleraii autoridades murucipales lýII Inigu 
ei comercio ambulante". EI, 41 de 9111 November. 
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for the city centre based on the existing participatory devices, greater quality M public 
services, and more rational governmental spenchng'9' 
CANAZAC and CANACINTRA are members of an acqwsitions committee, which 
is responsible for about five percent of all governmental spending in the state. The 
collaboration in this area has not been as successful as in commerce, for the state 
government has proposed a tax for industries and businesses of about two per cent 
of their gross income. The problem is not the tax per se, which would be used to 
grant low interest loans to businesses, bu. t the proposed administrator of the fund. 
WHe the governor wants the state government to administer it, the chambers want a 
collegiate direction' 92 . Despite this, collaboration 
between chambers and government 
is, relatively constant. Like in Le6n, the PRD administration has established a 
programme to finance soft credits to starting businesses 193 , which granted loans to 80 
small businesses in the 1998-2001 period. By the last year of the administration, 14 
per cent of the credits had been repaid (Cabrero-Mendoza et al., 2001). 
The experience of trade and industrial chambers in the three cases suggests that 
convergence is relatively easy to reach when three conditions arise: a) governmental 
lack of resources, b) the private actor's willingness to perform activities that are 
usually exclusive of government, and c) certain degree of agreement on operational 
issues. VIen collaboration in joint programmes takes place, both municipal officials 
and chambcr presidents interpret it as an expression of complementary pokics. 
Intemewed CANACO and CANACINTR-A officials argue that the obtained 
"' Dývila del Real, E. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 1511, February 2001. 
I" Ruiz - Ramirez, M. Personal interview. Zacatecas. 16til 
February 2001- 
I" Casas, 
' 
J. (1999). "Entrega Ay-untarruento Recursos Para crear 8 microempresas". E/ Sol de 
Zacate, -as, 10th November. 
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benefits are greater than the costs, especlafly in terms of saved time. Bureaucracy, 
they argue, is not as efficient as private sector companies. Municipal officials, on the 
other hand, do not usually oppose coflaborative programmes as long as, regulations 
are followed and a high level of supervision can be guaranteed. 
Conclusions 
The three case studies show high levels of interdependence between the most 
important non-governmental local actors and the municipality. The scarcity of 
resources and the political pre-eminence of local governments have been 
instrumental in the construction of shared public-private policies and programmes, as 
Cole and John (2001) argue about European cities. The municipal government 
continues to be the centre of the local political life and, as such, it can use its status 
to establish joint collaborative links with private actors, obtain benefits, and validate 
them as the result of subsidiary action. The activity of self-organised actors, on the 
other hand, does not appear to weaken or underrmne this governmental pre- 
ermnence. The three cases display patterns of governance, in the sense that the 
pooling of resources between governmental and non-governmental actors in order to 
implement and design policies in greater than in the past. Having said that, it is 
important to note that this combination of resources does not take place in all policy 
sectors but, mainly, in those vvhere the different actors' interests concur. 
In the three case studies, the policy areas , -, -here public and private actors coincide are 
mostly related to the enforcement of commercial regulations and the implementation 
of joint programmes that benefit chamber members. In a minor degree, social NGOs 
266 
have also been able to influence policy and collaborate with municipalities in 
situations of crisis or in very narrow policy sectors. Ile social NGOs performance in 
the three municipalities points at the importance of the considered policy issue to 
enable public-private Mterdependence to become co-operation. This, however, is 
coloured according to general partisan approaches in goverrm-lent. Differentlv from 
what Hernýndez-Vicenclo (2000) found in Chihuahua and Bala CaEfornia, the 
PANista government of Le6n developed, basicallý-, the same joint programmes as 
Orizaba and Zacatecas and, therefore, it cannot be proved that PAN governments 
cultivate closer relations with commercial and industrial chambers than PRI and 
PRD ones (at least among the case studies). The partisan element, however, appears 
to be more evident in the linkages established ýxqth the social NGOs. In this area, the 
relations established by the PRD administration of Zacatecas with Alianza Civica, 
and the prolonged negotiations VAth the street vendors' association suggest a greater 
disposition to become involved with autonomous social NGOs than Le6n, where 
the main exchanges with the non-governmental sector are maintained through its 
complex participator), system, described in the previous chapter, and the 
abovementioned charities taking care of persons VAth disabilities. 
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Conclusions 
Governance understandings reconsidered 
As it was explained in the introduction, this dissertation's research was ided by gul 
three main questions: a) what are the founding conceptual and empincal assumptions 
of contemporary debates about governanceý, b) what do contemporary modes and 
patterns of local governance in Mexico look hkeý, c) how useful are the resulting 
governance frameworks for understanding modes and patterns of governance in 
Mexico and how vahd are they when apphed to the Mexican pohtical systemý 
Chapter one addressed the first question focusing on governance understandings that 
are theoretical frameworks, i. e. that consider governance as an analytical tool, 
instrumental to explain government- society interactions. As a consequence, in 
chapter one I propose a group of commonalities present in the analysed governance 
understandings that formed the dissertation's theoretical framework. Having this 
framework in rnind, chapters three, four, and five dealt Xkq'th the second research 
question, mling to identify patterns of local governance in the three case studies. 
Finally, the respective chapters' conclusions, and these general conclusions, address 
the third research question on the usefulness of governance understandings to 
explain the changes analysed in the three selected municipalities. 
'11-iis final section of the dissertation, taking in consideration the findings of the 
previous chapters, argues that the basic theoretical propositions of governance 
understandings (especially m the national and sub-national level of analysis) 
constitute an adequate and useful framework to analyse the patterns of government- 
socien' interactions found in the three selected cases. This is possible not only 
for the 
268 
actual theoretical contents of the analysed frameworks (i. e. the definition of 
governance as a policy-making paradigm based on individuals' networks -John, 2001, 
and the resulting increased levels of fragmentation, blurredness, and self- 
organisation) but also because the recent contributions to governance literature have 
emphasised the importance of national and local contexts as shaping forces of 
governance patterns. In this way, governance understandings can be used to analyse 
the Mexican pohtical system and make a contribution towards the theoretical 
organisation of the increasing number of empirical studies on Mexican local 
govemments. 
Gommance as an orXanisin , gframework 
Mexican literature on local governments has increasingly dealt With some of the most Z!: ) I 
important themes of governance understandings, such as the transformation of the 
traditional roles of government and society, the implications of having more 
fragmented bureaucracies, and the dispersal of power that has been caused in some 
policy areas by the introduction of citizens' networks. In the last decade, the 
contributions made by E. Cabrero-Mendoza, V. Espinoza-Valle, R. Garcia Del 
Castillo, T. GwlI6n-L6pez, and A. Ziccardi have been instrumental in the 
development of a relevant corpus of stuches on Mexican municipalities -, -, -I-i-ich, in its 
turn, has increased the general interest over these matters. Nevertheless, these 
contributions to the academic literature have been mostly empirical, focusing on the 
development of case studies and management diagnostics that pay attention to the 
rapid changes taking place in some mutucipalities, and their implications on 
democracy and the traditional role of governments. 
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Unhke the 'Anglo-govemance' school, Mexican acaderrua lacks a Wide theoretical 
organising framework to deal with the multiple Imphcations of the increased 
participation of non-governmental actors in pohcy-making and implementation. It is 
enough to look at contributions such as Cabrero-Mendoza et A (2001) to notice the 
absence of broad and far reaching theoretical tools linking the different approaches 
and contents present in the wealth of empirical data. The basic governance 
propositions, as described in chapter one, can be instrumental in the establishment of 
common theoretical linkages among local government studies, as it was the case in 
this dissertation. 
The empirical data collected in this research was analysed follo'VNIng the 
abovementioned theoretical framework. Its four basic propositions, as it can be 
remembered, are: 
1. Gotvi-nwenl andowwwance are not a dicl)otomj. Confirming the basic argument of 
John (2001), Krahmann (2003) and Pierre and Peters (2000), Onzaba, Le6n, 
and Zacatecas can not be classified as either cases of government or 
governance. The patterns described in the previous chapters show that given 
the increased fragmentation of policy sectors, and their corresponding 
dealings IMth socletý,, is necessary to develop detailed accounts of governance 
differentiating by concrete policy areas, administrative periods, and political 
orientation of the City Council (among other variables). In the three case 
studies there are poky areas, hke the intemal administrative services, 
sanitation, local economic development, and public security, where citizens' 
netvvorks have not been incorporated in a substantial xvay to poky-making 
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processes. In this way, the three cases display patterns of strong mavors, 
emploYing traditional hierarchical command in some areas, coexisting -with 
policy sectors where networks have been incorporated as an ordinary 
procedure of pohcy design. Orizaba, Le6n, and Zacatecas are a rnixture of 
both government and governance in different degrees, as it is explained 
below. This is not only pertinent to the municipalities as a whole, but also to 
the concrete policy sectors in which there are dynan-usms of governance. In 
the three cases, direct exchanges With citizens circumventing autonomous 
social representatives, NCs, CP\X"s, citizens' councils, and joint programmes 
with commercial and industrial chambers coexist with strong mayors, and 
influential City Councfls and departmental directors. Pierre and Peters (2000) 
had already pointed out that, given that hierarchical government has not been 
replaced by policy-making through networks, all polities are hybrids of both 
government and governance practices; to what degree this is so in particular 
cases must be determined by empMcal research. 
1) In this disseiYation, goiernment and gopernance are considered as paradisms of Polig- 
,g and 
in, -pleiventation. In order to si tiýý the treatment of the conceptual , viakiii 'MP , 
difference between government and governance, this dissertation used the 
definition of John (2001), which understands governance as a 'flexible pohc), - 
making paradigm based on networks'. In this wav, it is easier to explain the Z, 
coexistence of government and governance in the same municipahties or 
pobcy sectors, as Pierre and Peters (2000) argue, the government-, governance 
nuxture can be considered as a pobcy continuum. The shift to governance, 
hovvever, imphes the use of governmental instruments and mechanisms of 
271 
interaction with society that are "qualitatively different from v, -hat \, vent on 
before" Oohn, 2001: 168). The studied municipalities show different degrees 
of the shift to govemance. Le6n is the case study that appears to be 
implementing governance mechanisms in a greater number of policy areas. 
This municipality has fragmented its bureaucracy (and its dealings vvith 
citizens) more than the other two, increasing significantly the number of 
semi-autonomous agencies and public-private planning bodies. It has the 
most complex participatory system, VAth a greater number of NCs, CP\X's 
and CCs working in more policy areas than OrIzaba and Zacatecas. Orizaba 
has reduced the capacity of NCs and CP\Vs to participate with their 
contnbutions in public senTices' funding, and its only CC is appointed, wl-ých 
means that it has limited autonomy. Zacatecas is in a similar situation to 
Orizaba, With the significant difference that, for a year, its public-private CC 
had binding powers over the Citý, Council. Nevertheless, the bureaucratic 
structure of these two municipahties remains more compact and 
subordinated to the mayor. In this way, Le6n has experienced a greater shift 
towards governance than Orizaba and Zacatecas. In order to deternune the 
exact extent to which this change has occurred, it is necessary to develop 
more sensitive indicators and elaborate more on the conceptual distinction 
bem, een government and governance, as Krahmann suggests. 
ns isation. 3. G oienjan, -e is characte ' ed bl, int-reasedfrao,, vientation, blurredness, and seýf-oraan * 
'lle introduction of nem, orks in policy-making in the case studies has 
trenerated different patterns of government-society interactions. 
Le6n, 
Orizaba, and Zacatecas have more governmental institutions than in the past, 
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a fact that, especially in Le6n, has increased fragmentation and the dispersal 
of decision-making loci. As a result of the introduction of participaton 
devices, the use of horizontal networks has increased. Innovative approaches, 
like the pooling of resources %Xqth direct beneficlanes of public sen-ices, have 
been introduced as a complement to traditional public setvice provision. 
Mayoral leadership plays a more prominent role than in the past to limit the 
duphclty of funcdons and the pohcy-incoherence resulting from 
governmental fragmentation and the incorporation of more non- 
governmental actors into policy-making. Overall, the three municipalities 
display the characteristics argued by John (2001) and Krahmann (2003) (see 
tables three, four and five) and therefore, hax, e developed dynaMisms of 
governance in different degrees. In order to sffnpliý,, I proposed that 
governance is charactensed by greater governmental fragmentation, 
blurredness between the pubhc and private spheres, and self-organisation 
among non-go-,?, ernmental actors. Chapters three, four, and five dealt v. -Ith 
these attributes of governance. 
Contexts shape localgoommance. These attributes, however, are not present in all 
policy sectors in the same way, but are shaped by the national and local 
contexts (Cole and John, 2001; Le Gales, 2002). Tl-ýs theoretical proposition 
is especially important given that early governance understandings proposed 
specific patterns or means of interaction a-,;, the defining attribute of 
govcmance. 
Rosenau and Czemplel (1992), for example, defined governance g 
as the behaviour convergence among autonomous actors adiieved in an 
environment vdiere fuH govemmental capacities were absent. More 
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significantly, the influential model of Rhodes (1995,1997) argues that 
governance is charactensed by the management of inter-organizational 
networks, which can override the states' capacities if become autonomous 
enough. Foflo', Aqng the same line of argument of Cole and John (2001) and 
John (2001), this chssertation proposes that in spite of the dynarnisms of 
governance present in the three case studies, there is not evidence of the 
formation of in ter- organiza tional networks capable of making local 
government ineffective. As the evidence discussed in chapter four shows, 
imPortant inter-organizational networks can still be influenced by local 
officials even when they cannot be controlled completely by them. 
These basic theoretical propositions constitute a useful framework to organise both 
the findings of Mexican literature and the empirical evidence. Overall, it allows 
producing differentiated accounts of local governance sensitive to national and local 
contexts, and to the way they shape governance patterns. 
The i)7.7poilance qf contexis 
The shift from government to governance in the three case studies has occurred in a 
patchy way, advancing in some pohcy sectors and not being present in others. Thus, 
Me. Xican local governments, as represented by these three urban municipalities 
governed bv different political parties, have indeed experienced a move towards the 
ordinary use of citizens' nem, orks in poky-making, but in a partial way. The sl-ýift to 
go-vernance in Mexico has not been comprehensi-ve, nor has it followed a linear 
change that could suggest a transition. On the contrary, as the case of Orizaba 
2: 4 
indicates, the power of citizens' networks over policy is reversible, as long as local 
officials are able to change the established procedures for their interaction with 
government. 
The differences in governance patterns of the three cases, and the diverse speeds and 
directions of change, can be explained by a set of variables that belong to the 
national and local contexts. Table 21a is a summary of the findings of chapter two, 
which analyses the national context conditions. BasicaDy, the studied mutUcipahties 
have shifted to governance because the compleyd 
t)7 
of the urban problems they have 
to address, the political alternation in City Councils, and the requirements of the 
LFC. In order to be able to qualiý, to branch 33 transfers, the three munIcipalities 
have implemented participatory mechanisms. They, however, are shaped by the 
particular needs of the municipalities. Le6n, having the hiLyhest need in basic urban C) 
infrastructure, has the largest NCs and CPV's system, asking neighbours to pay up to 
50 per cent of the cost of public works. Orizaba and Zacatecas, being less deficient in 
basic urbanisation services, have used their NCs and CP\X's mostly to supervise 
pubhc works and obtain information in order to le itirnise pohcy. Finally, alternation 91 j 
has played a role, for the first PANista administration of Orizaba introduced the 
Le6n model as the result of networking with other PANista municipal-ities. Zacatecas 
---l 
did the same, receiving advising from the state PRD government. Finally, Le6n 
generated its participatoty model in the earlv 1990s, during its first opposition 
administration. 
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Table 21a. Variables found to be useful to explain differences of governance 
patterns in the case studies (national context) 
Variable Observations 
Urban problems After the 1983 constitutional amendment, municipalities have been 
under the control of forced to address urban problems relying more on their own 
municipal agencies resources. The increasing complexity of these problems have reduced 
the subordination of local policy to state and national politics, 
. introducing approaches based on technical expertise and the pooling 
of resources with citizens. 'Me case studies show a varying level of 
need in their urban problems and different approaches to solve them. 
Political alternation in Partisan alternation, consolidated in the mid 1990s, has introduced 
sub-national rotation among local officials, but also alternative government 
governments projects and ground-breaking approaches to local problems. The 
most relevant innovations in citizens' participation were brought in 
by opposition administrations and have been shared by same-party 
municipalities using horizontal networking. 
Federal policies on After 1997, the LFC requires municipalities to conduct consultations 
requirements to among citizens to quahý- for federal transfers. This has promoted the 
receive transfers establishment of participatory mechanisms as NCs, CP\Vs, and 
citizens' councils. The studied municipalities differ in the degree in 
which these citizens'bodies have a say over budgets and public 
works' priorities. 
Source: own elaboration. 
Among the local variables, the political party in office, the policy area, the policv 
issue, the looseness of networks, and the procedures established for their functioning 
are especially important to explain differences in governance patterns (see table 21b). 
The political party in office detertrunes governance Patterns in a relative way, by 
comparing the possible gains of opening up policy communities to citizens' 
participation Aqth the performance of other parties' administrations. The model of 
Le6n, for example, was explicitly designed to develop a partisan differential with 
pre-, -,, lous PR1 governments. Onzaba did the same during the PANIsta 
administrations of the 1990s, but the participatoný mechanism was changed by the 
"New PRP government. FlnaUN', the first opposition government in Zacatecas 
introduced NCs and CP\N's. Policy area is also important. As it was mentioned 
before, the three murlicipalities have introduced citizens' networks in policy areas 
that have a 1-ugh legitimising potential or in great need of complementary resources. 
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It is interesting to note that the three cases have maintained, in general, rnonetarý- 
matters under the direct control and supervision of the City Council. Even in the 
cases of the budgetary capabflities of the COPL-%DEM of Le6n and the 
CODEMUN of Zacatecas, they are exercised within very strictly defined limits. The 
most innovative case of shift to governance in this area is the granting of binding 
powers to the CODEMUN of Zacatecas, for although the actual share of the 
municipal budget over which this council has decision powers is smal. 1, it has changed 
the usual line of command. 
In the same way, policy issues are important to open up pohcy-making to 
autonomous non-governmental networks. The application of commerce regulations, 
for example, has proved to be an important issue over which commercial and 
industrial chambers have agreed with local governments, establishing shared policies 
and programmes. On the other hand, pubhc security is a pohcy sector that generates 
more conffict between pubbc and private actors. Finafly, how compact pohcy 
networks are and how they participate in policy-making are important to determine 
membership and decision power. Procedures to be elected, or appointed, to a 
citizens' council, for example, determines its adNisory or deliberative character and 
thus, its level of influence. 
As a general conclusion, it can be said that the shift to governance taking place in the 
three cases is not a comprehensive change, nor has it occurred in a hnear way. The 
abovementioned variables can help to explain the differences among these cases. 
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Table 21b. Variables found to be useful to explain differences of governance 
patterns in the case studies (local contexts) 
Variable Observations 
Political party in office The general political orientation of the party in office, compared with 
other party's previous administrations, introduced new actors In the 
policy-making processes. The different parties' approach to ciry 
problems has been also Important in shaping management policies, 
including NPM and agency fragmentation, the attitude towards social 
NGOs and commercial or industrial chambers, and in the different 
styles of mayoral leadership. The three case studies show differences 
in these areas. 
Policy area Policy-making or implementation based on citizens' networks has not 
been introduced in all pohcv areas, but mainly in basic urbanisation 
services and in other sectors with high legitimising potential or in 
need of citizens' resources. The case studies display slight variations 
in the areas open to citizens' networks. 
Policy issues Pohcy-issues have been important to establish networks of 
collaboration between municipal governments and autonomous non- 
governmental actors. When the issue is considered of public interest, 
it receives support from social NGOs. The pohcy-issue has been 
instrumental to establish joint programmes and policies between 
municipalities and the commercial and industrial chambers. 
Looseness of The openness of a policy-network or community is used by the 
networks respective City Council to determine the level of Citizens' networks 
influence or degree of responsibility. 
Procedures established The case studies show different degrees of formalisation of 
for the interaction interactions of networks formed by citizens and local officials. 
between local officials Procedures are used by City Council members, and the municipal 
and citizens' networks staff, to influence decisions taken in citizens' partici atory bodies. IP 
Source: own elaboration. 
U.. 
hatber researcl) agenda 
The evidence collected in this dissertation suggests several research lines that, given 
its limited scope and dimension, could not be addressed. They are mostly related to 
the use of a more appropriate theoretical model to describe partial shifts to 
governance, the transformation of the mayoral pre-enunence, the legacies of 
corporatism and cbentehsm now that the PRI is no longer in power, the possible 
problems of accountability related to citizens' networks, and the internal dynamisms 
that explain citizens' bodies influence, among others. 
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1. Alternative theoretical models to describe padial and dýO`erenfiated shifts to governance. 
Governance understandings have been useful to analyse the Mexican case. 
However, the model of the 'shift from government to governance', being 
usually articulated in a general way, does not seem to include the possibility 
of partial and uneven shifts of pohcy-making paradigms. Moreover, the 
current use of the idea of a 'shift' does not rule out the presupposition of a 
direction of change, and thus, the idea of transition. In order to avold 
possible normative presuppositions that consider government as the 
departure point and governance as the airn of change, it is necessan, to use 
other kind of metaphors. The image of the overlapping areas of influence 
could be useful, for it acknowledges that governance is not a matter of a 
change that excludes government but, rather, that regardless of the scale of 
the shift, government and governance paradigms can be slMultaneously 
working in the same policy areas. Local governance literature would benefit 
by the development of these new metaphors that could, in turn, stimulate the 
rethinking of the conceptual difference between government and governance 
in polities where indiViduals' networks are used only in some policy sectors. 
1) 
I TI)e tranffiormation ofmayoralpre-eminence. This research 
has confirmed the pre- 
eminent place that the mayor has in Mexican local politics and in policy- 
networks. However, the need for the development of leadership styles based 
on a greater exposure to municipal staff and the general public suggests that 
this pre-en-unence is maintained at a higher cost than in the times when the 
PRJ was in power. Governance understandings suggest that the 
governmental place of importance is sustained bv the use of more resources 
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of all kinds. A specific research could address the problem, comparing 
traditional roles of the mayor with the emergent ones. 
3. The IeTacies of corporatism and clientelism. Most interviewees gave evidence to 
support the idea that the Citiýens' Dag progranune, NCs, CPWs, CCs, and 
even shared policies With local chambers were possible because a previous 
history of participation in unions and clientelistic networks. It seems that 
neighbourhood committees operate because there is a tradition on co- 
optation by local authorities, and citizens expect that their active involvement 
to make petitions to authorities is a requirement to gain access to public 
services. More research is needed to demonstrate a causal link between 
previous experiences in corporatism and clientelism, and participation in NCs 
and bodies as such. Ibis research would need to establish, in detail, the 
traditional patterns of clientelistic and corporatist interactions, and compare 
them With the existing ones in current participatory mechanisms. 
4. The possible problems of accounlabilo,. More research is needed in order to 
determine the actual level of supervision carried out by the City Councils and 
the respective local congress over concrete participatory mechanisms. It is 
necessary to research the usefulness of current regulations, the jntensltý, of 
contacts between members of CCs and City Councils, and the possible 
tensions arising as a consequence. 
5. The leiel of arillal influence qf CCs olerpoliýi,. This dissertadon used aggregated 
data, nev, -spapers, official reports, and intemevvs to trace the influence of 
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citizens' bodies over policy-making. Nevertheless, it is necessary to conduct 
long periods of participant obsenation, and maintain detailed records about 
citizens' proposals and the actual policy results in order to clariý, this process. 
'11iis could be important to learn the 1nternal dynanusms that explaln c1tizens' 
influence in conditions of governance. 
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Methodological appendix 
The intention of this appendix on methodological issues is to discuss brieffi, the 
criteria used in the selection of the general research approach and the interviewees, 
and point at some problems in information gathering that emerged during the 
fieldwork. These brief considerations could be useful for the assessment of the 
dissertation's scope and its implications on governance understandings. 
Qualitative Research 
As it was mentioned in the introduction and general conclusions, the main objective 
of the research is to establish how useful is the analysed corpus of literature to 
understand emergent governance trends in the three studied municipalities. It seeks 
to make a contribution to the differentiated accounts on local governance that 
emphasise local and national contexts as explanatory factors for the variation in 
governance patterns. The general structure of the dissertation follows the usual 
sequence of theorý,, presentation of empirical evidence, and theory revisited. This 
comparison, nevertheless, was to be based on variables that cannot be easily 
measured. Chapters three, four, and five, made use of hard data to support their 
respective arguments. Fragmentation was measured by the number of governmental 
agencies, especially the serru-autonomous ones and the number of inteniews or 
public audiences granted by local officials. Blurredness was approached by making 
cross-reterences to the number of NCs, CPXX's, and citizens' councils, their legal 
capabilities, and the municipal or federal funds used in the implementation of their 
decisions or directly managed by them. Finafly, self-organ-isation used the relative 
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weight in the local economies of the respective economic activities represented by 
the commercial and industrial chambers. 
Nevertheless, i en that the figures employed in this thesis indicated only general giv 
interaction patterns, it became apparent at the beginning of the research that the use 
of other sources was also necessary, like secondary literature, including local 
newspapers, and, decisiVely, the intenriew of local elites. As a result, I decided to 
approach the problem of local governance in the three case studies using qualitative 
methods. Making a comparison between governance theoretical understandings and 
the Mexican municipahties required detafled descriPtions on how interrelations take 
place. Full descriptions, in their turn, necessitated in-depth interviexvs to obtain 
information that is not normally reachable through structured sun, eys or published 
official reports (Cf Ruiz-Olabu6naga and Ispizua, 1989). 'I'lie research results 
presented in this thesis are the product of the combination of these different sources 
of information although, in general, the hard data were considered the standard 
against whých interviewees' opinions were compared. 
The main qualitative tools of analysis used in the collected information were those of 
Vounded theory. Both relevant documents (mainly municipal reports) and intervlc%xl 
transcripts or notes were treated as texts. The intenTiews that were considered 
especially important were recorded in audiotape (15 out of 40 Inter-\-Ie, \N-s and 
personal communications) and full transcripts were produced. Once transcripts and 
notes were ready, a first review of the texts Nvas conducted. The first survey of the 
information catalogued it in four main analytical categories, whicli followed the 
general order of the questions: a) differences in governing styles according to pobtical 
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party, b) governmental policies aimed at fragmenting bureaucratic structures or 
procedures, c) examples of serr-ý-corporatist or clientelistic practices, and d) examples 
of pubhc-private coRaboration that do not comprorruse the non-govemmental 
actor's autonomy. A second analysis organised the texts in a more detailed way, in 
three classifications that became the basis of the empirical chapters: a) fragmentation 
policies in government, b) blurredness in participation devices and c) coHaboration 
over shared policles. These categories were additionally subdivided according to the 
case to which accounts were applied (Le6n, Orizaba, Zacatecas, the corresponding 
state, or the general conditions of the Mexican political system). In the end, despite 
my initial scepticism about the value of the partisan factor in government, it was 
maintained as a means to explain governance differences in the three cases, albeit in 
the relative way explained in the previous, chapters. 
The objective of grounded theory techniques is to identiýý patterns among analytical 
categories and elaborate proNrisional explanations, which can be tested subsequently 
(Bernard et al., 1985). In the case of this dissertation, I considered patterns of 
governance as the dependent variable, while the political party in office, the structure 
of local governments, the policy sectors in which networks operate, their degree of 
looseness, and the procedures estabhshed for their functioning were treated as 
independent variables. 'Fhe general argurnentý as it was explained in both the general 
introduction and conclusions, is based on this relationship that is indicated by the 
collected evidence. Further research, however, is needed to quantitatively measure 
the argued hnkage bet%-,, een dependent and independent variables. Having said d-us, it 
is important to note that I was not attempting to develop a theoretical model to 
explain Mexican local governance as a whole, but on]v to propose explanations for 
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the variations present in the case studies and suggest hypotheses to be researched in 
the future in other Mexican regions. Mexican rural municipalities, for example, 
display governance patterns that could show that the results of this research are 
inadequate for their cases. 
Documenlal anaylsis 
Most of the documental sources were primary: annual reports of the murUcipahties 
and commerce or industrial chambers, documents for internal circulation, policy- 
papers, and the official reports from federal agencies dealing Vnth transfers to 
municipalities. The case studies presented by Cabrero-Mendoza (1996,1998 and 
others); Conde-Bonfil (1998); Guill6n-L6pez (1996,1998), Rodriguez and \X"ard 
(1991); Ward (1998,1998a); Ziccardi (1995); and Ziccardi and Saltalamacchia (1997) 
were used to complement information provided by the respondents when it was 
necessarý,. These contributions were also considered as an initial reading list to search 
for acaden-uc studies on the three munIcipalities. Le6n has been the most studied 
municipal. ity of die three cases, "th at least four substantial contributions analysing 
its participation system, and the NPM policies implemented during the PANista 
administrations (Bazdresch-Parada, 2002; Cabrero-Mendoza, 1999b; Negrete, 2002, 
and Santos-Zavala, 1999). By comparison, Orizaba and Zacatecas are practicaUy 
absent from the academic hterature. Ile second PANista administration in Onzaba 
has a research report on its management impro-vements (Velýzquez-Garcia, 1999), 
and Zacatecas has another focusing on the reforn-iss of the law of citizens' 
participation that took place in the last four years (Guerrero and Gn-J, 2004). This is 
explained, in part, by the municipalities' scales of influence. Le6n has a national 
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reputation, wHe Onzaba and Zacatecas are ffnportant at regional level. More 
sivnificantly, most of the pubhcations deahng With Le6n have been originated in the 
Centro de Investigacl6n y Docencla Econ6n-ucas (CIDE), which has a prestigious 
research centre of local governments that publishes a considerable amount of 
research papers and books per year. Orizaba and Zacatecas, on the other hand, have 
not been systematicaUy studied by re ional research centres which, m any case, 91 
usually have lower publishing rates than centres in Mexico City. 
The case studies keep records that, in general, are regarded as reliable by 
interviewees. Nevertheless, they tend to be fragmentary and inconsistent if compared 
with federal aggregates. This was especially problematic in the tables of chapter four 
deahng With amounts of transfers administered by CP\X, s. Most of the figures shown 
are reconstructions based on other sources, indicated in the respective table. 
INAFED (2002 and 2003a) and INEGI (2002) were particularly difficult, for most of 
their reported amounts appear to be provisional, despite that the %X'ebPages do not 
state that explicifly. This is explained by the ti-me-gap between the approval of the 
municipalities' expenses reports by the local congresses, and the reception of the 
official information in the central office of INEGI. This office does not receive 
financial reports from mumcipahties directly, but through ad hoc information 
exchange agreements Vnth the different states. If the infon-nation has been already 
released by the local congress (that is, if the annual expenditure reports have been 
approved and no mismanagement has been found) then the requested information is 
given to INEGI. If that is not the case, INEGI has to apply 
for it to the local 
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94. 
congress, and then only general aggregates are released' As a result, it is usual that 
the financial information is published by INEGI With a two or three year delay. 
Tbus, tables in the dissertation are updated until 2002. 
In the case of newspapers, it was possible to make a systematic search in the three 
cases for information corroborating or questioning the information received in 
interviews. However, Orizaba is the only city with ak gine Veb Page with a search en. 
that brings together most local newspapers' articles. In the cases of Le6n and 
Zacatecas, it was necessarN, to make a manual search in the national newspaper 
arch-ives (Hemeroteca Na(7'onaý. In practice, most of the relevant information, especialh, 
on amounts spent in public services, was published in the previous months to local 
elections, during the initial or final weeks of the administrations and in the months in 
which the particular mayor presented his annual report to the Cit: y Council. 
Elite interriewiq 
The selection of interviewees followed the cnteria set out in Stedward (1997) and 
Babbie (1992), trying to obtain intemews vAth persons with a privileged position 
because their appointments in government or NGOs and their access to information. 
In most cases, interviewing them -\vas the only means to obtain information that in 
the official reports , -,, Tas inconsistent or absent. In this way, technical staff was 
preferred as source of information related to procedural or financial matters, wMe 
poLiticians xvere questioned on policy pnonties. Vhen it , vas neccssatý, to obtain 
information on more than one municipabty, state and federal actors were chosen. All 
194 Padilla - Teleda, NI. del C. Personal commurucation. 2cid, %ugust 2()()2. 
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respondents were offered the opporruniti- of confidendahty and/or anonvrMtv in the 
report of the research results, which was declined in all cases. I also asked their 
exphClt authonsation to quote them. It appears that the fact that the PhD researcher 
belonged to a foreign university was instrumental in securing access to them. 
Regarding the translations of the interview quotations, they were made in the 
simplest terms. In the case of problematic words or expressions, the original Spanish 
term is provided between brackets [ ]. Finally, as Bernard et al. (1985) argue, 
interviews are an accurate tool if the objective is to know states of rrund, but not so 
for "external beha, %qour". In order to go around the problem of accuracy of 
informants, it was usual to make cross-references between inten-iewees and 
published records. Discrepancies were annotated in the corresponding table or 
chapter. In this way, any possible problems With the research validity and reliability 
are within acceptable limits for qualitative research (Yin, 1994). Table 22' is a list of 
interviewees with their corresponding posts and dates in which intemews were 
conducted: 
Table 22. List of interviewees and their appointments 
No. Name Position Date of 
interview 
Alvarado-Morales, jes6s. Director of the 19t" December 
Department of Social 2001 
Development in the 
Municipality of OriZaba 
(2000-2004). OnZaba. 
H6ctor. Professor. Department of 2 Ainezcua 8th February , Sociology, University of 
Veracruz [UMVersidad 
Veracruzana]. -Xalapa. 
3 Barragin-Montoya, Francisco. Department director of the 141h Februan- 
State Centre for Municipal 2001. 
Development [Centro 
Estatal de Desarrollo 
288 
Municipal]. Zacatecas. 
4 Bassols, Mario. Professor. Metropohtan Februan-, 1999. 
Autonomous Umversity 
[Universidad Autonoma 
Metropohtana] Mexico 
citýT. 
5 Brisefio, Francisco. PAN local deputV (2001- 25til August and 
2003), former director of 4th September 
the Department of Social 1998; and I-"', 
Development in the and 19tlýJanuarý, 
OriZaba Municipality 2001. 
(1998-2000), former 
trustee (1995-1997). 
OnZaba. 
6 Cad6, Yolanda. journalist of EIAlundo de 
Oiiýqba. OnZaba. 
1 OtI, January 
2001. 
Conde, Luis E. Official of the Department 10t'ý anuary 
of Social Development In 2002 
the Municipality of Le6n 
(2000-2003). Le6n. 
8 Cruz -AreUano, Ezeqwel. President of the Municipal 
2nd February 
Branch of the PRI in 2001. 
OnZaba. OrIZaba. 
9 Cuahua, Juan. President of Section 2,376 17til January 
of the PRI. OrlZaba. 2002. 
10 Dývila del Real, Enrique. President of the National 1511, February 
Chamber of Commerce in 2001. 
Zacatecas (CANAZAC) 
[Cimara NaciOnal de 
ComerciO Delegac16n 
Zacatecas]; PRI pre- 
candidate for mayor. 
Zacatecas. 
Dulowich, Susana. journalist and TV 
presenter. Orizaba. 
1911, J anuarý 
21001. 
1 Escudero - Stadelmann, 
Angel. Former mayor of Onzaba 1811, J anuary 
(1998-2000). OriZaba. 2001. 
13 Espinoza de los Monteros, Irma. Chief of Block, President 20th December 
of the NC at the 2001, and 14th 
CAN- A C7NTRA-(? jo de February 2003. 
, gua neighbourhood, 
A 
member of the 
CODEMUN. OnZaba- 
14 GoYtia-Robles, Pedro. Mayor of Zacatecas (1998- 
2001 admiriistration). 
Zacatecas. 
16t" February 
2001. 
15 Guerrero, I loracio. General Director, Institute 1-2", Februan, 
of Municipal Planning of 2001. 
Le6n (IMPI-NN) [Instituto 
Municipal de Planeac16n]. 
Le6n. 
16 Herrera, Gonzalo. Department of 9thNlay 2003. 
State Orp, nisation , 
2,89 
Committee of the National 
Action Party (PAN) 
(Personal communication). 
Xalapa. 
17 uýrez-Alfaro, Maria del Consuelo. PRD alderwoman, former thjanuary 2002. 
member of the 
CODEMUN (1998-2001). 
Zacatecas. 
18 Kuri-Rosado, Sergio. President of the National 3rdjanuarýy 
Chamber of Commerce 2001. 
and Services of Tourisrn, 
Onzaba's local office 
(CANACO-SERV'i-fUR) 
[CAniara Nacional de 
Comercio y Servicios 
Turisticos] Onzaba. 
19 Medina-Lizalde, j os6 Luis. President of the State W11 February 
Executive Committee of 2001. 
the PRD. Zacatecas. 
20 Morales-Falc6n, Pablo. Director of the 1 Ot', February 
Department of Public 2003. 
Relations in the 
municipality of OrIZaba 
(2001-2004). OMaba. 
21 Mufioz-L6pez, Adriana. Director of the department 19t'ý February 
of Citizens' Service 2001. 
[Atenc16n ClUdadana] in 
the Municipality of Le6n 
(2000-2003) Le6n. 
Navarro-Bafiuelos, Eladio. Director of the State 15th February 
Comnussion of Human 2001. 
Rights (CEDHZAC) 
[Cornisi6n Estatal de 
Derechos Humanos de 
Zacatecas] Zacatecas. 
23 Ortiz, Oscar. Director, Directorate of January 2002, 
Social Management. and 14th 
Department of Social February 2003 
Management and Citizens' (the latter via 
Participation Pirecci6n de telephone). 
Gesti6n Social y 
Participaci6n ClUdadana]. 
Municipality of Zacatecas 
(2001-2004) Zacatecas. 
24 Osegueda-Cruz, Alfonso. Director of the "Heriberto 8th February 
jara" Centre for Municipal 2001. 
ervIices [Centro de 
"; er-, 71CIOS Municipales 
Heriberto jara A. C. ] 
CESEI\1 -VER). Xalapa. 
25 Padilla-Telecla, Maria del Carmen. Customer sen-ices. 2-1 August -1002. 
I\Iumcipal System of 
Databases [Sistema 
9 
Mumcipal de Bases de 
Datos] (SIMBAD). 
National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography, and 
Informatics Rnstituto 
Nacional de Estadistica, 
Geografia e Inforrnitica] 
(INEGI) (Personal 
connnutUCation). 
Aguascalientes. 
26 P6rez-Franco, Aminadab. President of the Adolfo 1 9t', January 
Christlieb Tbarrola 2005. 
Association. Mexico City. 
27 Ramirez, Angeles. General co-ordinator of January 
Neighbourhood 2002. 
Committees. Department 
of Social Development. 
Mumcipahty of Le6n 
(2000-2003). Le6n. 
28 Rodriguez, HAda. National Chamber of 28th Nlaý- 2003. 
Conunerce and Services, 
Le6n's local office 
(CANACO) [Cimara 
Nacional. de Comercio y 
SenliCios]. Le6n. 
29 Ruiz-Ramirez, Miguel. President of the National 
Chamber of the lndustrý, 
of Transformation, 
Zacatecas branch [Cýmara 
NaciOnal. de la Industria de 
1611ý February 
2001. 
la Transforrmcl6n] 
(CANACIN'ER-A). 
Zacatecas. 
1) 30 Sýnz-Guraieb, Gerardo. President of the Civic -3 Id j anuary 
Association for the Integral 2001. 
Development of the 
C6rdoba-OnZaba Region 
Pesarrollo Integral de la 
Reg16n C6rdoba-Or1Zaba, 
A. C. ] (DIRCO). OriZaba- 
31 Torres, j esds. Roman Catholic priest. 17 th j anuary 
Our Lady of Guadalupe 2001. 
Parish. Pastoral vicar for 
the Diocese of OnZaba. 
OnZaba. 
)2 Trueba-Graciýý Tornis. Former mavor of OnZ. aba 411, September 
(1995-1997). OnZaba. NB- 1998. 
33 Vanegas, Eduardo. Director of Political 8til Januan- 2002. 
Studies, State Executive 
CoMMIttee of the PAN 
[Capacitaci6n; CoMIt6 
Ejecutivo Estatal del 
PAN]. Zacatecas. 
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34 Vega-Marin, jos6 Oscar. Executive director of the 131h February 
Association of 2001. 
Municipalities of Mexico 
[Asociaci6n de Municipios 
de M6XICo, A. C. ] Mexico 
City. 
35 Velasco-Pagaza, Mauricio. President of the National 1911, 
- 
January 
Chamber of the Industry 2001. 
of Transformation, 
OriZaba branch [Cýmara 
NaciOnal de la Industria de 
la Transformac16n] 
(CANACINTRA). 
Onzaba. 
As it can be seen, there are considerably more interviewees from Onzaba than from 
the other two (15). This is the result of some circumstances of the research. In the 
first place, the interviews were initiated in that city. For that reason, manv of the 
interviews conducted in January and February 2001 were exploratory, requiring long 
sessions that sometimes had to be continued in a second or third inteniew (as in the 
case of F. Brisefic, and 1. Espinoza de los Monteros). Additionally, this was the city in 
which I had previously made research for my Master's Degree, which ensured an 
easy access to other officials that, at the time, were considered relevant. In the end, 
not all the interviews of that city were important for the argument's design. 
Nevertheless, they were included for they abound in procedural descriptions. In 
order to correct the possible bias, I augmented the number of interviewees from 
state and federal institutions, focusing on patterns common to most municipalities. 
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